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ABSTRACT 
Unhealthy behaviour often entails short-term indulgence at the expense of 
long-term health. This thesis examines an hypothesis that temporal discounting, a 
measure of the extent to which a person devalues delayed benefit, predicts unhealthy 
behaviour. The work also evaluates temporal discounting as a psychological model 
for unhealthy behaviour, in particular unhealthy behaviour that is enacted in spite of 
healthy goals, and behaviour with painful consequences. Studies examining 
relationships between temporal discounting and health behaviour are systematically 
reviewed, with the finding that discounting of reward correlates with many forms of 
appetitive unhealthy behaviour. It is proposed that while steep discounting 
predisposes to unhealthy behaviour, goal-incongruent behaviour is better explained by 
the interfering effect of prelearned or innate values. Also, conventional discounting 
fails to account for the fact that many people prefer to expedite inevitable pain or 
illness. An explanation is that people dislike waiting for pain, termed ‘dread’. The 
empirical work of this thesis establishes how dread depends on delay, by asking 
participants to titrate the timing and severity of their own pain or that of others. For 
the average participant, the dread of pain accumulated at a decreasing rate as pain was 
delayed. Dread was found to be less marked when deciding on behalf of socially close 
others. Unexpectedly a tendency to dread future pain in one-off choices did not 
predict saving a budget of pain relief in sequential choices. Further experiments 
examined social discounting for pain, finding that participants appear more averse to 
causing pain in others than in themselves, a tendency that is discounted with social 
distance. Conclusions are that temporal discounting of reward is a promising marker 
of appetitive unhealthy behaviour, with a considerable evidence base, while dread 
offers a candidate marker for engagement in health-promoting behaviour with painful 
consequences, a possibility which demands further investigation.  
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1.  
INTRODUCTION 
“The mind has great influence over the body, and maladies often have their origin 
there.”  
 
 Molière – l’Amour Medecin (1665) 	  
 
In the United States in 1900 pneumonia, tuberculosis and gastrointestinal 
infection were the chief causes of mortality, together responsible for one third of all 
deaths (Department of Commerce and Labor, 1906); by 1997 these were replaced by 
heart disease, cancer and stroke, together responsible for almost two-thirds of all 
deaths (Hoyert, Kochanek, & Murphy, 1999). The fraction of total mortality 
attributable to non-communicable disease is projected to increase further over the first 
quarter of the twenty-first century, placing unsustainable demands on existing 
healthcare systems (R. Smith, Corrigan, & Exeter, 2012). A substantial proportion of 
non-communicable disease results from particular behaviour patterns, for example it 
is estimated that close to a fifth of all deaths in the US in the year 2005 were 
attributable to tobacco smoking, while physical inactivity and obesity were each 
responsible for nearly a tenth of all deaths over the same period (Danaei et al., 2009), 
and reducing the prevalence of these behaviours is therefore crucial to reducing the 
burden of non-communicable disease. However, the determinants of unhealthy 
behaviour remain poorly understood, and have only become a focus of research in 
recent decades (Conner & Norman, 2005a). 
The current dissertation proposes that understanding the reasons why people 
engage in unhealthy behaviour will assist the preventive effort. Existing research in 
health psychology has also adopted this view (Adler & Matthews, 1994; Armitage & 
Conner, 2000; Baum & Posluszny, 1999; Conner & Norman, 2005a), though the 
prevailing models of health behaviour require updating in light of recent advances in 
the behavioural sciences. In particular, formal descriptions of how human decision-
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making diverges from classical economic notions of rationality, collectively referred 
to as behavioural economics (Camerer et al., 2005; Camerer, Loewenstein, & Rabin, 
2004; Glimcher & Rustichini, 2004; Sanfey et al., 2006), offer a promising means to 
understand why people often make unhealthy choices despite knowing that such 
choices are unwise and planning to behave more healthily. The current work aims to 
characterise individual differences in health-related decision-making using tools 
derived from behavioural economics.   
The primary focus of the work is on personal health decisions, such as deciding 
whether to smoke a cigarette, whether to attend a potentially unpleasant cancer 
screening appointment, or how to consume a budget for spending on one’s health. By 
examining radically simplified versions of these choices presented to experimental 
participants, I construct models of the underlying psychological processes, in the hope 
that these models will yield parameters capable of predicting a person’s real-world 
health-related choices. A secondary focus concerns whether people behave differently 
when making decisions regarding other peoples’ health, a task facing health care 
professionals and policy-makers, in the hope that understanding such differences 
might assist in improving shared decision making in clinical practice. This aspect of 
the work also addresses a theoretical parallel between psychological processes 
involved in evaluating our own long-term wellbeing and those involved in evaluating 
the wellbeing of others.  
 
1.1 HEALTH BEHAVIOUR 
 	  
All behaviour might be said to influence health in some way. However, for the 
sake of parsimony, researchers have tended to focus on a set of easily defined 
behaviours that are known to be beneficial or deleterious to health. Frequently studied 
health-promoting behaviours include exercise participation, healthy eating, attendance 
for screening procedures or immunisations, and concordance with recommended 
medication. Frequently studied harmful behaviours include tobacco smoking, 
excessive alcohol intake, unhealthy eating, illicit substance misuse, and risky sexual 
practices (Ogden, 2012). Behaviours in either category could easily belong to the 
opposite category by defining them in terms of their absence; therefore I will use the 
term ‘health behaviour’ to the behaviours above, irrespective of valence. This usage 
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differs from existing definitions, which refer specifically to behaviour beneficial to 
health. For example, Conner and Norman define health behaviour broadly as “Any 
activity undertaken for the purpose of preventing or detecting disease or for 
improving health and well-being” (Conner & Norman, 2005b, p2). 
 
1.2 PREDICTING HEALTH BEHAVIOUR 	  
Demographic factors are known to influence engagement in health behaviours. 
For example, young age, high levels of education, and high levels of social support 
are associated with health-promoting behaviours (Ford et al., 1991; C. E. Ross & Wu, 
1995), while lower socioeconomic status is associated with harmful behaviours such 
as smoking, alcohol excess and substance abuse (Allgöwer, Wardle, & Steptoe, 2001; 
Baum, Garofalo, & Yali, 1999; Lynch, Kaplan, & Salonen, 1997; Steptoe, Wardle, 
Pollard, Canaan, & Davies, 1996; Van Oers, Bongers, Van de Goor, & Garretsen, 
1999). Unsurprisingly, however demographic data cannot explain all variability in 
health behaviour; that is individuals from similar backgrounds nevertheless differ in 
their behaviour (Cummings et al., 1980). As a result over the last three to four 
decades researchers have attempted to measure the more proximate antecedents of 
behaviour, in the form of individual cognition, with the aim of improving our ability 
to predict health behaviour (Conner & Norman, 2005b), and thereby allowing 
interventions to be directed towards at-risk groups.  
The most widely used models for understanding the psychological 
determinants of health behaviour are the social cognition models (SCMs) (Fiske & 
Taylor, 2013), which have been widely influential in health psychology and have 
influenced the design of behaviour change interventions (Conner & Norman, 2005b). 
Earlier SCMs, such as the Health Belief Model (HBM) (Rosenstock, 1974) and 
Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) (R. W. Rogers, 1975) are primarily concerned 
with the individual as a thinker; thoughts are seen to follow on from perception and to 
precede behaviour, and are accessed by asking people to report their beliefs explicitly. 
The Health Belief Model for example, proposes that the key determinants of health 
behaviour are beliefs about the threat posed by illness and about the relative benefits 
of and barriers to performing the behaviour, and originated from attempts by US 
public health researchers to improve the effectiveness of health education 
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programmes. In an early demonstration of this Hochbaum (1958) found that 
attendance for chest X-ray screening to detect tuberculosis showed a relationship with 
perceived susceptibility to tuberculosis, and a belief that the disease could be 
asymptomatic. Haefner (1974) went on to show that providing health education which 
aimed to increase perceived susceptibility, perceived severity and anticipated benefits, 
resulted in a greater number of routine visits to the doctor over the following months 
in the intervention group compared with the control group.  
The SCMs as a whole are reasonable predictors of the intention to engage in 
health behaviours. For example Milne, Sheeran, and Orbell (2000) report small to 
medium associations between constructs of PMT and health intentions (|r+|=0.10-
0.34; r+ represents the average Pearson correlation coefficient, r, across studies 
weighted by sample size). However, meta-analysis has shown that the intention to 
perform health behaviour explains less than half of the variance in behaviour itself 
(Sheeran, 2002; Webb & Sheeran, 2006). For example, in an analysis of 47 studies 
Webb and Sheeran (2006) showed that behaviour change interventions which had a 
medium-to-large effect on intention (d+ = 0.66, 95% confidence interval [0.51 to 
0.82]; d+ represents the weighted average Cohen’s d, a measure of effect size, see 
Cohen, 1992) had only a small-to-medium effect on behaviour (d+ = 0.36, 95% 
confidence interval [0.22 to 0.50]). Consistent with this the SCMs show weaker 
correlations with health behaviour itself, and are particularly challenged to predict 
behaviour prospectively. For example, in meta-analysis average correlations between 
HBM constructs and health behaviour are weak  (Pearson’s r = 0.15, 0.08, 0.13 and 
0.21 for susceptibility, severity, benefits and barriers respectively (Harrison, Mullen, 
& Green, 1992); and associations between PMT constructs (R. W. Rogers, 1975) and 
future engagement in health behaviours such as condom use, attendance at cancer 
screening or smoking cessation are either low or non-significant (J. Cohen, 1992; 
Milne et al., 2000).  
Consistent with the explanatory gap between health intentions and behaviour, the 
theoretical structure of the earlier SCMs does little to incorporate the fact that our 
behaviour does not always correspond to our declared goals (Ainslie, 2001; Allan, 
Johnston, & Campbell, 2010; Bargh, 1992; Nosek, Hawkins, & Frazier, 2012; Read & 
Van Leeuwen, 1998). Notably more recent social-cognition models, such as the 
Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen, 1991) and Implementation Intentions 
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(Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006) have attempted to address this. A further limitation of 
the SCMs is that they tend to lack a specification for the mechanisms linking the 
constructs, which are treated as independent variables (Conner & Norman, 2005a, 
2005b). Finally the constructs of the SCMs are measured through self-report, making 
them susceptible to self-presentation biases, or peoples’ motivation to conform to the 
implicit requirements of the survey (Sheeran & Orbell, 1996). Recent advances in 
decision-making psychology and neuroscience provide alternative or complementary 
approaches with the potential to address some of these limitations.  
 
1.3  BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS  	  
In recent years there has been a growing interest in understanding human 
decision-making from an information processing perspective (Camerer, Loewenstein, 
& Prelec, 2005; Dayan, 2012; Dayan & Balleine, 2002; R. J. Dolan & Dayan, 2013; 
Glimcher, 2004; Glimcher, Dorris, & Bayer, 2005; Glimcher & Rustichini, 2004; 
Montague, Dolan, Friston, & Dayan, 2012; Rangel, Camerer, & Montague, 2008; 
Sanfey, Loewenstein, McClure, & Cohen, 2006). This endeavour has seen a 
confluence between the fields of economics, psychology, and behavioural 
neuroscience, giving rise to the fields of behavioural economics and neuroeconomics 
(Camerer et al., 2005; Camerer, Loewenstein, & Rabin, 2004; Glimcher & Rustichini, 
2004; Sanfey et al., 2006).  
 
1.3.1 CHOICES, PREFERENCES AND UTILITIES 
 
While the social cognitive approach described above aims to access mental 
processes directly through self-report, economists have historically tended to take 
choice behaviour as their starting point. In the first half of the twentieth century a 
group of economists referred to as the neo-classical school began to formalise 
mathematical notions of rational choice (see for example Debreu, 1991; Samuelson, 
1937), laying down axioms which if followed would lead to internally consistent 
choices. Rather than seeking to describe how people actually behave, the resulting 
models of behaviour focussed on how individuals could make the best possible 
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decisions (Baron, 2000). A key principle of this approach is that choosing an 
alternative is said to reveal preference for that alternative (Houthakker, 1950; Sen, 
1971). To take a health-related example, if a consumer of health-care opts for elective 
surgery over management with Medicine A, they are said to prefer surgery to 
Medicine A.  
Neo-classical economists also derived sets of axioms for how agents should 
best choose between outcomes that are uncertain, or delayed in time (Von Neumann 
& Morgenstern, 1944; Samuelson, 1937). These theories explain preferences by 
assuming that decision-makers choose as if to maximise an unobservable internal 
quantity termed utility, related to the objective value of outcomes by a continuous 
function, the utility function. For neo-classical economists, preferences and utilities 
were unobservable quantities, existing only in theory, However the subsequent 
emergence of behavioural economics helped to lay the foundations for using the 
concepts of utility and preference to study the psychological antecedents of choice in 
their own right (Glimcher, Camerer, Fehr, & Poldrack, 2009).  
 
1.3.2 IRRATIONALITY  
  
 The field of behavioural economics arose out of a series of observations over 
the latter half of the twentieth century showing that human decision-makers violate 
the axiomatic assumptions of the neo-classical models (Camerer & Loewenstein, 
2004; Camerer et al., 2005; Camerer et al., 2004; Glimcher et al., 2009; Kahneman & 
Tversky, 2000). In each case, to account for these ‘irrational’ deviations from 
normative theory, behavioural economists introduced new descriptive theories. For 
example, expected utility theory (EUT) states that rational decision-makers should 
compute the value of a risky gamble by weighting the utility of each outcome by its 
probability of occurrence (Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). However, by 
offering participants choices between structured gambles, Kahneman and Tversky 
illustrated that humans deviate from EUT, displaying systematic biases in the 
interpretation of stated probabilities, which were taken as the basis for their Prospect 
Theory, a descriptive theory of risk preference (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  
Behavioural economic research has also revealed biases in how people select 
actions (Kahneman & Tversky, 2000). For example people show a tendency to choose 
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pre-selected ‘default’ options (Choi, Laibson, Madrian, & Metrick, 2004; Kahneman, 
Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991), and often use convenient rules of thumb, termed heuristics, 
to make potentially complex decisions, such as choosing how much money to save for 
retirement (Benartzi & Thaler, 2007; Gigerenzer, 2008; Gigerenzer, Hertwig, & 
Pachur, 2011). Similarly, studies have demonstrated that relatively subtle changes in 
how an option is described, for example as a gain in reward from a low baseline 
versus a loss from a high baseline, can sometimes have a marked effect on preference, 
leading to a set of effects collectively referred to as framing (Kahneman & Tversky, 
2000; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). These deviations from neo-classical notions of 
rationality provided behavioural economists with the building blocks for a new 
psychologically grounded theory of decision-making. The leap of faith required was 
to go beyond the as if, and to consider the behavioural economic theories as 
hypotheses for how humans process information to arrive to a decision (Camerer et 
al., 2005; Glimcher et al., 2009; Glimcher & Rustichini, 2004). 
Several behavioural and neuro- economic approaches evoke multiple 
psychological (or neural) systems for decision-making as a means to account for 
observed deviations from optimality (e.g. Angeletos, Laibson, Repetto, Tobacman, & 
Weinberg, 2001; Kahneman, 2011; Loewenstein, 1996; Loewenstein & O'Donoghue, 
2004; McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein, & Cohen, 2004). These models reflect a long 
tradition in psychology, which pre-dates behavioural economics, of distinguishing 
between fast, automatic and slower, controlled or deliberative information processing 
(Bargh, 1992; Hofmann, Friese, & Strack, 2009; Schneider & Chein, 2003; Schneider 
& Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977; E. R. Smith & DeCoster, 2000; 
Tiffany, 1990), or between emotionally laden, so-called ‘hot’ states and more 
seemingly rational, ‘cold’ states (Chapman, 2005; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999). Such 
models are useful in so far as they acknowledge, unlike some of the social cognitive 
models discussed above, that human behaviour is not exclusively preceded by a 
deliberative weighing-up of information.  
 
1.4  BEHAVIOURAL HEALTH ECONOMICS 	  
Within the behavioural economic tradition described there is now a growing 
endeavour to identify decision-making phenotypes which correlate with maladaptive 
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behaviour (Montague et al., 2012; Bickel et al., 2007; Burks, Carpenter, Götte, & 
Rustichini, 2012). In particular, behavioural economic measures offer new tools with 
which to attempt to predict health behaviour (Vlaev & Darzi, 2012). For example, in a 
sample of 1094 adults, L. R. Anderson and Mellor (2008) find significant negative 
relationships between individual risk aversion and health behaviours (including 
cigarette smoking, heavy drinking and being overweight or obese), after controlling 
for demographic characteristics. Furthermore, a new interventional science based on 
behavioural economic principles attempts to change (or ‘Nudge’) behaviour by 
exploiting commonly exhibited biases and heuristics (Thaler & Benartzi, 2004; Thaler 
& Sunstein, 2008). A recent example is the MINDSPACE framework, a policy tool 
commissioned by the UK government to assist civil servants in increasing the 
behavioural impact of their policy interventions (P. Dolan et al., 2012; P. Dolan, 
Hallsworth, Halpern, King, & Vlaev, 2009; King, Greaves, Vlaev, & Darzi, 2013).  
Behavioural economic models have the potential to address some of the 
shortcomings of the social cognitive models of health behaviour described above; for 
example they emphasise choice-based methods of eliciting value, which are less 
vulnerable to self-presentation effects than subjective report. Also, behavioural 
economic approaches acknowledge that humans often make inconsistent choices, 
providing a starting point for addressing intention-action discrepancies. Finally, the 
economic approach brings with it mathematical formalism, which requires researchers 
to be more explicit about their underlying assumptions.  
 
1.5 TEMPORAL DISCOUNTING AS A MARKER OF UNHEALTHY CHOICE 
 
The current dissertation seeks primarily to critically appraise one behavioural 
economic tool, the individual measurement of ‘temporal discounting’, as a model for 
predicting and understanding apparently shortsighted personal health choice. Given a 
choice, people tend to prefer immediate over delayed rewards, for example preferring 
to receive $10 today rather than $15 a month from today. This implies that people 
assign lower utility to delayed rewards relative to more immediate ones, a 
phenomenon referred to as temporal discounting, for the reason that delayed reward is 
discounted (Samuelson, 1937, for reviews see Frederick, Loewenstein, & 
O'Donoghue, 2002; Kalenscher & Pennartz, 2008). By analysing how a person 
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chooses between immediate and delayed rewards (Mazur, 1987), for example by 
titrating upwards the magnitude of a small immediate reward until it is deemed 
subjectively equivalent to receiving a larger delayed reward, it is possible to estimate 
the extent of temporal discounting, summarised by a single parameter, the temporal 
discount rate (e.g. Green & Myerson, 2004; Myerson & Green, 1995). Unhealthy 
behaviour frequently has a delayed effect on health, leading to the hypothesis that an 
individual’s tendency to make unhealthy choices is positively correlated with their 
temporal discount rate (Bickel, Jarmolowicz, Mueller, Koffarnus, & Gatchalian, 
2012; MacKillop et al., 2011).  
1.5.1 EXPONENTIAL DISCOUNTING 
 
Neo-classical economic theory posits that goods ought to be discounted 
exponentially with delay (Samuelson, 1937). Formally, an outcome with utility  𝐴 if 
received straightaway (𝑡 = 0) is worth 𝐴𝛿! if delayed 𝑡 periods into the future. The 
present-time value, 𝑉, of receiving 𝐴 at time 𝑡  is thus given by: 
 𝑉(𝐴, 𝑡) =   𝐴𝛿! 
       (1.5.1) 
Here the discount rate, 𝛿, embodies a constant proportional decrease in value with 
each time period of delay. The assumption of a constant discount rate leads to the 
prediction that if two rewards are separated by a given delay, the ratio of their value 
remains constant no matter how far into the future the first reward occurs. This 
property, known as the stationarity axiom, ensures that decision-makers who discount 
exponentially make consistent choices between alternative streams of future reward 
(Strotz, 1957) (Figure 1.1a). 
1.5.2 HYPERBOLIC AND QUASI-HYPERBOLIC DISCOUNTING 
 
Exponential discounting is a normative, rather than descriptively accurate 
theory. In particular, both humans and animals violate the assumption of a constant 
proportional discount factor; instead net discounting is lower when measured over 
longer delays than over shorter ones, implying that the discount factor for each added 
unit of delay decreases as delays grow longer (Ainslie, 1974, 1975, 2001; Benzion, 
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Rapoport, & Yagil, 1989; Chung & Herrnstein, 1967; Green et al., 1994; Mazur, 
1987; Strotz et al., 1957).  In other words delaying a reward a short time into the 
future markedly decreases its subjective value, but each additional increment of delay 
has a smaller proportional effect. This pattern is better accounted for by a hyperbolic 
function, written in its simplest form as follows, where    𝑘 represents the hyperbolic 
discount rate: 𝑉(𝐴, 𝑡) =    𝐴1+ 𝑘𝑡 
        (1.5.2) 
An alternative is the “quasi-hyperbolic” approximation to hyperbolic 
discounting (Angeletos et al., 2001; Laibson, 1997; McClure, Ericson, Laibson, 
Loewenstein, & Cohen, 2007; McClure et al., 2004; Phelps & Pollak, 1968), which is 
formalised as exponential discounting, combined with a preference for immediate 
reward, expressed as a second discount factor, 𝛽, applied to all time-periods except 
the first: 𝑉(𝐴, 𝑡) =                𝐴                          𝑖𝑓  𝑡 = 0𝐴  𝛽𝛿!                𝑖𝑓  𝑡 > 0  
           (1.5.3) 
The hyperbolic and quasi-hyperbolic forms qualitatively capture the 
observation that individuals make far-sighted plans when outcomes are distant, but 
reverse their choices in favor of short-term rewards when the future is reached (Figure 
1.1b and c; Green et al., 1994; Kirby & Herrnstein, 1995; Strotz et al., 1957; see 
Kalenscher & Pennartz, 2008 for a review). To extend the example above, people 
might archetypally prefer to receive $10 today over $15 in a month, yet prefer $15 in 
thirteen months over $10 in twelve months (though see Chapter 4 for a more detailed 
discussion of the evidence for this). In economic terms this phenomenon is referred to 
as myopic preference reversal (Kirby & Herrnstein, 1995).  
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Figure 1.1 Hyperbolic and exponential discounting. Discounted value, 𝑉(𝐴, 𝑡, 𝜏) under 
three discount functions is plotted of as a function of the decision maker's position in time, 𝜏. 
Here 𝐴 is the instantaneous utility of the outcome and 𝑡  the time at which it is due to be 
delivered. A larger-later reward, LL, of utility 𝑙 is due to be received at 𝑡! and a smaller-
sooner reward, SS, of utility 𝑠 is due to be received at 𝑡!. A Exponential discounting. The 
ratio of the discounted value of the two rewards is constant irrespective of how far away the 
earlier reward is in time, leading to consistent choices. In this case the decision-maker always 
prefers LL (i.e., 𝑉(𝑙, 𝑡!, 𝜏)   >   𝑉  (𝑠, 𝑡!, 𝜏) for all 𝜏   <    𝑡!). B Simple hyperbolic discounting 
with a low discount rate. The ratio of the value of two rewards is no longer constant as a 
function of  𝜏, but SS becomes relatively more valuable as both rewards are approached. The 
hyperbolic discount rate, 𝑘, governs the steepness of the curvature. Here, where 𝑘 is low LL is 
still preferred throughout, even when the smaller sooner reward is immediately available. C 
Hyperbolic discounting with a high discount rate. At 𝑡!, when both rewards are distant, LL is 
preferred, i.e., 𝑉(𝑙, 𝑡!, 𝑡!)   >   𝑉  (𝑠, 𝑡!, 𝑡!), however SS becomes increasingly desirable as it 
approaches in time, such that at 𝑡!, SS is preferred, i.e., 𝑉(𝑙, 𝑡!, 𝑡!)   <   𝑉(𝑠, 𝑡!, 𝑡!).  
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Hyperbolic or quasi-hyperbolic discounting therefore putatively imparts an 
explanation for why people intend to perform behaviours which they fail to carry out 
(though see Read, 2001; Read, Frederick, & Airoldi, 2012). Thus, not only does 
temporal discounting offer a potential model for unhealthy actions with deleterious 
long-term consequences, but also hyperbolic discounting purports to explain the 
marked intention-action gap in health behaviour which the social cognitive models 
fail to address.  Furthermore discounting is easy to measure and as such seems well 
placed as a predictor of individual differences in health behaviour. Evaluating 
discounting as a viable model for unhealthy behaviour forms the fulcrum of this 
thesis.  
 
1.6 SOCIAL DISCOUNTING AND SOCIAL HEALTH CHOICES 
  
A secondary aim of this thesis is to examine how people make choices 
regarding others’ health, pertinent to the perspective of health-care professionals or 
policy-makers. For example, if temporal discounting were related to an individual’s 
propensity to make unhealthy chocies, it would be interesting to ask whether people 
discount the future differently when choosing on behalf of others. Were systematic 
differences in intertemporal preference for self and other to emerge, this might have 
implications for shared decision-making in health care settings.  
 It is also of interest that similar models have been used to understand both 
social and intertemporal decision-making. While temporal discounting refers to the 
fact that that the subjective value of reward decreases with delay, in a related sense, 
the subjective value of giving reward to others appears to decrease with social 
distance, termed social discounting (B. Jones & Rachlin, 2006; B. A. Jones & 
Rachlin, 2009; Rachlin & Jones, 2008). Social distance can be formalised by asking 
people to create an imaginary rank ordering of the people closest to them, starting 
with their dearest friend or relative (B. Jones & Rachlin, 2006). Remarkably, previous 
work has shown that social discount functions for donations of money are also well 
described by a decreasing hyperbolic function (B. Jones & Rachlin, 2006; B. A. Jones 
& Rachlin, 2009; Rachlin & Jones, 2008). Furthermore, temporal and social discount 
rates for money are correlated, with more patient individuals tending also to be more 
altruistic (Curry, Price, & Price, 2008; Rachlin & Jones, 2008), suggesting that 
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temporal and social valuations of reward engage similar computational processes. 
These findings hint at the possibility of a ‘patient-altruistic’ phenotype (see also 
Bartels & Rips, 2010; Ersner-Hershfield, Wimmer, & Knutson, 2009; Harris & 
Madden, 2002), whereby people who make sensible long-term choices are also more 
likely to be prosocial. If this were to hold true for health-related choices, social 
discounting might even form a useful predictor of personal health behaviour.  	  
1.7 THESIS OUTLINE 
 
This thesis first systematically reviews studies measuring temporal 
discounting for hypothetical health outcomes (Chapter 2). Studies comparing 
temporal discount measures with any form of health outcome are reviewed 
subsequently in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 critically appraises the notion that hyperbolic 
discounting accounts for failures of self-control, and proposes an alternative account 
in terms of interplay between the goal-directed and habitual control of action. Chapter 
5 describes the general experimental methods used in subsequent chapters, including 
Bayesian model comparison. 
The vast majority of existing studies comparing discounting with health 
behaviour examine temporal preferences for reward. People exhibit rather more 
unusual preferences, not well described by temporal discounting, when choosing the 
timing of pain or illness (Berns et al., 2006; Loewenstein & Prelec, 1991; Van Der 
Pol & Cairns, 2000). To address this in Chapter 6 I test models of time preference for 
pain and illness. Chapter 7 explores the implications of these models for the use of a 
personal health budget for the relief of pain in real-time.  
In Chapter 8 I test the same models in a setting where individuals must choose 
the timing of others’ pain, pertinent to the perspective of health-care professionals or 
policy-makers.  In Chapters 8 and 9 I also address the theoretical and empirical 
overlap between temporal and social decision-making, including social discounting 
(Jones & Rachlin, 2006; Rachlin & Jones, 2008). 
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2. 
HEALTH DISCOUNTING 
“In order to arrive at the measurement of utility… it is necessary to place the 
individual (homo economicus) … under certain ideal circumstances where his 
behaviour will render open to unambiguous inference the form of the function which 
he is conceived of maximising.” 
 
Paul A. Samuelson – A note on the measurement of utility (1937) 
 
 
If an individual’s engagement in healthy behaviour is considered equivalent to 
their investing in their long-term health, then their discount rate ought to predict such 
engagement (Fuchs, 1982; Grossman, 1972). A key question in testing this hypothesis 
is whether to elicit intertemporal choices between monetary outcomes, as is most 
conventional, or between health states. Clearly in real-world health choices the 
ultimate delayed outcome is a health state. However, it is pertinent to ask whether 
measured discounting is equivalent for health and money outcomes.  
Neo-classical economic theory dictates that discount rates should be the same 
across all commodities (Samuelson, 1937), for the reason that if all commodities can 
be monetised then adopting a different rate of discount for different commodities 
leads to inconsistent choices (see Brouwer, Niessen, Postma, & Rutten, 2005; Cairns, 
1992; Chapman & Elstein, 1995; Severens & Milne, 2004). However, health states 
are not always directly fungible, for example health cannot be directly invested  
(Chapman, 1996b), nor exchanged for other commodities, suggesting that discounting 
for health outcomes might differ from monetary discounting. Furthermore there is no 
good reason to believe that people should behave in line with normative economic 
theory. 
Studies measuring health discounting require subjects to imagine a 
hypothetical illness and to trade-off the duration or severity of the illness against 
when they would prefer to experience it (e.g. Van Der Pol & Cairns, 2002). 
Individuals who will accept more severe delayed illness over less severe immediate 
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illness are said to discount future illness. Alternatively, the health state may be 
described as an improvement in health (for example Ganiats et al., 2000), where 
individuals who prefer health improvement sooner rather than later, and are willing to 
accept a smaller-sooner improvement in health over a larger-later improvement are 
said to discount future health. At the time of writing, few previous authors have given 
an up-to-date synthesis of the findings of these studies (though see Asenso-Boadi, 
Peters, & Coast, 2008; Chapman, 2003; Chapman, 2005).  
 
2.1 SYSTEMATIC REVIEW METHODS 
 
I reviewed studies of hypothetical health discounting by systematically 
searching the PubMed Medline database in January 2014 for full text articles 
published up to January 2014 whose title contained any of the following keywords: 
‘Time Preference’, ‘Discounting’, or ‘Intertemporal’ together with either of the words 
“Health” or “Illness”. This search yielded 87 studies. The abstracts of these were 
reviewed for suitability: studies were included if they used any delay discounting 
paradigm with a non-fatal change in health as the outcome. Studies solely measuring 
discounting of life years were not included, since a large proportion of these actually 
measure social preferences, and the focus of this review is on personal preferences 
regarding qualitative future health states. On the basis of these criteria 20 suitable 
studies were identified. Reference and citation lists of studies meeting the inclusion 
criteria were also reviewed to identify further studies suitable for inclusion, yielding a 
further 15 studies. (The 35 studies reviewed are summarised in Table 2.1).  
 
2.2 POSITIVE TIME PREFERENCE FOR HEALTH 
 
Several established properties of monetary discounting are also exhibited in 
the health domain. Many people discount future health improvements in the 
conventional sense, termed positive discounting, or positive time preference for health 
(Bleichrodt & Johannesson, 2001; Lipscomb, 1989; Olsen, 1993). For example, an 
early study (Lipscomb, 1989) obtained preference scores from 52 undergraduates for 
a set of health scenarios, covering an hypothetical 50 year period beginning at age 25. 
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A period of a specified illness, of defined length (e.g. one year), could occur at a 
variable time into the 50 year period (e.g. at age 26 or at age 28), followed either by 
excellent health until aged 75 or by immediate death.  Delaying onset to the period of 
illness had a positive effect on the preference scores, such that an illness delayed 
further into the future tended to be preferred to those where illness occurred sooner, 
implying a positive rate of discount for illness.  
Where positive temporal discounting occurs for health outcomes, existing 
findings support hyperbolic or quasi-hyperbolic over an exponential discounting, 
illustrating a consistency with monetary discounting (Bleichrodt & Johannesson, 
2001; Van Der Pol & Cairns, 2002; Van Der Pol & Cairns, 2011). For example, Van 
Der Pol and Cairns (2002) asked participants to make choices relating to a generic 
illness, which could be delayed into the future by means of an imaginary treatment, 
showing that hyperbolic discount functions fitted choices better than exponential 
ones. The same authors (Van Der Pol & Cairns, 2011) later extended their analysis to 
directly test the stationarity axiom of exponential discounting, as well as axioms 
predicted from quasi-hyperbolic and hyperbolic models. They found violations of 
stationarity extending beyond the first time period, favouring a hyperbolic model over 
quasi-hyperbolic or exponential alternatives.  
 
2.3 ZERO AND NEGATIVE TIME PREFERENCE FOR HEALTH 
 
The observation that many people positively discount hypothetical future 
health states is at least congruent with an hypothesis that discounting explains 
unhealthy behaviour. Problematically however positive temporal discounting for 
health (unlike monetary) outcomes is far from universal. Some individuals rather 
choose to advance the timing of illness (Cairns, 1992; Chapman, 1996b; Chapman et 
al., 2001; Chapman & Coups, 1999; Redelmeier & Heller, 1993; Van Der Pol & 
Cairns, 2002; Van Der Pol & Cairns, 2011; Van Der Pol & Cairns, 2000) or to defer 
health improvement  (Chapman, 1996b; Chapman & Elstein, 1995; P. Dolan & 
Gudex, 1995; Olsen, 1993). This is the opposite pattern to conventional (positive) 
discounting, and is termed negative time preference or negative discounting 
(Loewenstein, 1987; Loewenstein & Prelec, 1991). In addition, some people do not 
discount hypothetical future health outcomes at all, preferring to experience better 
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health, irrespective of delay, which is termed zero time preference (Cairns, 1992; 
Chapman, 1996b; Chapman et al., 2001; Chapman & Coups, 1999; Chapman & 
Elstein, 1995; P. Dolan & Gudex, 1995; Olsen, 1993; Redelmeier & Heller, 1993; 
Van Der Pol& Cairns, 2002; Van Der Pol & Cairns, 2011; Van Der Pol & Cairns, 
2000). 
Across the majority of studies the proportion of individuals exhibiting 
negative time preference ranges from 3-10%. The study of Olsen (1993), referred to 
previously, found that 3.6-5.2% of participants had implied negative discount rates. 
Redelmeier and Heller (1993) using example outcomes of blindness, depression and 
colostomy, found that 62% of their sample had discount rates of zero and 10% 
exhibited negative discount rates. Cairns (1992) performed a health discounting task 
on a small sample of students, in which the health state was described in terms of an 
episode of depression. Of 18 participants with consistent health discounting results, 
three had negative discount rates, six had zero discounting and nine had positive 
discount rates. Chapman and colleagues (Chapman, 1996a; Chapman et al., 2001; 
Chapman & Coups, 1999; Chapman & Elstein, 1995) found that up to 10% of their 
samples display negative discount rates for health. Additionally, across repeated 
studies Van der Pol and Cairns (2000, 2002, 2011) found that 6.7 – 10% of their 
respondents displayed negative discount rates for illness. A notable outlier is a study 
performed by P. Dolan and Gudex (1995), who found much higher proportions of 
negative discounting. Averaged across all health states, 39% of participants displayed 
negative time preference, preferring sooner illness, and 36% showed zero time 
preference. The higher rates of negative discounting in this study may be attributable 
to the fact that health and illness were explicitly presented in sequence, which is 
known to increase negative time preference (Chapman, 2000; Loewenstein & Prelec, 
1993).  
An observation related to that of negative time preference, is that monetary 
losses tend to be (positively) discounted at a lower rate than monetary gains, referred 
to as the sign effect (e.g. Benzion et al., 1989; Thaler, 1981). There is also evidence 
for a sign effect in the health domain; for example Chapman (1996b) found that 
illness was discounted less than health improvement, to the extent that discount rates 
for illness were uncorrelated with discount rates for health improvement. MacKeigan, 
Larson, Draugalis, Bootman, and Burns (1993) report a similar result for preferences 
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over hypothetical improvements or decrements in health framed as a scenario of 
arthritis, finding positive discounting for health improvement and for long periods of 
illness, but negative discounting for fleeting illness.  
The substantial proportion of individuals displaying negative or zero 
discounting in choices between hypothetical future health states presents a theoretical 
stumbling block for a proposed link between discounting and health behaviour. 
Negative discounting denotes a preference for expediting hardship (‘getting things 
over and done with’), quite the reverse of the procrastinatory mindset hypothesised to 
be associated with unhealthy behaviour.  
 
2.4 CORRELATIONS BETWEEN HEALTH AND MONETARY DISCOUNTING 
 
In keeping with the high prevalence of negative and zero time preference for 
health, discount rates for health and money are poorly correlated across individuals 
(Cairns, 1992; Chapman, 1996b, 2002; Chapman & Elstein, 1995; Lazaro, Barberan, 
& Rubio, 2001; Petry, 2003). In an early study addressing this question, Cairns (1992) 
compared discounting for a health state described in terms of depression with 
monetary discounting. Sub-samples of discount rates within each domain were 
correlated with each other, however there was no significant correlation between 
health and monetary discounting. Chapman and Elstein (1995), who also included a 
third domain of vacations of varying duration, report an overall mean Spearman 
coefficient of 0.25 for the correlation between discount rates of different domains, 
indicating a low to medium correlation. In a later study, Petry (2003) studied discount 
rates for hypothetical health, money and freedom (from time spent in jail), finding 
that health and freedom discount rates were correlated, but neither domain was 
significantly correlated with monetary discount rates.  
Chapman and Elstein (1995) suggested three possible confounding 
explanations for the low cross-domain correlations in discounting in these studies. 
Firstly, the authors proposed that the difference in discount rates across domains 
might be accounted for by the sign-effect, if health and monetary outcomes were not 
matched for sign. Secondly, they suggested that domain independence might be 
attributable to a phenomenon known as the magnitude effect, an observed violation of 
the discounted utility model whereby larger amounts are discounted less than smaller 
	   35	  
amounts (Benzion et al., 1989; Green et al., 1994; Loewenstein, 1988; Thaler, 1981). 
This could lead to higher discount rates for health if health outcomes were deemed 
less valuable relative to monetary outcomes.  Finally, Chapman and Elstein noted that 
apparently different discounting could result if the instantaneous utility functions for 
health and money differed in shape. Chapman (1996b) addressed these possible 
confounds, demonstrating that low correlations between health and monetary domains 
persist even when the outcomes are matched for sign as well as utility. Correlations 
between the two domains overall showed a trend towards being higher when matched 
for sign, although all correlations remained weak (Spearman r 0.06-0.28). In other 
words discount rates for illness showed marginally stronger correlations with 
monetary losses than with monetary gains, and discount rates for health improvement 
showed marginally stronger correlations with monetary gains than with monetary 
losses, though all such correlations are weak and most do not reach conventional 
levels of significance.  
 
2.5 CONCLUSIONS 
 
To sum up, discounting of hypothetical health is at best weakly correlated with 
monetary discounting (e.g. Chapman 1996, Spearman r 0.06-0.28) and in such studies 
a high proportion of individuals either appear not to discount future health at all, or 
prefer to delay good health. The latter finding appears to challenge the hypothesis that 
unhealthy choices in some sense result from the discounting of delayed health. It 
remains possible however that people represent health outcomes differently when 
making real health choices as opposed to responding in hypothetical health 
discounting tasks.  
 
2.5.1 EXPERIENTIAL OUTCOMES AND ZERO TIME PREFERENCE  
 
The high proportion of zero time preference for hypothetical health may 
derive from the fact that the health outcomes are described in experiential terms. As 
mentioned above, unlike money, health cannot be invested, removing a key normative 
motive for discounting (see Chapter 10: General Discussion). Interestingly Chapman 
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(2002) demonstrated that higher correlations (Pearson correlation coefficient r = 0.41) 
between health and monetary discount rates result if choices are embedded in a 
scenario in which health and money are framed as tradable, compared with their being 
framed as non-tradable (Pearson correlation coefficient r = 0.07), suggesting that 
thinking of health as a commodity leads to health being discounted in a more 
conventional manner.  	  
2.5.3 DREAD AND NEGATIVE TIME PREFERENCE  
 
Negative discounting for illness outcomes is not unexpected. In choices 
between genuine delayed painful events, many people prefer to expedite inevitable 
pain (negative time preference) (e.g. Berns et al., 2006; Cook & Barnes, 1964; 
Loewenstein, 1987; Loewenstein & Prelec, 1991). Negative time preference for pain 
has been attributed to the fact that anticipating delayed pain is itself aversive, termed 
dread (Berns et al., 2006; Loewenstein, 1987). This unpleasant anticipation can be 
minimised by choosing to “get the pain out of the way”. Consistent with respondents 
exhibiting dread for delayed illness, in an illness discounting task, individuals who 
perceived the illness as more severe were more likely to have negative discount rates 
(Van Der Pol & Cairns, 2000). Despite authors having previously observed that 
negative discounting of health is consistent with dread (Van Der Pol & Cairns, 2000), 
no previous studies have examined the functional form of negative time preference. I 
address this in Chapter 6 of this thesis.   
 
2.5.2 DISCOUNTING AS A TRAIT 	  	  
The high rates of negative and zero discounting for health call into question 
the notion of discounting as a unitary contstruct, pertinent to a trait interpretation of 
discounting. In a recent analysis, Odum (2011) evaluates the extent to which 
discounting fulfills criteria for a personality trait. Odum adopts a commonly used 
definition of a trait as ‘a relatively enduring pattern of thoughts, feelings, and 
behaviours that reflects the tendency to respond in certain ways under certain 
circumstances’ (Roberts, 2009).  Notably, discounting for monetary outcomes 
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robustly fulfills the first criterion, namely that a trait should be ‘relatively enduring’, 
since the test-retest reliability of monetary discounting is high at intervals of up to one 
year (Pearson r = 0.71; Kirby, 2009) and across different elicitation methods (Odum, 
2011). Furthermore, Odum demonstrates that discounting for several forms of 
outcome, excluding health, shows consistency across individuals. Discount rates are 
not identical across commodities: people tend to discount primary reinforcers such as 
food and water more steeply than money (Odum, 2011) and a number of studies have 
shown that people with substance dependence discount their drug of abuse more 
steeply than money (e.g. Bickel, Odum, & Madden, 1999; Madden, Petry, Badger, & 
Bickel, 1997; Petry, 2001). However, discount rates for money are strongly and 
significantly correlated with other forms of appetitive outcome, such as the 
discounting of cigarettes for cigarette smokers, the discounting of heroin for opioid-
dependent outpatients and the discounting of food amongst college students (Odum, 
2011; Pearson r = 0.93; p = 0.0007 for money versus the mean of all other outcomes).  
There is also evidence that discounting is heritable (for a review see MacKillop, 
2013). A recent longitudinal twin study estimated the heritability of delay discounting 
in adolescence at up to 50% (Anokhin, Golosheykin, Grant, & Heath, 2011), rats and 
mice can be bred to exhibit greater degrees of delay discounting (e.g. K. G. Anderson 
& Woolverton, 2005; Belin, Mar, Dalley, Robbins, & Everitt, 2008), and steeper 
discounting in humans is associated with specific polymorphisms related to dopamine 
signaling (Eisenberg et al., 2007). Thus, for appetitive outcomes at least, discounting 
has characteristics consistent with a trait variable. However, the low correlations 
between health and monetary discounting seem to suggest a limitation to the scope of 
the discounting-trait, and suggest that hypothetical health discounting tasks engage 
different processes from those with appetitive outcomes. 
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3. 
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN DISCOUNTING AND 
HEALTH BEHAVIOUR  
	  
“Live fast, die young.” 
    Willard Motley – Knock on Any Door (1947) 
 
The low correlations between health and monetary discounting, and the high 
prevalence of negative and zero time preference for health described in the preceding 
chapter would appear to cast doubt on an hypothesis that health behaviour results 
from discounting of delayed health in a strictly mechanistic sense. Nevertheless, 
either measure might prove capable of predicting real-world health behaviour. In fact, 
authors addressing the hypothesis that discounting predicts health behaviour have 
tended to simply use conventional monetary discounting, with promising findings. In 
this chapter I perform systematic review of studies which examine relationships 
between temporal discount rates and health behaviour or health status.  
 
3.1 SYSTEMATIC REVIEW METHODS 
 
The PubMed database was searched in January 2014 for full-text articles 
published up to January 2014, containing any of the keywords ‘Discounting’, 
‘Intertemporal’, ‘Time Preference’, together with the words ‘Health’, ‘Illness’, ‘BMI’, 
‘Obesity’, ‘Alcohol’, ‘Drinking’, ‘Smoking’, ‘Drug’ or ‘Behaviour’. This initial 
search yielded 104 studies. The abstracts, and where necessary full texts, of these 
studies were then examined to determine suitability for inclusion, defined as any 
study which compared the results of a delay discounting paradigm to an observed 
health-related measure or behaviour. Altogether 34 suitable full text articles were 
identified by this method. The references and citation lists of these studies were then 
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reviewed for inclusion, yielding a further 78 suitable studies, making a total of 112 
suitable studies (summarised in Tables 3.1 to 3.5). Several of these studies have been 
included in previously published reviews (Bickel et al., 2012; Bickel, Koffarnus, 
Moody, & Wilson, 2014; Bickel & Marsch, 2001; Koffarnus, Jarmolowicz, Mueller, 
& Bickel, 2013; MacKillop et al., 2011; Reynolds, 2006b). However, these have been 
chiefly in the context of addiction – here a broader range of health outcomes are 
reviewed. Below, studies are organised first by the modality of discounting, 
hypothetical health versus money or other appetitive rewards. Within each modality 
studies are organised by the nature of the health outcome(s), namely tobacco 
smoking, alcohol use, illicit substance misuse, obesity and eating behaviour, 
preventive health behaviour, risky sexual behaviour and drug-taking practices or 
multiple health behaviours.  
 
3.2 HYPOTHETICAL HEALTH DISCOUNTING AND HEALTH BEHAVIOUR 
 
Four studies comparing discount rates for hypothetical health outcomes with 
observed health behaviour were identified. Only one of these four studies found a 
statistically significant correlation. Two of the studies examined relationships 
between health discounting and cigarette smoking. Baker, Johnson, and Bickel (2003) 
measured health discounting in current and never-before cigarette smokers, finding 
that current smokers discounted health at a marginally higher rate than the never-
before smokers, but this difference did not reach statistical significance. By contrast 
current smokers discounted money at a significantly higher rate than the never before 
smokers. Similarly, Khwaja, Silverman, and Sloan (2007) found no significant 
differences between smokers and non-smokers in health discounting for health 
outcomes (however neither did this study find a relationship between smoking status 
and monetary discounting).  
A single study in the sample (Petry, 2003) examined discount rates for health 
outcomes in substance misusers, finding significantly higher discount rates for 
hypothetical health, money and freedom (from time spent in jail) in a group of current 
or previous heroin and/or cocaine users compared with a group of controls with no 
history of substance misuse in their lifetime. Finally, Chapman and Coups (1999) 
asked whether discount rates for monetary losses, described in terms of a parking fine, 
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and for a flu-like illness, could explain uptake of free-of-charge influenza 
vaccinations. The respondents were future oriented, with 85% not significantly 
discounting the flu-like illness (i.e. showing zero time preference) and 83% not 
significantly discounting parking fines. Monetary time preferences were related to 
vaccine uptake: 45% of those with no discounting accepted the vaccine, compared 
with 29% of those who discounted money in the conventional manner. However, 
health discount rates were unrelated to vaccine acceptance.  
The observed higher health discount rates in substance misusers compared 
with controls (Petry, 2003) and the trend towards higher health discounting in current 
cigarette smokers (Baker et al., 2003), taken together with the larger between-group 
differences in monetary discounting, suggest that health discounting does exhibit a 
weak relationship with health behaviour, but is a less sensitive predictor than 
monetary discounting.  
 
3.3 MONETARY OR APPETITIVE DISCOUNTING AND HEALTH BEHAVIOUR 
 
Although discounting for hypothetical health appears to be a weak predictor of 
observed health behaviour, many studies in the search sample demonstrate that 
discount rates for money or other appetitive outcomes such as food or drug rewards 
correlate more substantially with health behaviour or health status. The key findings 
are discussed below, grouped by health outcome. 
 
3.3.1 DISCOUNT RATES AND SELF-REPORTED HEALTH 	  	  
Self-reported health is perhaps the most general health outcome measure and 
correlates with life-expectancy in the developed world (Idler & Benyamini, 1997). A 
recent household survey in the Netherlands (N = 2300) (Van Der Pol, 2011) found 
that, in a multiple linear regression, higher monetary discount rates were weakly 
associated with poorer self-reported health status. A further study in a South African 
population (Chao, Szrek, Pereira, & Pauly, 2009) found evidence for a U-shaped 
relationship between subjective health and monetary discount rates, whereby those 
who reported “average” health had lower discount rates than those who are either very 
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healthy or very sick. The authors suggested that this might be due to the fact that 
those with very poor health were in more urgent need of money to fund medical care, 
whereas those in excellent health were able to enjoy the benefits of immediate 
economic consumption, highlighting the considerable difficulties in establishing a 
casual pathway between discounting and health.  
 
3.3.2 DISCOUNT RATES AND CIGARETTE SMOKING 
 
Monetary discount rates have consistently been shown to be higher in people 
who currently smoke tobacco than in non-smokers (Bickel et al., 1999; S. Fields, 
Leraas, Collins, & Reynolds, 2009; Kobiella et al., 2014; Rezvanfard et al., 2010; S. 
H. Mitchell, 1999; Odum, Madden, & Bickel, 2002; Reynolds, 2006a; Reynolds, 
Leraas, Collins, & Melanko, 2009; Reynolds, Patak, & Shroff, 2007; Reynolds, 
Penfold, & Patak, 2008; Stillwell & Tunney, 2012; Wing, Moss, Rabin, & George, 
2012). A recent meta-analysis of studies comparing discount rates with addictive 
behaviours, (MacKillop et al., 2011) estimated a moderate and highly significant 
effect (Cohen’s d = 0.57 p<0.0001) across all studies comparing discount rates in 
smokers versus non-smokers.  
Monetary discount rates also correlate with smoking frequency (L. H. Epstein 
et al., 2003; Fuchs, 1982; Kang & Ikeda, 2013; Ohmura, Takahashi, & Kitamura, 
2005). In keeping with this infrequent smokers exhibit monetary discount rates 
intermediate between heavy smokers and non-smokers (Heyman & Gibb, 2006; 
Reynolds & Fields, 2012; Stillwell & Tunney, 2012 N = 9454) (however see M. W. 
Johnson, Bickel, & Baker, 2007 for negative findings; Reynolds, Karraker, Horn, & 
Richards, 2003) and both smoking frequency and monetary discount rates were found 
to be higher in a group of young-adult smokers than in a group of adolescent smokers 
(Reynolds, 2004). The relationship between smoking frequency and discounting does 
not appear to be mediated by the acute effects of nicotine, since acute nicotine 
administration to non-smokers has recently been shown to have no effect on 
intertemporal choice behaviour (Kobiella et al., 2014).  However the relationship may 
be related to the level of nicotine dependence (Sweitzer, Donny, Dierker, Flory, & 
Manuck, 2008), consistent with discounting being a state-based marker of addiction 
severity. 
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Interestingly those who have previously smoked and those who have never 
smoked do not significantly differ in their monetary discounting (Bickel et al., 1999). 
Furthermore in a prospective study of smoking cessation, participants were separated 
into a group who received an intervention program directed at reducing smoking and 
a control group who continued to smoke as usual. The two groups did not differ in 
their discounting behaviour at baseline. Whilst the control group showed no changes 
in discounting over time, the intervention group (who reduced their smoking 
frequency) showed a significant decrease in discounting for both money and 
cigarettes after only five days into the program (Yi & Landes, 2012). These results 
strongly suggest that the state of nicotine addiction acts reversibly to increase 
discount rates. However there is also evidence to support the idea that discounting 
operates as an antecedent vulnerability marker, since monetary discount rates in 
smokers predict rates of smoking adoption (Audrain-McGovern et al., 2009). 
Monetary discount rates in smokers also predict rates of relapse within smoking 
cessation programs (Brown & Adams, 2013; Krishnan-Sarin et al., 2007; MacKillop 
& Kahler, 2009; Sheffer et al., 2012; Yoon et al., 2007), and the ability to abstain 
from smoking under laboratory conditions (Dallery & Raiff, 2007; Mueller et al., 
2009). It seems reasonable to conclude therefore that relationships between 
discounting and smoking behaviour are subject to both state- and trait-based 
influences (de Wit, 2009; Odum, 2011). 
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Finally short-term abstinence from cigarettes increases discounting in addicted 
smokers (Field, Santarcangelo, Sumnall, Goudie, & Cole, 2006; S. H. Mitchell, 2004; 
Yi & Landes, 2012). For example, Field et al. (2006) measured discounting for 
hypothetical gains of money or cigarettes in a group of 30 smokers: one randomised 
group performed the procedures following their usual cigarette consumption, the other 
following a minimum of 13 hours of abstinence from cigarettes. Implied discount 
rates for both money and cigarettes were significantly higher in the abstinence group.  
In summary, monetary discount rates are higher in current smokers, correlate 
with smoking frequency and prospectively predict the adoption of smoking and 
abstinence from smoking. The upward effect of nicotine cravings on discount rates 
and the decrease in discounting concomitant with reductions in smoking indicate that 
discounting is influenced by state-based environmental and motivational factors. 
Taken together these results indicate that relationships between discounting and 
smoking have both state- and trait- based components, a consideration which most 
likely also applies to relationships between discounting and other addictive 
behaviours (de Wit, 2009; Odum, 2011).  
 
3.3.3 DISCOUNT RATES AND ALCOHOL USE  
 
Monetary discount rates exhibit consistent relationships with alcohol use. A 
recent meta-analysis of studies comparing discount rates in persons meeting clinical 
criteria of an alcohol dependence syndrome with controls (MacKillop et al., 2011) 
demonstrated a moderate, highly significant effect (Cohen’s d = 0.50 p<0.0001).  
Monetary discount rates are higher in currently abstinent alcohol dependent 
individuals compared with non-dependent controls (Bjork, Hommer, Grant, & 
Danube, 2004; Boettiger et al., 2007; J. M. Mitchell, Fields, D'Esposito, & Boettiger, 
2005), in early-onset as opposed to late-onset alcohol dependence (Dom, De Wilde, 
Hulstijn, Van Den Brink, & Sabbe, 2006), and correlate with the severity of alcohol 
dependence (J. M. Mitchell et al., 2005), as well as symptoms of an alcohol abuse 
disorder (MacKillop et al., 2010). Monetary discount rates have also been shown to 
be higher in a group with a previous lifetime diagnosis of an alcohol abuse disorder as 
compared with those without a lifetime history of alcohol abuse (Bobova, Finn, 
Rickert, & Lucas, 2009). 
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Several studies have further linked higher discounting with relatively 
moderate levels of alcohol consumption. For example, Vuchinich & Simpson, 1998 
demonstrated higher monetary discount rates in “problem drinkers” and also heavy 
social drinkers, compared with light social drinkers, suggesting a relationship between 
alcohol intake and discount rates even amongst those designated as social drinkers. 
Similarly, Field, Christiansen, Cole, and Goudie (2007) found that delay discounting 
for alcohol positively correlated with weekly alcohol consumption (Pearson r = 0.31) 
amongst adolescents, where those in highest tertile of alcohol use had a mean weekly 
consumption of 23 units, while those in the lowest tertile had a mean of 3 units. 
Finally, Yankelevitz, Mitchell, and Zhang (2012) found that implied discounting for 
both money and alcohol was moderately correlated with levels of alcohol use in 
female students (Pearson r = 0.43 for money and 0.41 for alcohol discounting), 
though no correlation was found in male students.  
Amongst students, monetary discount rates appear related to adverse 
consequences of alcohol use (Dennhardt & Murphy, 2011; Kollins, 2003; Rossow, 
2008). Kollins (2003) observed that monetary discount rates were negatively 
correlated with age at first using alcohol and showed a strong positive correlation with 
the number of times that students had “passed out” as a result of alcohol use (Pearson 
r = 0.73, P < 0.01) and Rossow (2008), studying a sample of 17,413 adolescents in 
Norway, demonstrated that high monetary discounters became intoxicated more 
frequently and were more likely to vomit or “pass out” as a result of drinking. 
Paralleling findings in previous smokers of cigarettes, previously addicted users of 
alcohol who have achieved long-term abstinence have discount rates intermediate 
between current users and controls (Petry, 2001). Finally, in an elegant field study, the 
discount rates of male social-drinkers on their entry to a bar prospectively predicted 
increases in blood alcohol level on their exit (Moore & Cusens, 2010), such that those 
that had steeper discounting on entry showed greater increases in alcohol level. 
Discount rates were not confounded by baseline intoxication, since blood alcohol 
level at entry to the bar did not significantly predict the baseline discount rates.  
In summary, despite a minority of studies reporting negative findings (Fernie, 
Cole, Goudie, & Field, 2010; Kirby & Petry, 2004; MacKillop, Mattson, Anderson 
Mackillop, Castelda, & Donovick, 2007), monetary discount rates (and in some 
studies discount rates for alcohol) show robust relationships with alcohol intake over 
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a wide range of usage, being higher in currently dependent individuals, where they 
correlate with the degree of dependence, and predicting use in non-dependent 
individuals.   
 
3.3.4 DISCOUNTING AND ILLICIT SUBSTANCE MISUSE  
 
Amongst health behaviours, illicit substance misuse exhibits the most 
consistent relationships with discount rates. In an early study, heroin dependent 
individuals exhibited monetary discount rates twice those of non-drug-using controls 
(Kirby, Petry, & Bickel, 1999). Several other studies have also demonstrated 
significantly higher monetary discount rates in opioid-dependent individuals 
compared with controls (Kirby & Petry, 2004; Madden et al., 1997). Monetary 
discount rates are also higher in users of stimulant drugs such as cocaine and 
methamphetamine than in non-drug-using controls (Coffey, Gudleski, Saladin, & 
Brady, 2003; Heil, Johnson, Higgins, & Bickel, 2006; Hoffman et al., 2006; M. W. 
Johnson, 2012; Kirby & Petry, 2004; Moeller & Dougherty, 2002; Monterosso et al., 
2007), with one study finding significantly higher monetary discount rates among 
individuals primarily using crack cocaine than among those primarily using heroin 
(Bornovalova, Daughters, Hernandez, Richards, & Lejuez, 2005). Indeed, Mackillop 
et al. (2011) estimated a large and highly significant aggregate effect (Cohen’s d = 
0.87, p<0.0001) across studies comparing discount rates in dependent users of 
stimulant drugs versus controls and a moderate highly significant effect across studies 
comparing discount rates in opiate dependent individuals versus controls (Cohen’s d 
= 0.76, p<0.0001). 
Consistent with nicotine abstinence studies, mild opioid deprivation in opioid 
dependent individuals increases discounting for money as well as heroin (Giordano et 
al., 2002), whereas those who have achieved longer term abstinence from heroin have 
lower discount rates than those currently addicted (Bretteville-Jensen, 1999; Kirby & 
Petry, 2004). By contrast abstinent formerly dependent cocaine users do not differ in 
discounting behaviour from current users (Kirby & Petry, 2004; Heil et al., 2006), and 
Hoffman et al. (2006) found no relationship between length of abstinence and 
monetary discount rates in amphetamine dependent individuals. These findings 
suggest that either discount rates do not predict abstinence from stimulants, or that 
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addiction to stimulants can have an irreversible effect to increase discount rates. 
Evidence against the former suggestion is that baseline discounting has been shown to 
predict the duration of abstinence from cocaine under a contingency management 
intervention (with low-incentives but not with high-incentives) (Washio et al., 2011).  
Monetary discounting has not been consistently associated with concurrent 
cannabis use. M. W. Johnson et al. (2010) found that discount rates for hypothetical 
money in a group of marijuana dependent individuals did not differ from non-drug 
using controls, despite their study being adequately powered to detect any such 
difference (see also Stea, Hodgins, & Lambert, 2011). Similarly Heinz, Peters, Boden, 
and Bonn-Miller (2013) found that monetary discounting did not correlate 
significantly with frequency of cannabis use over a 90-day period, although higher 
discounting was associated with younger age at first cannabis use. A recent study has 
shown that discount rates for hypothetical large monetary amounts ($1000) 
prospectively predicted abstinence outcomes amongst adolescents undergoing 
treatment for marijuana dependence (Stanger et al., 2012), more recent studies have 
(Heinz et al., 2013; E. N. Peters, Petry, LaPaglia, Reynolds, & Carroll, 2013) found 
that discount rates did not predict response to a similar intervention in adults.  
Finally studies have demonstrated an additive effect of smoking and alcohol 
use on discounting (Moallem & Ray, 2012; see also Andrade & Petry, 2012) but not 
of smoking and other forms of substance misuse (Businelle, McVay, Kendzor, & 
Copeland, 2010), and the combination of gambling problems and substance misuse 
appears highly predictive of impulsive choice (however see Ledgerwood, Alessi, 
Phoenix, & Petry, 2009; Petry, 2001; Petry & Casarella, 1999). In summary, with the 
exception of cannabis use, monetary discount rates consistently show strong 
correlations with the use of illicit substances.  
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3.3.5 DISCOUNTING, OBESITY AND EATING BEHAVIOUR  
 
Researchers have examined relationships between obesity and discounting for 
both food and money outcomes, citing similarities between eating behaviour and 
addiction. Obese children have been shown to choose immediate over delayed edible 
rewards more often than normal weight children, though this effect was not found for 
non-food rewards (Bonato & Boland, 1983; W. G. Johnson, Parry, & Drabman, 
1978). Notably the ability to delay gratification for food rewards at aged four predicts 
the likelihood of being overweight at aged 11 (Seeyave et al., 2009).  
Correlational cross-sectional studies have examined links between measures 
of monetary discount and Body Mass Index (BMI) in adults, with mixed findings 
(Borghans & Golsteyn, 2006; L. H. Epstein et al., 2003; Ikeda, Kang, & Ohtake, 
2010; Nederkoorn, Smulders, Havermans, Roefs, & Jansen, 2006; Reimers, Maylor, 
Stewart, & Chater, 2009). In a large sample from the Netherlands financial proxies for 
the discount rate, for example reported under-saving or excessive expenditure, were 
significantly correlated with BMI, however measured discount rates themselves were 
not (Borghans and Golsteyn, 2006). Similarly, Ikeda et al. (2010) found that BMI was 
positively correlated with a survey measure of procrastination, but showed no 
correlation with monetary discount rates in a sample of 2987 Japanese adults. 
A handful of studies have compared discounting for overweight and normal 
weight individuals. Weller, Cook, Avsar, and Cox (2008) found that obese women 
exhibited significantly higher discount rates than healthy weight women, and a further 
study has shown that people who smoke cigarettes who are also obese to exhibit 
higher rates than non-obese smokers (S. Fields, Sabet, Peal, & Reynolds, 2011). C. 
Davis, Patte, Curtis, and Reid (2010) found that obese women with a binge-eating 
disorder, but not obese women without binge-eating disorder, had significantly higher 
monetary discount rates than normal weight women. More recently Kulendran and 
colleagues found significantly higher monetary discount rates in obese adolescents 
compared with normal-weight adolescents (Kulendran et al., 2013), and demonstrated 
that monetary discount rates in obese adolescents decreased over the course of a 
residential obesity intervention (Kulendran et al., 2013). 
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Finally, it has been suggested that sensitivity to food rewards interacts with 
delay discounting, in support of which high discount rates predict palatable food 
intake amongst normal weight women who find palatable foods highly rewarding 
(Rollins, Dearing, & Epstein, 2010), an effect which has been replicated in obese and 
overweight women (Appelhans et al., 2011). Taken together these studies suggest an 
emerging relationship between discounting and weight status, although further work 
is clearly required to establish whether particular aspects of eating behaviour, such as 
caloric intake, or eating frequency show relationships with discounting.   
 
3.3.6 DISCOUNT RATES AND PREVENTIVE HEALTH BEHAVIOUR  
 
Some studies have demonstrated relationships between discounting and 
preventive health behaviours, however the findings are less consistent than for 
addictive behaviours. As described above, Chapman and Coups (1999) asked whether 
discount rates for monetary losses, as well as for a flu-like illness, could explain 
uptake of influenza vaccinations, with the finding that time preferences for money, 
but not illness, were related to vaccine uptake. In a later study (Chapman et al., 2001) 
monetary discounting showed an absent or very weak correlation with compliance 
with anti-hypertensive or cholesterol lowering medication. Similarly, a meta-analysis 
(Chapman, 2005) of 16 existing studies, including those described above, found no 
significant correlation between discounting and preventive health behaviour (Mean 
Pearson r = 0.04, 95% CI = - 0.01, 0.09).  
The studies of Chapman and colleagues above suggest that in the population 
as whole preventive health behaviours show little or no relationship with discounting. 
However, two subsequent studies suggest that a subset of the highest discounters 
diverge from the rest of the population in their patterns of preventive health 
behaviour. Firstly, Axon, Bradford, and Egan (2009), studying 422 hypertensive 
adults, found that those in the highest quintile of monetary discount rates reported that 
they would be less likely to alter their diet and exercise plans to improve their future 
health. The highest discounters were not however significantly less likely to check 
their blood pressure or to follow their doctors’ plans, as assessed by self-report. 
Secondly, Bradford (2010), analyzing discounting in 978 adults, found that for high 
discounting women the implied probability of attending mammography was reduced 
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by 15.30% over the preceding two years and high discounting men had significantly 
lower rates of prostate examination (probability reduction 8.31%). The influence of 
discounting on attendance for cervical cancer screening was marginally significant. 
Across gender, high discounters were significantly less likely to have attended the 
dentist (probability reduction of 24.8%) or to have had any cholesterol testing 
(probability reduction 12.38%) or any influenza vaccination (probability reduction 
11.05%) over the preceding two years. Additionally, high discounters were 
significantly less likely to be non-smokers or to have undertaken weekly vigorous 
activity. These studies suggest that monetary discount rates might be a useful tool for 
identifying groups at risk of failing to engage in preventive health practices.   
 
3.3.7 DISCOUNT RATES AND RISKY SEXUAL BEHAVIOUR OR DRUG-TAKING PRACTICES  
 
Convergent evidence associates high monetary discount rates with behaviours 
that increase the risk of contracting sexually transmitted or blood-borne viral 
infections. Individuals infected with hepatitis C exhibit higher rates of discounting 
than controls (Huckans et al., 2011), although the direction of causality cannot be 
established from this study. Higher discount rates are associated with needle sharing 
amongst heroin users (Odum, Madden, Badger, & Bickel, 2000). Dierst-Davies et al. 
(2011) found that a sample of homeless, men who abused substances and had sex with 
men, had higher discount rates than a control sample of men, deemed to be at lower 
risk of HIV, who had sex with men however had stable housing and did not abuse 
substances. Finally, Chesson et al. (2006) found relationships between monetary 
discounting and a range of sexual behaviours and outcomes in a combined sample of 
university students and adolescents attending clinics (N = 1042).  For example, 
adolescents with higher discount rates were more likely to have had sexual 
intercourse before age 16 years, to have contracted gonorrhea or chlamydia, or to 
have become pregnant.  
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3.3.8 DISCOUNT RATES AND MULTIPLE HEALTH BEHAVIOURS 
 
Two studies in the search sample compared discount rates with a broad range 
of health behaviour. Firstly Daugherty and Brase (2010), collected data from 467 
undergraduates on an inventory of health behaviours, namely tobacco, alcohol and 
drug use, number of visits to a doctor or dentist in the past year, exercise frequency, 
eating breakfast, seat-belt use when in a vehicle, motorbike or bicycle helmet use, and 
the use of sunscreen. They found that, in a two-step hierarchical regression analysis, a 
combination of delay discounting for hypothetical money and survey measures of 
time perspective explained a significant proportion of the overall variance in health 
behaviour over and above the combination of the respondents’ gender and their 
personality type (Costa & McCrae, 1990). At the level of predicting individual 
behaviours, the improvement in model fit achieved by adding the time preference 
measures at the second step was small (the largest improvement in R2 was 0.05) but 
significant for all the behaviours above except helmet wearing. Notably Daugherty 
and Brase (2010) did not separate individuals by their level of cigarette, alcohol or 
drug use. As a result the observed relationships between discounting and other 
behaviours may have been confounded by the effects of these addictive behaviours to 
increase impulsivity in other domains. 
Secondly, Melanko and Larkin (2012) analyzed data from 72 young adults 
who performed both a discounting task with real monetary rewards and a hypothetical 
monetary discounting task as well as completing a questionnaire assessing a variety of 
health behaviours. Unfortunately however their published article has since been 
retracted.  
 
3.4 CONCLUSIONS 
 
Taken together, the studies reviewed here support an hypothesis that high 
discount rates for money, and in specific instances food or drug rewards, are 
correlated with many unhealthy behaviours. Furthermore the effect sizes reported 
compare favorably to existing social cognitive models of health behaviour (Armitage 
& Conner, 2000; Conner & Norman, 2005b), establishing high discounting as a 
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reliable correlate of unhealthy choice. Several of the studies above also identify state-
based influences on discounting, and as such it is timely to re-examine the extent to 
which discounting can be considered as a either a personality trait or a state variable 
(de Wit, 2008; Odum, 2011; Bickel et al., 2012). Personality traits are defined as 
stable and enduring characteristics, reflecting a general tendency to respond in a given 
manner under given circumstances and can be seen to represent persistent patterns of 
internal states (seeCosta & McCrae, 1990). State variables by contrast vary over a 
shorter time scale, and may be altered with changes in the motivational state of the 
respondents and/or the elicitation conditions (Kraemer, Gullion, Rush, Frank, & 
Kupfer, 1994).  
 
3.4.1 TRAIT AND STATE VARIABILITY IN DISCOUNTING 
  
In the preceding chapter I reviewed evidence to suggest that discounting for 
appetitive outcomes has features of a trait marker, exhibiting high test-retest 
reliability and being correlated across different forms of appetitive reward. If 
discounting indeed indexes an impulsive personality trait, then high discounting ought 
to precede unhealthy choice. The majority of studies reviewed above are cross-
sectional and are therefore indeterminate as to whether high discounting antecedes 
unhealthy behaviour, or vice versa.  However one study reviewed here demonstrates 
that monetary discounting can prospectively predict onset of unhealthy behaviour 
(Audrain-McGovern et al., 2009). Furthermore a growing number of studies have 
shown that monetary discounting predicts response to behaviour-change interventions 
(Yoon et al., 2007; Dallery and Raiff, 2007; Krishnan-Sarin et al., 2007; MacKillop 
and Kahler, 2009; Mueller et al., 2009; Washio et al., 2011; Sheffer et al., 2012; 
Stanger et al., 2012; Brown and Adams, 2013). Thus discounting has predictive utility 
and may allow health-behaviour change interventions to be tailored to benefit at-risk 
groups. In addition, interventions may be targeted at modifying the cognitive 
mechanisms associated with discounting, which under a trait hypothesis are assumed 
to contribute to unhealthy behaviour, for example working memory training has been 
shown to both reduce discount rates and modify addictive behaviour (Bickel, Yi, 
Landes, Hill, & Baxter, 2011).  
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Nevertheless, there is also considerable evidence from the studies reviewed 
that discounting is influenced by state-based factors. Discount rates amongst 
substance misusers are greater in a state of drug-craving than in a drug-sated state, 
and discount rates have been shown to decrease following behaviour change (e.g. 
Kulendran et al., 2013; Landes, Christensen, & Bickel, 2012). These findings are 
supported by a wealth of additional evidence showing that discounting can be 
manipulated through contextual framing (see Koffarnus et al. 2013 for a review).  The 
observation that discounting exhibits state-dependence does not necessarily detract 
from its trait status, provided that the rank ordering of discount rates across 
individuals is preserved over these changes in state (for example, if addicted 
individuals who have the highest discount rates in a drug-sated state also have the 
highest rates when craving the drug). To our knowledge no studies have directly 
examined this. Until this question is addressed, a conservative conclusion would be to 
view discounting as a concurrent marker of the extent of unhealthy behaviour, rather 
than exclusively as an anteceding risk factor.  
 
3.4.2 CONCLUDING REMARKS 	  	  
This chapter has addressed correlations between discounting and health 
behaviour, without explicit discussion of the psychological processes putatively 
linking the two. Hyperbolic discounting has been envisaged by some authors as a 
mechanistic model, in the sense of being an algorithm by which humans or animals 
evaluate delayed outcomes (Ainslie, 1992; Ainslie, 2001). This algorithmic 
interpretation of discounting suggests that unhealthy choices in part result from 
hyperbolic discounting of their distant health consequences. For example, an oft-cited 
hypothesis is that the dynamic inconsistency theoretically engendered by hyperbolic 
discounting causes people renege on their best-laid plans. The next chapter, Chapter 
4, scrutinises this proposal. Also, whilst hyperbolic discounting is widely accepted as 
a descriptive model for choice between immediate and delayed rewards (though see 
Kable & Glimcher, 2010; Luhmann, 2013; Read, 2001; Read et al., 2012; Read & 
Roelofsma, 2003), few previous authors have mapped out the functional form which 
best explains intertemporal choice for aversive outcomes. Many health-relevant 
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choices involve aversive outcomes, for example in the form of a painful preventive 
procedure, unaccustomed exercise, or even illness itself, and a model for aversive 
time preferences might assist in predicting choices concerned these kinds of outcome. 
To address this lacuna, Chapter 5 aims to test and extend existing theoretical accounts 
of negative time preference for aversive events.   
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4. 
DISCOUNTING AND SELF-CONTROL 
“People sometimes behave as if they had two selves, one who wants clean 
lungs and a long life, an another who adores tobacco.” 
 
   Thomas C. Schelling – Choice and Consequence (1984) 
 
  
Most people are familiar with having made well-intentioned plans for the 
future that they fail to carry out. For example early in the week one might plan to go 
to the gym on Sunday morning, only to find that when Sunday morning arrives, 
staying in bed appears more attractive. The attempt to enact one’s goals despite 
competing motives is referred to as ‘willpower’ (Ainslie, 2001) or ‘self-control’ (Tuk, 
2015; O’Donoghue & Rabin, 2003; Prelec & Bodner, 2003; Thaler & Shefrin, 1981), 
and is often characterised as a conflict between larger-later and smaller-sooner 
rewards, which Read, Loewenstein, and Kalyanaraman (1999) have termed ‘virtues’ 
and ‘vices’ respectively. Such conflicts are a likely source of the marked intention-
action discrepancy in health behaviour (Sheeran, 2002).  
  
4.2 HYPERBOLIC DISCOUNTING AND DYNAMIC INCONSISTENCY 
  
A classically rational agent would have no need for willpower, instead 
adhering effortlessly to previously made plans (Baron, 2000; Samuelson, 1937; Strotz 
et al., 1957). In axiomatic terms, a self-consistent agent who prefers a smaller reward, 𝑟 available at time t, over a larger reward, 𝑅, available at time 𝑡 + 𝑑, denoted by 𝑟, 𝑡 ≻    𝑅, 𝑡 + 𝑑 ,  should still prefer the smaller reward when both rewards are 
delayed into the future by an added delay, 𝜙, that is should also satisfy   (𝑟, 𝑡 + 𝜙) ≻
	   66	  
(𝑅, 𝑡 + 𝑑 + 𝜙). This is referred to as the stationarity axiom and is satisfied if the 
agent discounts delayed reward exponentially.  
 However, there is substantial evidence that, in choices between immediate and 
delayed rewards, both humans and animals exhibit relatively lower discount rates 
over longer delays than over shorter delays (e.g. Ainslie, 1974, 1975, 2001; Benzion 
et al., 1989; Chung & Herrnstein, 1967; Green et al., 1994; Mazur, 1987), a pattern 
more consistent with a hyperbolic, rather than an exponential discount function. A 
decision maker with a hyperbolic discount function violates the stationarity axiom. In 
other words, hyperbolic discounting predicts that a preference for smaller-sooner over 
larger-later reward can be reversed simply by adding sufficient delay before both 
options are available. Hyperbolic discounting is therefore superficially consistent with 
a tendency for people to choose virtues over vices when viewed from a distance, but 
to reverse their choice when the situation is at hand (see Figure 1.1). Furthermore, 
since hyperbolic discount rates correlate with many forms of unhealthy behaviour (see 
Chapter 3), hyperbolic discounting has been proposed as an algorithmic explanation 
for impulsive reward-seeking at the expense of long-term plans (e.g. Ainslie, 2001; 
Angeletos et al., 2001; Bickel et al., 2012; Laibson, 1997; for a discussion of 
algorithmic models see Farrell & Lewandowsky, 2010; Lewandowsky & Farrell, 
2010; Marr, 1982) 
 
4.3 EVIDENCE FOR AND AGAINST HYPERBOLIC DISCOUNTING  
 
Despite the elegance of the above account, direct empirical evidence for it is 
mixed. The majority of studies providing support for hyperbolic over exponential 
discounting elicit choices between immediate and delayed rewards, where lower 
discount rates over long delays (e.g. Benzion et al., 1989; Bleichrodt & Johannesson, 
2001; Raineri & Rachlin, 1993), or an improved fit with a (quasi-)hyperbolic rather 
than an exponential model (Kirby & Maraković, 1995; Van Der Pol & Cairns, 2002), 
are taken to indicate violation of stationarity. However such studies do not in fact 
demonstrate preference reversals in process. As Read (2001) identifies, such studies 
confound the length of delay with the interval separating the two rewards, since in 
studies where the sooner reward is immediate these are identical. Thus although in 
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such studies implied discount rates are seen to decrease with increasing delay, this 
could equally be attributable to decreasing discount rates over longer intervals. 
A more rigorous approach therefore tests for preference reversal directly by 
adding a ‘front-end’ delay to both sooner and later options and testing whether this 
indeed causes people to shift their preference from smaller-sooner to larger-later 
options as hyperbolic discounting predicts. Several studies have demonstrated that 
adding a front-end delay indeed causes the predicted preference shift (e.g. Green et 
al., 1994; Kirby & Herrnstein, 1995; Van Der Pol & Cairns, 2011). However, Read 
(2001) found that when a delay was divided into three intervals and discounting 
measured separately for each interval, discounting over the final interval was not 
significantly greater than that over the first interval. In other words adding a front-end 
delay did not produce the decrease in discounting predicted by hyperbolic 
discounting. Similarly, Kable & Glimcher (2010) found that discount functions based 
on a choice set in which all options were delayed by a fixed amount had the same 
hyperbolic curvature as those based on the same choice set in which the sooner option 
always occurred immediately. They concluded that their participants evaluated all 
delayed rewards relative to the earliest available reward, in contrast to conventional 
hyperbolic discounting, in which all outcomes are evaluated relative to the present 
time. This “as-soon-as-possible” function does not predict impulsive preference 
reversal.  
Finally, an even more rigorous approach to testing the premises of hyperbolic 
discounting is to look for the predicted preference reversals longitudinally: if 
hyperbolic discounting is veridical, preference should shift from larger-later to 
smaller-sooner rewards with the passage of time.   Such longitudinal preference 
reversals have been successfully demonstrated in choices with health-relevant 
outcomes. For example, Read and Van Leeuwen (1998) asked people whether they 
would prefer to receive in one week’s time either a healthy snack (such as a piece of 
fruit) or an unhealthy snack (such as a chocolate bar). The same individuals were 
followed up and one week later they were offered an immediate choice between a 
healthy and an unhealthy snack. Respondents chose healthy snacks more frequently 
when the choice was made in advance compared to when the snacks were 
immediately available. However, studies testing the predictions of hyperbolic 
discounting in real-time using monetary outcomes have had mixed findings (Ainslie 
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& Haendel, 1983; Read et al., 2012; Sayman & Öncüler, 2009). The earliest of these 
studies found support for the preference reversals predicted by hyperbolic 
discounting. In this study Ainslie and Haendel (1983) asked participants on a Monday 
to choose between smaller amount of (hypothetical) money on to be received on 
Friday and larger amount to be received the following Monday. Participants were 
offered the choice again on the Friday, this time between receiving the smaller 
amount (for real) immediately or the delayed amount on the coming Monday. 
Consistent with hyperbolic discounting, the most common pattern was a preference 
for the larger-later amount when choices were made in advance, but for the smaller 
sooner amount when this was immediate. However subsequent studies have not 
replicated this finding. Sayman and Öncüler (2009) found the opposite result using a 
design similar to that of Ainslie and Haendel (1983). Furthermore a study performed 
over several weeks using real monetary rewards showed that preference reversals 
towards choosing smaller-sooner amounts (that is, in the direction predicted by 
hyperbolic discounting) were not significantly more common than those in the 
opposite direction (Read et al., 2012). Importantly this was the case despite the 
participants displaying hyperbolic discounting in conventional “cross-sectional” 
choices.   
In summary, the preference reversals of the form predicted by conventional 
hyperbolic discounting have hitherto not been consistently demonstrated, at least with 
monetary outcomes. Nevertheless, intention-action discrepancies in health behaviour 
do exist, and failures of self-control accord with everyday experience. This suggests 
that the preference reversals underlying health-related choices (such as those in Read 
and van Leeuwen, 1998) do not result directly from hyperbolic discounting in an 
algorithmic sense. Instead, real-world preference reversals may result from peoples’ 
inability to predict in advance the impact of motivational and environmental states on 
their future decision-making.  
 
4.4 GOAL-INCONGRUENT ACTIONS OFTEN RESULT FROM STATE CHANGES  	  	  
Everyday experience suggests that people often abandon long-term plans in 
favour of immediate reward in response to environmental cues or changes in internal 
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motivational state; for example, one might plan to abstain from eating dessert as part 
of a diet plan, but find it harder to resist when presented with a piece of cake (see for 
example Allan et al., 2010). This idea is supported by evidence; for example, relapses 
in drug-taking behaviour following abstinence commonly occur after exposure to a 
previous drug-taking environment (O'Brien, Childress, Ehrman, & Robbins, 1998). 
Indeed, hyperbolic discounting often does not appear necessary to explain these state-
dependent influences. For example, in a study of analgesic preferences for childbirth 
(Christensen-Szalanski, 1984), women asked roughly one month in advance of labor 
preferred to avoid invasive spinal anesthesia in favor of less invasive but less effective 
pain relief methods, however during active labor women frequently reversed 
preference and opted for anesthesia. These findings are easily explained by an 
increase in the marginal utility for anaesthesia during the painful state, which was not 
accurately predicted in advance, without reference to hyperbolic discounting.  
In keeping with the suggestions above, Loewenstein (1996) and Read (2001) 
have proposed that motivational drives and the cues that elicit them, rather than 
hyperbolic discounting, are responsible for impulsive preference reversal. However, 
existing accounts of these ‘visceral influences’ (Loewenstein, 1996) have tended to 
lack an explicit framework either for incorporating the motivational information 
provided by environmental cues, or for how this information becomes associated with 
cues through learning. The following discussion advances a suggested quantitative 
framework based on the principles of reinforcement learning for understanding the 
effects of environmental cues on intertemporal health choice. Key to this account is 
the notion that cues previously associated with rewarding actions can trigger goal-
incongruent habits, leading to preference reversal even in the absence of hyperbolic 
discounting.  A full exploration of learning is beyond the scope of this discussion, 
which is restricted to the effects of cues after learning has taken place.  
 
4.5 A REINFORCEMENT LEARNING APPROACH TO CUE-TRIGGERED 
PREFERENCE REVERSAL 
 
Models of reinforcement learning posit that action control proceeds by 
estimating the expected value of ensuing reward over series of temporally connected 
future states, encapsulated in a state-action value function (Sutton & Barto, 1998); 
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such models are therefore well placed to incorporate the effects of state-changes on 
choice behaviour. Attempting to optimise value in changing environments can be 
considered a trade-off between flexibility in rapidly incorporating new information 
and the efficient use of past experience (Daw, Niv, & Dayan, 2005). This trade-off is 
embodied by two methods of learning: a rather rigid, but computationally lean 
method, referred to as model-free, and a flexible, planning method capable of 
simulating future possible outcomes, often referred to as model-based (Daw, 
Gershman, Seymour, Dayan, & Dolan, 2011; R. J. Dolan & Dayan, 2013; Gläscher, 
Daw, Dayan, & O'Doherty, 2010; McDannald, Lucantonio, Burke, Niv, & 
Schoenbaum, 2011; Simon & Daw, 2011; Wunderlich, Smittenaar, & Dolan, 2012). 
These systems reflect an established distinction in psychology between deliberative 
and automatic processes (Evans & Stanovich, 2013), but endow this with a normative 
and explicitly computational basis (Daw et al., 2005; Dayan, Niv, Seymour, & Daw, 
2006).  
A model-based decision-maker is generally assumed to search through the 
possible future states consequent on each action. Model-based decision-making 
corresponds to the definition of “goal-directed” behaviour in animal learning 
experiments as rapidly sensitive to changes in outcome value or the contingency 
between response and outcome (Balleine & Dickinson, 1998; Colwill & Rescorla, 
1986; Dickinson & Balleine, 1994; Domjan, 2003). A model-free decision-maker, by 
contrast, through a gradual integration of outcome values encountered through 
experience, assigns a scalar estimate of long-run future value to taking an action in a 
particular state, without explicitly representing the corresponding future state of the 
world. The resulting ‘cached’ action values are relatively insensitive to immediate 
changes in the outcomes. Instrumental behaviour is initially goal-directed (model-
based), but becomes increasingly model-free with learning, such that actions 
eventually become insensitive to changes in the value of the outcome, acquiring the 
characteristic of habits (Dickinson, Balleine, Watt, Gonzalez, & Boakes, 1995; Neal, 
2006; Ouellette, 1998). Say for example a rat is trained to press a lever to obtain a 
food reward.  Early in learning, lever pressing can be abolished by devaluing the food 
reward, for example by pairing it with sickness outside of the response box. By 
implication level pressing is ‘goal-directed’: the rat presses because it ‘wants’ the 
food, a want that is abolished by pairing the food with sickness. By contrast, after 
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extensive training, lever pressing continues to some extent even after the food is 
devalued (Dickinson, Balleine, Watt, Gonzalez, & Boakes, 1995). This perserverative 
behaviour bears direct analogy to economic models of habit formation, which modify 
the instantaneous utility function to depend on past consumption (G. S. Becker & 
Murphy, 1988).  
The differential engagement of these two systems has the potential to explain 
the environmental dependence of the preference reversals which underlie many forms 
of unhealthy behaviour. While steep temporal discounting over the model-based 
valuation of future health would be expected to encourage the initiation of unhealthy 
behaviour, with repetition, unhealthy behaviour is likely to become increasingly 
model-free, or habitual. At this stage, even if the decision-maker re-evaluates their 
goals in favor of making healthy choices, cached action values will continue to 
encourage unhealthy choice in response to relevant environmental cues, leading to 
apparently impulsive preference reversals (intention-action discrepancies).  
 
4.5.1 ENVIRONMENTAL CUES CAN TRIGGER GOAL-INCONGRUENT HABITS 
 
As outlined below, the goal-incongruent influence of cached (habitual) action 
values can produce preference reversal, without invoking hyperbolic discounting. 
Furthermore, preference reversal can result even if each system in isolation exhibits 
exponential discounting and discounts the future at the same rate, a crucial distinction 
from dual-process models of quasi-hyperbolic discounting (Angeletos et al., 2001; 
Koffarnus et al., 2013; Laibson, 1997; McClure et al., 2007; McClure et al., 2004). To 
demonstrate this formally, I consider a decision-making agent for whom overall 
action value is a weighted average of the value from each controller, where both 
systems discount the future exponentially with a per period rate, 𝛾  (𝛾  is the 
conventional symbol for the discount rate in reinforcement learning approaches; its 
meaning is equivalent to that of 𝛿 in Equation 1).  
Say, for example, the agent is a person who has just commenced a new diet 
plan and is choosing whether or not to consume a calorific biscuit when faced with a 
cue, the biscuit tin.  A simplified (semi-Markov) state space for this decision is 
depicted in Figure 4.1. State B represents the presence of the biscuit tin. Consuming 
biscuits leads after a short delay, 𝑑! ,  to state C, which carries a reward associated with 
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the tasty biscuits, 𝑅! , and after a longer delay, 𝑑! , to maintaining one’s current 
weight, for simplicity here assigned a reward value of zero. By contrast, abstaining 
from biscuits leads, via the unrewarded state, 𝐴, to a small incremental health benefit 
in the form of weight loss, 𝑅! , after delay 𝑑!.  
Say for example that before starting the diet plan, the goal-directed value of 
the delayed health benefit was zero (𝑅! = 0),  and on starting the diet increases to 𝑅!. 
The model-based system is capable of flexibly incorporating this new goal-value, 
however the model-free system has learned the cached value of consuming biscuits 
(termed a ‘𝑄  –value’) based solely on the reward previously provided from 
consumption, and not the health consequences (Figure 2B). It is assumed that the 
model-based system has some difficulty in forecasting these cached values. Consider 
then that the agent, is asked to make their decision when situated in state P, at some 
time delay,  𝑝 in advance of state B, where cached values have no influence, and that 
here they are indifferent between indulging and abstaining, that is to say that the 
model-based value, 𝑄!", of consumption is equal to that of abstention: 
 𝑄!"(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑒,𝑃)   =   𝑄!"(𝐴𝑏𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛,𝑃) 
     (4.5.1) 
 
Given by: 
 𝑅! ∙   𝛾!!!!! =   𝑅! ∙   𝛾!!! 
     (4.5.2) 
 
Which simplifies to:  
 𝑅! ∙   𝛾!!! =   𝑅! ∙   𝛾! 
        (4.5.3) 
 
On reaching B, the presentation of the biscuit tin, cached action values are also 
“brought online”, incrementing the benefit of indulging, such that: 
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𝑄!"#$%&'( =   𝑄!" ∙     𝜔 + 𝑄!" ∙     (1− 𝜔) 
        (4.5.4) 
 
Given by: 
 
 𝑄!"#$%&'( 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑒,𝐵 =    𝑅! ∙   𝛾! ∙ 𝜔   + [𝑅! ∙   𝛾! ∙ (1− 𝜔)  ] 
         (4.5.5) 
 𝑄!"#$%&'( 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛,𝐵 =   𝑅! ∙   𝛾!!! ∙ 𝜔 
       (4.5.6) 
And therefore, by Equation 4.5.4: 
         𝑅! ∙   𝛾!!! ∙ 𝜔 ≤ 𝑅! ∙   𝛾! ∙ 𝜔   + [𝑅! ∙   𝛾! ∙ (1− 𝜔)  ] 
       (4.5.7) 
Predicting a preference for indulging for 𝜔 < 1. Therefore the presentation of the 
biscuit tin brings about a preference for sooner consumption. In economic terms, 
environmental cues such as the biscuit tin can be viewed as updating the utility of the 
immediately available option, by providing (previously inaccessible) information 
from prior experience. This is simply a way of formalising the idea that previously 
formed habits can be difficult to overcome.  
The interplay between model-based and model-free systems in the account 
above bears some similarity to existing dual-systems models of intertemporal choice, 
which posit a deliberative planning system in opposition with an impulsive system. 
However, while the former are often mapped onto quasi-hyperbolic models of 
discounting (McClure et al., 2007;  McClure et al., 2004), which combine two 
exponential discount functions with differing rates, here the two systems may share 
the same discount rate. Dynamic inconsistency can then result from the different 
sources of information available to either controller (also see Dayan et al., 2006).  In 
particular, the state-dependent valuations of the cached system can explain why real-
world preference reversals occur in response to learned cues and, unlike existing 
quasi-hyperbolic accounts, why these preference reversals become more prominent 
with the formation of habits. In addition, unlike existing dual-process accounts, 
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reinforcement learning models can explicitly model the learning process generating 
incongruent preferences.  
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Figure 4.1 Interactions between model-based and model-free decision-making. An agent 
deciding whether or not to consume biscuits given a cue, the biscuit tin. The agent’s choice 
combines model-based and model-free value. A Model-based decision-tree from state, 𝑃 at a 
time,𝑑!, in advance of encountering the biscuit tin, denoted by state  𝐵. Actions at 𝐵 are 
evaluated by searching through the tree. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑒 is followed after a short delay,𝑑!, with 
food reward, 𝑅!, associated with consumption, state  𝐶, followed after a longer delay, 𝑑!, by 
the maintenance of current body weight, the unrewarded state, 𝑈. 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛  is followed after 
delay, 𝑑!, by the unrewarded state 𝐴, followed after delay, 𝑑!, by weight loss with reward, 𝑅!. The agent is naïve to model-free values. Model-based values, 𝑄!", are given by the total 
reward following each action, discounted according to, 𝐷(𝑡), here exponential and identical 
across both controllers. B Model-free values: neither the outcomes, nor the transitions 
between them, are represented. Distant health consequences do not influence these values, 𝑄!" . Model-based and model-free values combine according to a weighted average, 
governed by 𝜔. At 𝑃, where model-free values have no influence, the agent is indifferent 
between consuming and abstaining. In the presence of the biscuit tin at 𝐵 however the 
additional influence of model-free (cached) values induces preference for consumption. 
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4.6 DISCUSSION 
 
The foregoing evidence and argument challenge hyperbolic discounting as an 
explanation for intention-action discrepancies. The preference reversal predicted by 
hyperbolic discounting is not consistently evidenced in longitudinal studies of choices 
between delayed sums of money, and preference reversal can formally result from 
failure to forecast the effects of environmental cues and motivational states on 
behaviour, without evoking hyperbolic discounting. Nevertheless, independent the 
precise form of the discount function, steep discounting would putatively favor the 
initiation of unhealthy behaviour at a goal-directed level, following which the 
acquisition of habits might effectively bind impulsive individuals to their initial 
choices.  In addition, repeated choice of immediately available rewards by individuals 
with high discount rates would be expected to lead to these individuals acquiring 
habits more rapidly (by more reinforced choices).  
The above process appears particularly relevant to addiction (Everitt et al., 
2008; Everitt & Robbins, 2005; Lucantonio, Caprioli, & Schoenbaum, 2014) and may 
in part account for the strong relationships between discount rates and addictive 
states. In support of this, animal studies of addiction demonstrate that rats bred to 
exhibit steeper delay discounting more rapidly acquire compulsive self-administration 
of cocaine than their low discounting counterparts (Belin et al., 2008). Finally, the 
shift towards model-free responding might be made all the more irrevocable in 
chronic addiction (Keramati, Dezfouli, & Piray, 2012), through damage to frontal 
cortical areas on which model-based valuations are thought to depend (Camchong et 
al., 2011; Gläscher et al., 2010; R. D. Rogers & Robbins, 2001; Smittenaar, 
FitzGerald, Romei, Wright, & Dolan, 2013), with an attendant decrease in the 
capacity to exert model-based control over goal-incongruent habits.  
 
4.6.1 INNATE (PAVLOVIAN) INFLUENCES 
 
Notably, while the above account focuses on goal-directed valuations and 
learned habits, it is also likely that innately signaled sources of cached value, and their 
interaction with motivational states, have an important behavioural effect. For 
example, if I am offered a tasty looking snack it I am likely to find it harder to resist 
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when hungry than when sated. This idea has been formalised by proposing that, in 
addition to goal-directed and habitual control, an innate controller mediates 
motivational state changes and initiates stereotyped evolutionarily appropriate actions 
in response to stimulus cues (Dayan et al., 2006; Domjan, 2003; Pavlov, 2003). This 
controller can be seen as reporting which stimuli and attendant actions have proved 
advantageous in our evolutionary past. The innate system is often referred to as 
‘Pavlovian’, with reference to Pavlovian conditioning, in which a stimulus capable of 
eliciting an innate response is temporally paired with an arbitrary environmental cue, 
which subsequently becomes capable of eliciting the response independently 
(Domjan, 2003; Pavlov, 2003). Such innate affordances correspond to the ‘visceral’ 
influences (Loewenstein, 1996) and emotionally ‘hot’ states (Chapman, 2005; 
Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999) which have been previously associated with self-control 
failure, but place these influences within a quantitative framework.  
The precise contributions of instrumental and Pavlovian effects to real-world 
choices are difficult to distinguish, for example there is also an ongoing debate as to 
role of classical (Pavlovian) conditioning in addictive disorders, and its interaction 
with the aforementioned instrumental processes (Everitt and Robbins, 2005). 
Nevertheless the mechanism of choice inconsistency proposed above for the case of 
model-based and model-free interactions would remain largely equivalent for the case 
of interactions between model-based and Pavlovian values (Dayan et al., 2006). An 
advantage of the reinforcement learning approach is its ability to generate simulations 
of these interactions over the course of learning and such models may yield 
parameters capable of explaining further variance in health behaviour.  
 
4.6.2 FUTURE DIRECTIONS 	  	  
Novel interventions might be directed at specific constructs within the above 
framework, and indeed several existing health behaviour interventions can be viewed 
in this manner. For example strategies aimed at making healthy choices habitual are 
already known to be effective (Lally, Chipperfield, & Wardle, 2008). Similarly, the 
Implementation Intentions approach (Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006; Sheeran, Milne, 
Webb, & Gollwitzer, 2009) can be seen as encouraging people to set up cached values 
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in advance, by specifying ‘if-then’ plans for how to enact a particular goal when a 
situation calling for self-control is encountered. These approaches are discussed in 
more detail in the General Discussion (Chapter 10). There is an urgent requirement 
for novel interventions capable of reducing goal-incongruent unhealthy choice, since 
the increasing burden of disease attributable to unhealthy behaviour is placing 
unsustainable demands on existing healthcare systems (R. Smith et al., 2012).  
This chapter has focused on preference reversals for appetitive outcomes. By 
contrast, goal-incongruent choices regarding unpleasant, or ‘dreaded’ events have 
been less extensively studied from an economic perspective (for a discussion of the 
theoretical implications see Loewenstein, 1987), and no previous studies have set out 
to establish precisely how the disvalue of future pain depends on its timing. Much of 
the experimental work described in subsequent chapters of this dissertation addresses 
this issue.   
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5. 
GENERAL EXPERIMENTAL METHODS 
“Would the art of measuring be the saving principle, or would the power of 
appearance?” 
- Plato, Protagoras 
 
This chapter details the generic procedures and analytical methods used in the 
experiments described in Chapters 6 to 9. Treatment is first given to methods for 
estimating models of utility from discrete choice experiments, since this forms the 
bulk of the experimental work contained in this thesis. I then give a brief description 
of methods that yield continuous estimates of subjective utility, namely matching 
procedures and incentive-compatible auctions. The final sections of the chapter 
concern the procedures used to induce pain in the laboratory, physiological 
measurements and the design of the social decision-making experiments described in 
Chapters 8 and 9.  	  
5.1 ESTIMATING UTILITY FROM DISCRETE CHOICE EXPERIMENTS 	  	  
By the principle of revealed preference, choosing a particular option over an 
alternative is taken to indicate that the chosen option carries higher subjective value 
(utility) for the decision-maker (see Sen, 1971). Of course, an experimenter might 
wish to disambiguate alternative functions for how utility depends on factors such as 
magnitude or delay. A straightforward approach to this is to design a set of choice 
options that titrate the independent variable of interest. For example, choices used to 
estimate discounting titrate upwards the size of a small immediate reward, while 
holding constant the size of a larger delayed reward and the delay (Kirby et al., 1999; 
Mazur, 1987). The point at which the subject switches their choice from preferring the 
large delayed reward to preferring the smaller immediate reward provides an estimate 
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of the indifference point at each delay (the point at which immediate and delayed 
options carry equal subjective value) and hence the discount rate. The Bayesian 
methods described below are based on analysis of a large number of such binary 
choices, presented in a randomised order. These methods incorporate stochasticity in 
choices, enabling a decision maker’s preference for A over B to be expressed as a 
probability that they will choose A over B, and thereby allowing utility to be placed 
on a continuous scale (Glimcher et al., 2009; Glimcher et al., 2005).  
The above approach requires a linking function to transform the utilities 
associated with alternative actions to the probability of choosing each, conventionally 
a logit, or softmax, function of the following form: 
 
 𝜋  (𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑒  𝑎)   =          exp 𝛽 ∙ 𝑈 𝑠|𝑎exp 𝛽 ∙ 𝑈 𝑠|𝑎′!!            
             (5.1.1) 
 
Thus the probability,  𝜋, of choosing action, 𝑎, is an exponential function of the 
utility of the state, 𝑠, obtained after taking action 𝑎, divided by the sum of the 
exponentiated value of all alternative actions, 𝑎’. (The utility of a state conditional on 
performing a given action is referred to as an action value). The parameter 𝛽, referred 
to as the inverse temperature, governs the steepness of the sigmoid dependence 
between values and choice probabilities, as illustrated in Figure 5.1, and can be 
thought of as governing the agent’s sensitivity to the underlying utilities. When 𝛽 = 0 
all actions are chosen with uniform probability. As 𝛽 increases there is an increasing 
probability of choosing the option with higher value on any given choice. 𝛽 is usually 
fitted as a free parameter in modelling applications. The probability function 𝜋 is 
referred to as the ‘policy’. For the special case of two alternative actions the above 
simplifies to: 
 𝜋 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑒  𝑎 =    11+ exp  [ β (𝑈(𝑠|𝑎!)− 𝑈(𝑠|𝑎))]           
         (5.1.2) 
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This illustrates that the probability of choosing an action 𝑎  over an alternative 𝑎’  increases as a function of the value difference between 𝑎 and 𝑎’ (see Figure 5.1). 
More precisely the log odds of choosing 𝑎!over  𝑎 increase as a linear function of the 
value difference (obtained by rearranging the above): 
 log 𝜋 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑒  𝑎′𝜋 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑒  𝑎 = 𝛽[𝑈 𝑠 𝑎! − 𝑈 𝑠 𝑎 ] 
         (5.1.3) 
 
This formulation has been shown to provide a good fit to behaviour in decision-
making tasks (Daw, O'Doherty, Dayan, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006; for a theoretical 
review see J. D. Cohen, McClure, & Yu, 2007).  
 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Softmax (logistic) action selection function for binary choice. The probability 
of choosing an action,  𝑎, over an alternative, 𝑎’, increases as a sigmoid function of the 
increase in utility obtained by choosing 𝑎  rather than 𝑎’ , 𝑈(𝑠|𝑎) − 𝑈(𝑠|𝑎’).  The inverse 
temperature parameter, 𝛽, governs the steepness of this relationship, shown here for three 
settings of 𝛽.  
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5.2 BAYESIAN MODEL COMPARISON 
 
 Bayesian model comparison (Daw, 2011; Raftery, 1995; Stephan, Penny, 
Daunizeau, Moran, & Friston, 2009) offers a principled means to disambiguate 
alternative models for how utility itself depends on the independent variables of 
interest. For example, a researcher might be interested in establishing a function by 
which the delay preceding a reward and reward magnitude interact to influence the 
utility of the reward. To do so the researcher could compare alternative models 
(functional forms) for the effect of these two factors. The Bayesian approach 
prioritises models that provide a good fit to the data, whilst penalising more complex 
models, which is important because a more complex model will always fit the data 
better, but may not make good predictions outside of the current experimental context 
(Lewandowsky & Farrell, 2010). The approach is based on Bayes’ theorem, a 
fundamental principle of conditional probability: 
 𝑝 𝐻 𝐸 =   𝑝 𝐻   𝑝(𝐸|𝐻)𝑝(𝐸)  
        (5.2.1) 
 
Thus the posterior probability of an hypothesis, 𝐻, being true given some 
evidence, 𝐸, is proportional to the prior probability of the hypothesis being true 
(before seeing the evidence),𝑝(𝐻), multiplied by the probability of observing 𝐸 under 
a state of the world in which 𝐻  is true, 𝑝(𝐸|𝐻), (termed the likelihood of the 
hypothesis). To turn the resulting estimate into a probability measure, this product is 
divided by a normalising constant, given by the probability of observing 𝐸 under all 
possible hypotheses, 𝑝(𝐸).  
For the purpose of model comparison, the hypothesis is the model under test, 𝑀, and the evidence is the experimental data, 𝒚, giving: 
 𝑝 𝑀 𝒚 𝛼  𝑝 𝑀   𝑝(𝒚|𝑀) 
        (5.2.2) 
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That is, the posterior probability, given the data, of a model being true is 
proportional to the prior probability of the model being true, 𝑝 𝑀 ,  multiplied by the 
consistency between the model and the data, formally the probability of the data given 
the model, 𝑝(𝒚|𝑀) . The latter is referred to as the evidence for model 𝑀 . If 
consideration is given only to models that are equally plausible on a priori grounds, 𝑝 𝑀  can be safely ignored, and models compared on the basis of the model 
evidence.  
To compare models the best fitting parameters, 𝜃, of each model must first be 
estimated. Expressed in terms of Bayes’ theorem, doing so seeks to maximise the 
posterior probability of the parameters, given the data and the model (Daw, 2011; 
Lewandowsky & Farrell, 2010): 
 𝑝 𝜃 𝒚,𝑀 = 𝑝 𝒚 𝜃,𝑀 𝑝(𝜃|𝑀)𝑝(𝒚|𝑀)  
        (5.2.3) 
 
In the numerator, 𝑝 𝒚 𝜃,𝑀  is the probability of seeing the data given the 
model and the current parameter settings, and indicates the extent to which the 
parameterised model provides a close fit to the data; expressed as a function of 𝜃 it is 
referred to as the likelihood function. 𝑝(𝜃|𝑀) represents the prior belief in the current 
setting of the parameters themselves. Note that the denominator,  𝑝(𝒚|𝑀), is the model 
evidence as described above. This can be computed by marginalising over the model 
parameters, 𝜃,  and integrating: 
 𝑝 𝒚 𝑀 = 𝑝 𝒚 𝜃,𝑀 𝑝(𝜃|𝑀)𝑑𝜃 
        (5.2.4) 
 
This term takes account of model complexity, penalising models whose parameters 
deviate further from their prior values. In practice this integral is often difficult to 
calculate analytically, leading to a number of approximate solutions.  
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5.2.1 MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATION 
 
 Given uniform priors on the model parameters, a straightforward approach to 
parameter estimation is to maximising the likelihood term, 𝑝 𝒚 𝜃,𝑀 , in other words 
finding the parameters,  𝜃!" , that make the observed pattern of data most probable 
(Daw, 2011; Lewandowsky & Farrell, 2011): 
   𝜃!" = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥!   𝑝(𝒚|𝜃,𝑀) 
        (5.2.5) 
The data here consist of a vector of 𝑛 choices made by each subject, such that: 
 𝒚 =    𝑐!,𝑐!, 𝑐!… 𝑐!  
        (5.2.6) 
 
The likelihood function for each data point, 𝑐!, is given by the policy, 𝜋, which 
is in turn determined by the utility and softmax functions. Assuming that each choice 
is an independent observation, the likelihood for all choices can be expressed as the 
product of the likelihood for each individual choice: 
 𝜃!" = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥!    𝑝(𝑐!|𝜃,𝑀)!  
        (5.2.7) 
 
Taking logs: 
 𝑙𝑜𝑔  𝜃!" = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥!    𝑙𝑜𝑔  𝑝 𝑐! 𝜃,𝑀!  
        (5.2.8) 
 
In practice the maximum can be calculated by minimising the negative log 
likelihood. To do so here I use non-linear optimisation routines in Matlab 
(Mathworks, USA), either a simplex optimisation (fminsearch: Nelder-Meald 
algorithm, Lagarias, Reeds, Wright, & Wright, 1998), or constrained optimisation 
(fmincon: Active-Set algorithm). Having obtained the maximum likelihood parameter 
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estimates for each model, an approximation to the (log) Bayesian model evidence is 
given by the Bayesian Information Criterion (Schwarz, 1978): 
 
 𝐵𝐼𝐶 =   −2𝑙𝑜𝑔  𝜃!"   + 𝑘𝑙𝑛(𝑛)   
        (5.2.9) 
where 𝑛 is the number of fitted choices for each subject, and 𝑘 the number of model 
parameters. The second term penalises more complex models, according to their 
number of parameters.  
If each subject’s choices are treated as independent, 𝐵𝐼𝐶  estimates for each 
subject can simply be summed to obtain a group-level estimate of the model evidence 
(Daw, 2011). This is sometimes referred to as fixed effects analysis, since the 
relationship of each subject’s data to the group (population) level data is ignored. 
Since the parameters for each subject are estimated independently, frequentist 
statistical tests can be performed on the parameter estimates, permitting conclusions 
to be drawn regarding particular effects at the population level (Daw, 2011; Friston, 
Stephan, Lund, Morcom, & Kiebel, 2005; Holmes & Friston, 1998). In this thesis I 
chiefly use this ‘summary statistic’ approach.  
A disadvantage of maximum likelihood fitting is that parameter estimates are 
sometimes poorly defined for particular ranges of the data, allowing parameters to 
take on extreme values. A solution is to impose sensible bounds on the parameters, 
which in practice means that extreme-valued parameters take on the lower or upper 
bound (Daw, 2011). This irregularity often means that parameter estimates are not 
normally distributed across subjects; for this reason I use non-parametric tests where 
applying this method. A further drawback of maximum-likelihood methods is that 
they tend to encounter local minima in the likelihood surface, and therefore often 
return estimates that do not reflect the global maximum likelihood. To circumvent this 
I use a random-multistarted overlay (RMSearch), which calls the optimiser 1000 
times at starting points drawn from a uniform distribution between the bounds.  
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5.2.2 HIERARCHICAL BAYESIAN MODEL-FITTING 
  
An alternative to the summary statistic approach is to perform Bayesian model 
comparison at the group level. The approach described below allows the distribution 
of parameters across subjects to inform an empirical prior for parameter estimation at 
the subject level (Daw, 2011; Huys et al., 2011; Huys et al., 2012). Model fitting at 
the subject level for each subject,  𝑗, then aims to find the maximum a posteriori 
estimate of 𝜃!, given a vector of each subject’s choices, 𝒚!: 
                 𝜃!!"# = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥!   𝑝(𝒚!|𝜃!)𝑝(𝜃!|𝜗) 
         (5.2.10) 
 
where 𝜗 are the parameters (hyperparameters) of an empirical prior distribution on 𝜃.  
The use of an empirical prior constrains unreliable parameter estimates to take on 
sensible values.  
Model-fitting in this case proceeds by estimating the maximum-likelihood 
hyperparameters, given the data from all  𝑁 subjects: 
 𝜗!" =   𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥!  𝑝 𝒚!…   𝒚! 𝜗 =   𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥! 𝑝(! 𝒚!|𝜗) 
         (5.2.11) 
 
Note that this is analogous to the equation for maximum-likelihood at the parameter 
level, only now is applied to estimation of the group-level priors. (Dependence on the 
model, M, is omitted for simplicity). The likelihood of the hyperparameters is 
obtained by integrating over the subject-level parameters, weighted by the empirical 
prior: 
         𝑝 𝒚! 𝜗 =    𝑑 𝜃!   𝑝 𝒚! 𝜃! 𝑝(𝜃!|𝜗) 
        (5.2.12) 
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Since both sides of the equation depend on 𝜗, this integral is intractable. I used a 
procedure described previously (Huys et al., 2011; Huys et al., 2012), which uses 
Expectation-Maximisation (E-M) to find a solution. The equations below were 
derived by Quentin Huys and colleagues, though the notation has been adapted to 
follow on from the preceding discussion. I apply this previously published method in 
Chapter 8, described in detail below. 
In the ‘E-step’ at the 𝑘 th iteration the maximum a posteriori  (MAP) 
parameter estimates for each subject are estimated, given an estimate of the empirical 
prior  from the preceding iteration, 𝜗(!!!): 
            𝜃!(!) =   𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥!   𝑝(𝒚!|𝜃!)𝑝(𝜃!|𝜗(!!!)) 
        (5.2.13) 
 
This maximisation is achieved by minimizing the negative log posterior 
probabilities by unconstrained nonlinear optimisation in Matlab (Mathworks, MA, 
USA). In the ‘M-step’, the estimated hyperparameters 𝜗(!) of the empirical prior 
distribution, mean 𝜇,  and factorised variance, 𝜎! , are then updated based on the 
group-level distribution of the estimated MAP parameters. The mean update is 
straightforward, and is simply given by the mean of the subject-level parameters: 
     𝜇(!) =    1𝑁 𝜃! !!  
       (5.2.14) 
 
The variance update is somewhat more complex, and incorporates both error 
in the estimation of each subject’s parameters, and between-subject variability. The 
estimate of the variance on the individual-level MAP parameters, uses a Laplace 
approximation, which assumes that the posterior is Gaussian around the MAP 
estimate: 
 𝑝 𝜃! 𝒚! ≈ 𝑁 𝜃! ! ,∑!(!)  
        (5.2.15) 
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where ∑!(!) is the second moment around 𝜃! ! , which approximates the variance. The 
factorised prior variance, 𝜎!, is then updated as follows: 
                  𝜎(!) ! = 1𝑁 𝜃! ! ! + ∑!(!)! − 𝜇 ! !   
        (5.2.16) 
 
The Bayesian model evidence, 𝑝 𝒚!…   𝒚! 𝑀 , can be approximated as 𝐵𝐼𝐶!"#   
(Huys et al., 2011; Huys et al., 2012):               − 12𝐵𝐼𝐶!"# = log𝑝(𝒚!…   𝒚! 𝜗!" −   12 𝑀 log  ( 𝒚!…   𝒚! ) 
        (5.2.17) 
 
where 𝒚!…   𝒚!  is the total number of choices made by all subjects, and 𝑀  denotes 
number of hyperparameters fitted (a mean and a variance for each parameter). By 
distinction from conventional BIC, log𝑝(𝒚!…   𝒚! 𝜗!"  is a sum over the model 
evidence at the subject level by integrating out the subject-level parameters: 
 
log𝑝(𝒚!…   𝒚! 𝜗!" =    log 𝑑𝜃  ! 𝑝 𝒚! 𝜃   𝑝 𝜃 𝜗!"   ≈    log 1𝐾 𝑝!!!!! 𝒚! 𝜃!  
 
         (5.2.18) 
 
The right hand expression approximates the integral by summing over 𝐾 
samples, drawn from the empirical prior, 𝑝 𝜃 𝜗!" .  Thus the individual-level 
parameters intervene between the data and the group-level inference, but are averaged 
out when comparing models. Since the above approach assumes that parameters are 
distributed normally in the population (or log normally if parameters are log 
transformed prior to inference), when using this approach I also analyse choice data 
directly with model-free approaches and non-parametric statistical tests, which do not 
rely on such distributional assumptions.  
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5.3 CONTINUOUS UTILITY ESTIMATES 	  
5.3.1 UTILITY MATCHING PROCEDURES 	  	  
An alternative to the forced choice methods described above is to simply ask 
participants to directly report their indifference points, for example by asking them to 
adjust the size of an immediate reward until they feel it just outweighs the subjective 
utility of a larger delayed reward, referred to as a ‘matching’ procedure (e.g. Read & 
Roelofsma, 2003; Van Der Pol & Cairns, 2008). Utility functions can then be 
estimated directly, for example by least squares curve fitting. I use a matching 
procedure in Experiment 1C to estimate time preferences for delayed illness, 
following a design previously published by Van der Pol and colleagues (Van Der Pol 
& Cairns, 2002) (see Chapter 6 for details). To compare models with different 
numbers of parameters, conventional BIC was estimated from the least squares model 
fits, by assuming that errors were normally distributed around the model estimate and 
using the normal probability density as a likelihood function.  
  
5.3.2 WILLINGNESS-TO-PAY 	  	  
 A further means of obtaining a continuous utility estimate is to elicit subjects’ 
willingness to pay money to obtain a particular outcome. A standard means of doing 
so in an ‘incentive-compatible’ fashion is to hold a simulated auction using a method 
proposed by Becker, deGroot and Marschak, abbreviated to ‘BDM’ (G. M. Becker, 
DeGroot, & Marschak, 1964) (for an application see Vlaev, Seymour, Dolan, & 
Chater, 2009). Here the participant is asked how much of an endowment they would 
be willing to pay to receive a given outcome, referred to as their ‘bid’. Subsequently a 
‘market price’ for the outcome is selected at random from a uniform distribution 
between zero and the size of the monetary endowment. If the participant’s bid 
exceeds the market price, they obtain the outcome and pay the market price (second-
price auction); otherwise they forgo the outcome and pay nothing, keeping the entire 
endowment. This method ensures that the optimum behaviour is to bid an amount that 
is exactly equivalent in utility terms to the subjective utility of the outcome. Where 
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this method was used (Experiment 4), participants were fully briefed on the method. 
Following previous studies from the same laboratory, we also used an animated 
‘roulette wheel’ effect to indicate that a market price was being selected randomly 
(see Chapter 9 for details).  
 
5.4 EXPERIMENTAL PAINFUL CUTANEOUS SHOCK STIMULI 	  	  
 The experiments presented in this thesis examine temporal and social 
preferences for aversive events. To implement real aversive outcomes I used electrical 
stimulation applied to the skin on the dorsum of the hand or wrist. Such stimuli are 
extensively used in studies of aversive processing (e.g. Berns et al., 2006; Crockett, 
Kurth-Nelson, Siegel, Dayan, & Dolan, 2014; Feldman-Hall et al., 2012; Hein, 
Lamm, Brodbeck, & Singer, 2011; Seymour et al., 2005; Singer et al., 2004; Vlaev et 
al., 2014; Vlaev et al., 2009; Winston, Vlaev, Seymour, Chater, & Dolan, 2014) and 
are considered to be harmless. Participants were fully briefed on the nature of the 
stimuli, and were free to discontinue the study at any time they wished. They were 
reassured that all stimuli would below an intensity level that they had indicated they 
were willing to tolerate. In fact all participants completed the experiments without 
undue distress.  
The current experimental setup was developed at the Wellcome Trust Centre 
for Neuroimaging by Ben Seymour, Ivo Vlaev and Joel Winston (e.g. Seymour et al., 
2005; Vlaev et al., 2014; Winston et al., 2014), and adapted for use in the current 
experiments by Giles Story.  For each experiment a constant current stimulator 
(Digitimer, Letchworth, UK) was used to deliver shocks via two silver chloride 
electrodes affixed to the dorsum of the hand or wrist. Experiments 1A and 2 used a 
DS7 constant current stimulator, Experiments 3A and 4 used a DS5 constant current 
stimulator. In each case the stimulator receives an analogue voltage input and 
converts this into a current, applying the necessary voltage to generate a current level, 
in milliamperes (mA) specified by the experimenter.  
After providing consent, participants underwent a threshold procedure, which 
allowed selection of current levels corresponding to an equivalent subjective level of 
discomfort for each participant, controlling for between participant variations in pain 
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perception. Notably that the pain scales used confound pain and unpleasantness (see 
Duncan, Bushnell, & Lavigne, 1989; Miron, Duncan, & Bushnell, 1989; Price, 
McGrath, Rafii, & Buckingham, 1983), however throughout I was primarily 
interested creating a generic noxious stimulus, rather than in isolating specific sensory 
components of pain.  Owing to the differences between the DS5 and DS7 stimulators, 
different threshold procedures were used in each case, detailed below.  The general 
principles of these procedures, and necessary Matlab code were developed by Joel 
Winston and Ben Seymour; the specific stimuli used were generated by Giles Story. 
 
5.4.1 THRESHOLD PROCEDURE FOR DS7 STIMULATOR 
 
The DS7 stimulator receives input from the parallel port of the Stimulus PC, 
which controls the timing of individual 200𝜇𝑠 square-wave pulses. The current level 
is set manually by adjusting a dial on the stimulator itself. In view of this constraint, 
to generate stimuli of equal duration, the severity of which could be controlled from 
the computer during the task, I manipulated the frequency of pulses within a 5 second 
stimulus train, while holding the current constant.  (The intensity of each discrete 
shock did not vary). The independent variable was the probability of receiving a 
shock at each sampled time interval during the 5 seconds, such that the number of 
shocks within the stimulus train followed a Poisson distribution.  To achieve this, 
each 5s stimulus was partitioned into 50 sampling intervals of 0.1s duration. There 
was a fixed probability of receiving a shock within each of these sampled 0.1s 
windows. For example to achieve an expected shock rate of 10 shocks/5s, the 
probability of receiving a shock in a given 0.1s interval was set to 10/50 (i.e. 1/5). The 
mean number of shocks per five seconds varied between 2 and 14, corresponding to 
mean shock rates of 0.4 and 2.8 shocks/s respectively. These stimuli were used for 
Experiments 1A and 2, which were performed in the same session with the same 
participants.  
The threshold procedure in this case was designed to set a current level such 
that each participant rated the five-second stimulus at the maximum shock rate (2.8 
shocks/s) as moderately severe pain. To achieve this the expected shock rate was set 
to 2.8 shocks/s whilst the current amplitude was varied. Participants provided a visual 
analog pain rating of the entire five-second stimulus on a continuous 10-point visual 
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analogue scale (VAS), where 0=no sensation at all, 1-3=mild pain or discomfort, 4-6= 
moderate pain, 7-9=moderate to severe pain and 10=intolerable pain.  I spent some 
time explaining the concept of this scale to participants, in order to set a realistic 
expectation of the level of shock. For example, the usage of such a scale in a 
controlled experiment clearly differs from its use in clinical practice, where 10/10 
pain would represent excruciating pain. In this case a 10/10 stimulus was set to the 
maximum pain a participant would be willing to tolerate for the purposes of the 
experiment (i.e. a level which the participant felt unwilling to endure). Current level 
was increased in small increments until the participant rated the stimulus as 6/10. The 
staircase procedure was then repeated, allowing participants time to adapt to initial 
anxiety about the shocks. I encouraged each participant to give a qualitative 
description of the resulting sensation as the current was increased, to check his or her 
interpretation of the rating scale. If their interpretation differed from the initial 
briefing, thresholding was restarted.  
The above procedure determined a single current level corresponding to 
moderately severe (6/10) pain for each participant. During the Experiments 1A and 2 
this current level was held fixed, whilst the mean rate of shocks varied. At the end of 
Experiment 2 I also verified that increasing the mean shock rate indeed corresponded 
to monotonic increases in rated aversiveness, by asking participants to provide visual 
analog ratings of stimulus trains with different mean shock rates but constant current 
amplitude. To do so, shock rate was increased in increments of 2 shocks/5s, starting 
from the baseline mean rate of 2 shocks/5s up to the maximum rate of 14 shocks/5s at 
a constant current level equal to that used during the choice phase, followed by a 
symmetrical decreasing staircase.  (See the results section 6.2.2 for data on the extent 
to which participants adapted to shocks over time).  
 
5.4.2 THRESHOLD PROCEDURE FOR DS5 STIMULATOR 
 
The DS5 stimulator receives a voltage input (-10 to +10V) via a USB data 
acquisition board (USB-6211, National Instruments, Austin, TX, USA), which in turn 
receives stimulus commands via USB from a stimulus PC running Matlab 
(Mathworks, MA, USA) with the National Instruments Data Acquisition (NI-DAQ) 
toolbox installed. The DS5 was set up such that +10mV inputs mapped to +10mA 
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outputs. The specific stimuli used for each experiment using the DS5 stimulator 
(Experiments 3A and 4) are described in the relevant methods sections of Chapters 8 
and 9. The threshold procedure used was equivalent in each case. Firstly participants 
were asked verbally to rate the pain associated with shocks of varying current levels 
using a 10-point visual analogue scale (VAS), identical to that described above. The 
experimenter specified current levels manually, by typing into the Matlab command 
line. Suggested current values were generated automatically from a custom script 
designed to produce an increasing stochastic staircase of current levels. Stochastic 
increments were used to limit participants’ expectation that subsequent shocks would 
be of increasing intensity.  Two iterations of this staircase procedure were used to 
identify the maximum intensity (rated 10/10) that the participant felt they could 
tolerate for the purposes of the experiment. Participants were reassured that during the 
experiment all stimuli would be below their maximum tolerance. Secondly 
participants rated, using an on-screen VAS, a randomised sequence of sub-maximal 
shock intensities generated automatically. An evenly-spaced sequence of current 
levels between zero and the maximum tolerable level was generated by the computer 
programme, and the presentation order of these current levels was subsequently 
randomised to prevent expectation effects. The least-squares fit of a sigmoid 
psychophysical function (a three-parameter Weibull distribution) describing the 
subjective ratings at each current level was determined automatically for each 
participant using a customised curve-fitting routine in Matlab (Mathworks, USA), and 
inverted to determine current levels (in mA) for use during the experiment, 
corresponding to specific VAS ratings (the precise subjective rating levels used varied 
by experiment: see the relevant methods sections of each). In addition, the programme 
plotted the resulting curve fit, the quality of which was checked visually by the 
experimenter. If a participant’s rating scores were particularly variable, the curve fit 
was disrupted by outlying values, or significant adaptation to the shocks had taken 
place since the initial staircase procedure, the entire thresholding procedure was 
repeated.  
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5.5 ETHICS STATEMENT 
  
All procedures described here received approval from a local research ethics 
committee. All participants gave full informed consent before taking part in the 
experiments. Experiments 1 and 2 were approved by the National Health Service 
National Research Ethics Service, Central London Research Ethics Committee 3 
(Ethics number 08/H0716/6, Amendment AM1). Experiments 3 and 4 were approved 
by the UCL Research Ethics Committee (4418/001 for Experiment 3A and 4418/002 
for Experiments 3B and 3C, 3953/001 for Experiment 4).  	  
 
5.6 PARTICIPANT RECRUITMENT 	  
For Experiments 1A and Experiment 2 healthy adult participants were 
recruited from the University College London Division of Psychology and Language 
Sciences Subject Pool (currently available at http://uclpsychology.sona-systems.com). 
For Experiments 1B, 3A and 4 healthy adult participants were recruited from the 
University College London Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience Subject Database 
(currently administered at http://groupspaces.com/ICNSubjectDatabase/). Both these 
subject pools offer a facility for researchers to post advertisements regarding their 
study for participants to browse. Participants must complete a pre-screen survey 
before signing up to confim that they do not suffer from any major neurological or 
psychiatric conditions and are not currently taking any prescribed psychoactive 
medicines. Participants are given guidelines when they sign up regarding acceptable 
conduct for taking part in studies, for example advising them that it is prohibited to 
use mobile phones or to eat during studies. No data are currently available regarding 
the demographics of these populations as a whole, however healthy adult volunteers 
aged 18-55 were recruited for all the above experiments. Specific demographic details 
of participants are given in the relevant methods section of each experiment.  
For Experiments 3B and 3C participants were recruited using Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (AMT). Healthy adult participants who had worker accounts on 
Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) were recruited via an advertisement on the AMT 
account of one of the authors (MC). AMT is an online marketplace for work, now 
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widely used as a method of data collection for psychology experiments (Mason & 
Suri, 2012). Responses on AMT have been shown to be reliable (Rand, 2012) and 
replicate well-established findings in the cognitive psychology literature (Crump, 
McDonnell, & Gureckis, 2013).  Demographic data relating to these participants is 
described in the relevant methods section. 
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6. 
TIME PREFERENCE FOR PAIN AND ILLNESS 
“The only thing we have to fear is fear itself.” 
Franklin D Roosevelt, 1933 
 
Imagine that you are faced with having to schedule a time for an appointment 
at the dentist to have a tooth removed. You know that the experience will be painful, 
but will only last for a short time. Would you prefer an appointment this week or in 
three weeks’ time? In experiments people frequently seek to expedite unavoidable 
pain in order to “get it of the way” (Badia, McBane, & Suter, 1966; Berns et al., 2006; 
Cook & Barnes, 1964; M. D'Amato & Gumenik, 1960; Franzini, 1970; Hare, 1966a, 
1966c; Hare, Krebs, Creighton, & Petrusic, 1966). In other words, people often 
appear impatient to receive pain as well as reward. As described in Chapter 2, since 
this behaviour implies a negative discount rate it is termed ‘negative temporal 
discounting’, or ‘negative time preference’ (Elster & Loewenstein, 1992; 
Loewenstein, 1987; Loewenstein & Prelec, 1991). Preventive health behaviours, such 
as attendance at cancer screening, or physical exercise, are readily framed as entailing 
short-term discomfort for the sake of long-term relief from illness, suggesting that 
time preferences for pain or illness might prove capable of predicting such 
behaviours.  
An influential explanation for the tendency to expedite inevitable pain that has 
been that anticipating pain is itself aversive, aptly termed ‘dread’ (Loewenstein, 1987; 
Berns et al. 2006). The longer a person has to wait for pain, the longer they have to 
anticipate it, suggesting that the total disutility from dread ought to increase with the 
delay (see for example Franzini, 1970), and a person can putatively mitigate this 
prospective dread by choosing sooner pain. The concept of dread receives empirical 
support from the finding that brain responses to the anticipation of pain are 
anatomically contiguous with responses to the direct experience of pain (Koyama, 
Tanaka, & Mikami, 1998; Ploghaus et al., 1999). Further, using a cue-delayed shock 
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paradigm and measuring human brain blood-oxygenation-level-dependent (BOLD) 
activity with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), Berns et al. (2006) 
demonstrated that individuals with stronger preference for sooner pain had 
significantly higher anticipatory brain activity during the cue-shock interval, 
suggesting that stronger preference for sooner shocks in these individuals was indeed 
driven by their greater prospective dread. However, despite empirical support for the 
existence of dread, no previous studies have compared alternative models for how the 
disvalue of pain might grow with delay. Hitherto unresolved issues are the form of the 
anticipation, and the way that this anticipation affects present value as dread.  
Under existing theoretical accounts, the decision-maker is assumed to sum the 
moment-by-moment anticipation they can expect to experience whilst waiting for 
pain, to form a prospective estimate of dread (Berns et al., 2006; Loewenstein, 1987). 
A simple account proposes that, when doing so, people treat each unit of waiting time 
as equally aversive. Here the total dread of pain is directly proportional to the delay. 
Under an alternative account, the moment-by-moment anticipation of pain increases 
as pain draws nearer. Here the total dread of pain again increases with increasing 
delay, though at a decreasing rate (for the reason that distant pain generates relatively 
little immediate anticipation). A further possibility is that the moment-by-moment 
increase in anticipation is itself prospectively discounted in time (Loewenstein, 1987). 
In other words, although people putatively expect to be experiencing intense 
anticipation immediately before the pain, if the pain is distant, this future anticipation 
might have little influence in the present. In particular, this predicts that prospective 
pain has a future point at which it is maximally aversive, being preferred both sooner 
or later. Thus we might prefer to have a painful dental procedure now as opposed to 
next week, but also next year as opposed to next week. These differing accounts make 
testable predictions for how the disvalue of prospective pain depends on its timing. 
Another unknown property of dread is its stability in the face of biases such as 
framing (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). In particular, if dread can be re-framed as 
relief from a putatively higher amount of pain, it might be possible to reduce dread or 
even eliminate it. This would be consistent with a ‘sign effect’ shown for monetary 
outcomes (Frederick et al., 2002; Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992; Tanaka, Yamada, 
Yoneda, & Ohtake, 2014; Thaler, 1981), whereby losses are discounted less than 
gains, and also for health outcomes, whereby decrements in health (illnesses) are 
	   98	  
discounted less than health improvements (MacKeigan et al., 1993; Odum et al., 
2002). By contrast, if people interpret a relief frame in a rational manner, they ought 
to dread the unrelieved pain, and so exhibit no framing effect. To test the alternative 
models described above and the influence of framing effects, in two experiments I 
examined intertemporal choices between painful outcomes at different delays. In 
Experiment 1A the delays ranged from seconds to around 15 minutes, and outcomes 
consisted of moderately painful cutaneous electric shock stimuli delivered to the 
dorsum of the hand. In Experiment 1B outcomes consisted of hypothetical dental 
appointments with varying degrees of dental pain at delays ranging from today to 
approximately 8 months.  
As reviewed in Chapter 2, negative time preference is frequently observed for 
hypothetical illness (e.g. Van Der Pol & Cairns, 2000).  Whilst it has been suggested 
that this effect might be explained in terms of the dread of future illness, no previous 
studies have formally tested this. I do so here in Experiment 1C. This experiment 
directly follows the design of a previously published study of illness discounting, Van 
der Pol and Cairns (2002), which asks participants to choose whether to delay an 
illness by means of an imaginary treatment.  
 
6.1 EXPERIMENT 1A: TIME PREFERENCE FOR PAINFUL SHOCKS 	  
6.1.1 METHODS 
 
Thirty-five healthy adult participants (18 females, mean age 28.5 years, s.d. 
5.1 years) took part in the experiment. Participants were recruited by advertisement 
on the website of the University College London Psychology Subject Pool (see 
General Experimental Methods 5.6).  All experiments were carried out at the 
Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, University College London and each 
session lasted around 2 hours. All participants gave full informed consent prior to the 
experiment. Participants were briefed that they would be making choices between 
different numbers of moderately painful electric shocks that would be delivered at 
different points in time. Verbal briefing of participants suggested that several had 
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previously taken part in studies involving similar painful shock stimuli, though 
unfortunately I did not collect data on this to enter into the analyses.  
Shocks were delivered using a Digitimer (Letchworth Garden City, England) 
DS7 constant current stimulator through silver chloride surface electrodes placed 
approximately 3 cm apart on the dorsum of the left hand. Each individual shock 
consisted of a single 200μs square-wave pulse. Throughout the experiment the 
participant sat in front of a computer monitor; where trials were presented on-screen, 
and decisions were indicated using two keys on the keyboard. The software package 
COGENT 2000 (University College London) was used for stimulus presentation and 
response acquisition.  
The painful shocks occurred within a five second stimulus train, and the 
intensity of each discrete shock did not vary. The independent variable governing the 
severity of pain was the number shocks within the five second stimulus. Since the 
duration of the stimulus was constant, increasing number of shocks was equivalent to 
an increasing shock rate. The number of shocks within the stimulus train followed a 
Poisson distribution with uniform probability of receiving a shock at each sampled 
time interval. To achieve this, each 5s stimulus was partitioned into 50 sampling 
intervals of 0.1s duration. There was a fixed probability of receiving a shock within 
each of these sampled 0.1s windows. For example to achieve an expected shock rate 
of 10 shocks/5s, the probability of receiving a shock in a given 0.1s interval was set to 
10/50 (i.e. 1/5). (see also General Experimental Methods 5.4). Participants were 
briefed on the probabilistic nature of the outcomes and were informed of the number 
of shocks they could on average expect to receive for a particular outcome, that is, the 
mean of the distribution; it was assumed that participants made their choices based on 
this number. Probabilistic outcomes were used to embed the experiment into a more 
naturalistic context. 
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Figure 6.1. Trial structure of the task in Experiment 1A. 1. A sequence of two Choice 
Trials, demonstrating the display of outcome options and outcome phases. The dotted arrow 
denotes how choices on previous trials determine expected shock rates on the future trials 
referred to by those choices. 2. A No Choice Trial.  
 
After providing consent, participants underwent a standardised thresholding 
procedure (Seymour et al., 2005; Vlaev et al., 2014; Winston et al., 2014) (see 
General Experimental Methods 5.4.1) to control for between participant variations in 
pain perception. Prior to making choices participants also received six samples of five 
second stimulus trains at two different shock rates, corresponding to the minimum and 
maximum rates used during the experiment, of 2 shocks/5s (0.4 shocks/s) and 14 
shocks/5s (2.8shocks/s). As detailed in General Experimental Methods 5.4.1, for this 
experiment, two threshold procedures were performed, firstly to determine a current 
level to use throughout the experiment, corresponding to 6/10 pain at the maximum 
shock rate. Secondly, at the end of the experiment, participants’ ratings were obtained 
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of the unpleasantness of varying shock rates. This second procedure had two 
purposes: firstly to confirm that increasing shock rates were associated with 
increasing levels of rated aversiveness, and secondly to check that participants had not 
substantially adapted to the shock stimuli over the course of the experiment (see 
Results 6.1.2 for data).  
Prior to the intertemporal choice phase, participants were briefed with on-
screen instructions that embedded the task in a naturalistic health-related scenario: 
 
Imagine that you are suffering from pains as a result of damage to the nerves 
in your arm, which feel as if you are having brief electric shocks delivered to your 
hand. The pains come in clusters of ‘shocks’, which are roughly evenly spaced in 
time, with each episode lasting five seconds. Within each episode the shocks come 
randomly. You experience a usual baseline level of pain, of on average two shocks 
per episode. All the shocks are of the same intensity.  
 
On each trial the default outcome was a five second shock train with mean 2 
shocks/5s (0.4 shocks/s), which was referred to as a “Baseline Episode”. Participants’ 
choices determined outcomes with higher shock rates, referred to as “Severe 
Episodes”. Participants were informed that their choices would not change the total 
number of pain episodes, only their timing and severity.  Intertemporal choice data 
were collected in two blocks, the order of which was counterbalanced across 
participants: a block in which outcomes were framed as an increase in shock rate, 
referred to as the pain frame and an otherwise identical experimental block in which 
outcomes were framed as a decrease in shock rate, referred to as the relief frame. The 
timing of outcomes was expressed as the number of trials (episodes) in the future. The 
description in the pain frame was as follows: 
 
You are about to have an attack of more severe episodes, lasting about half an 
hour in total. These severe episodes consist of more shocks than your usual baseline 
level, sometimes up to around 12 extra shocks per episode. You can choose when you 
would like to experience each severe episode: for each episode you will be offered 
two different points in time, and you will be given the choice as to which you would 
prefer. The severity of the episode will often be different at the two different time 
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points but, to help you make your choice you will be told the average number of extra 
shocks, relative to your usual baseline, that you could expect to receive at each time. 
 
The description in the relief frame was as follows: 
 
You are about to have an attack of more severe episodes, lasting about half an 
hour in total. These severe episodes consist of 12 more shocks per episode than your 
usual baseline level. You can choose when you would like to experience each severe 
episode: for each episode you will be offered two different points in time, and you will 
be given the choice as to which you would prefer. The severity of the episode will be 
12 shocks above the baseline, but you will be offered a painkiller to reduce the 
severity. The effectiveness of the painkiller might depend on when it is used. To help 
you to choose you will be told how many shocks you can expect the painkiller to 
relieve at each time-point. 
  
In each of 2 sessions participants made 95 choices between two options 
involving between 3 to 12 moderately painful electric shocks, delivered at between 4 
to 51 trials in the future. Choice blocks proceeded according to a trial-based design in 
which the unit of time was a single trial and participants’ choices determined 
outcomes on future trials. The sequence of events across a series of trials is shown in 
Figure 6.1. All choices were genuine, with shock delivered faithfully according to 
participants’ choices.  Making no a priori assumptions about the direction of 
participants’ time preference, there were an equal number of choices in which the 
delayed outcome had a higher expected shock rate as choices in which the sooner 
outcome had a higher expected shock rate. The set of choices used is detailed in the 
Appendix (Table A1). The presentation of outcome options was counterbalanced and 
randomised such that sooner outcome options appeared on the left-hand side of the 
screen on half of trials, and on the right-hand side in the other half of trials.  
Finally, there were two types of trial: Choice Trials and No Choice Trials. In 
each run there were 95 Choice Trials and an approximately equal number of No 
Choice Trials. The latter were necessary to absorb the outcomes of all the choice 
trials, such that all choices faithfully led to their outcomes. On Choice Trials 
participants were first presented with a choice between two options for a Severe 
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Episode, where each detailed its timing and expected shock rate. After a choice had 
been made, there followed the painful episode (five-second outcome stimulus) for that 
trial, whose shock rate was determined by previous choices. On No Choice Trials 
participants were presented with a screen saying “No Choice This Time”, which was 
displayed for a constant delay of 1s, and followed directly by the painful episode for 
that trial.  
Choices and outcomes were interleaved: for example if a participant chose on 
trial one to receive “a Severe Episode with nine extra shocks, five trials in the future”, 
then on trial six they would experience an outcome with a mean shock rate of nine 
shocks above the baseline.  The outcome for trial one would then be a Baseline 
Episode, as was the case for all trials not referenced by a previous choice.  Prior to 
each experimental run we generated a novel trial order using a random permutation 
that was bounded such that no two Choice Trials referred to an outcome on the same 
trial, and participants were informed of this fact. Although Choice Trials and No 
Choice Trials were randomly interspersed, the frequency of the latter necessarily 
increased towards the end of the experimental run, in order to ensure that choice 
delays did not extend beyond the end of the experiment.  
 
6.1.2 RESULTS 	  	  
6.1.2.1 Adaptation to Shock Stimuli and Participant Inclusion Criteria 
 
Ratings of stimuli with varying shock rates obtained at the end of the 
experiment revealed that rated unpleasantness was an increasing concave or sigmoid 
function of shock rate (fitted using a three-parameter Weibull function).  Of the 35 
participants, 2 participants were excluded from the analysis after they reported during 
the experiment that they did not find the shock stimuli aversive. With these 2 
participants excluded, inversion of the psychophysical curve fit to the ratings data 
revealed that the mean participant rated the maximum shock rate used during the 
experiment at 5.81/10 on the VAS (s.d. 1.22 points, 95% CI [5.38 6.25]), not 
significantly different from the 6/10 rating obtained at the start of the experiment 
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(one-tailed t-test, p>0.25), indicating that no significant adaptation had taken place at 
the group level.   
A further 8 participants deterministically chose sooner pain, irrespective of the 
shock rate: these “maximum dreaders” were excluded from the modelling analysis, 
since the shape of their preferences could not be reliably assessed using the 
experimental choices offered. Notably this is relatively high exclusion rate. However 
it is not unreasonable that some participants fell outside the range of preferences 
assessed by the choice options, given that preferences for delayed pain had received 
little empirical exploration previous to this study.  
 
6.1.2.2 Group Level Time Preference 
 
At the group level, participants showed a strong preference for sooner pain, at 
the expense of an increased number of shocks. Overall time preference in the 
experiment is given by the mean probability across all choices of choosing later 
shocks (S2) over sooner shocks (S1), referred to as p(Choose S2). Since there are 
equal numbers of trials in which S1>S2 as in which S2>S1, overall negative time 
preference is indicated by p(Choose S2) < 0.5. Group mean p(Choose S2) averaged 
across both frames and all delay lengths was significantly less than 0.5, [mean 
p(choose S2) = 0.29, SE = 0.04, N = 33, One sample t(32) = -5.23, p<0.001], this was 
confirmed with non-parametric testing [median p(choose S2) = 0.34, One sample 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank test p<0.001], indicating overall negative time preference. As 
a result, participants chose the larger pain on 32.6% (SE = 3.21) of choices overall. 
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Figure 6.2.  Observed time preference: Experiment 1A. Mean p(Choose S2) across 
participants included in the modelling analysis (N = 25) as a function of difference in delay 
between delivery of S2 and S1 (D2 – D1), expressed in units of trials. Delay difference (D2-
D1) is binned into tertiles, corresponding to short (1-10 trials), medium (11-20 trials) and long 
(>20 trials) delay differences. A: choice probabilities for all choices. Since there are equal 
numbers of trials in which S1>S2 as in which S2>S1, and option presentation is 
counterbalanced, p(Choose S2) at a delay difference of zero is theoretically bounded at 0.5. 
Blue circles represent choice probabilities for the relief frame, red circles choice probabilities 
for the pain frame. Error bars represent one standard error from the between subject mean. B: 
choice probabilities for choices in which the more delayed option was a smaller number of 
shocks. At delay difference of zero, S1 and S2 would occur at the same time-point, under 
which circumstance it might be assumed that participants would show preference for the 
smaller number of shocks, denoted by the blue and red square. 
 
Figure 6.2 shows mean p(Choose S2) on the two frames across the 25 subjects 
included in the modelling analysis, as a function of delay length, expressed as the 
difference in delay between the two choice options. A 2-way repeated measures 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed a significant main effect of frame [F(1,24) = 
9.5 p = 0.005)], whereby participants chose sooner shocks less frequently in the relief 
frame. There was also a significant main effect of delay [F(3,72) = 8.2; p = 0.002)], as 
well as a delay by frame interaction [F(3,72) = 4.2; p = 0.023)]. Non-parametric 
pairwise comparisons between zero, short, medium and long delay differences (across 
both frames combined) revealed a significant decrease in p(Choose S2) between zero 
and short delay differences [p(Choose S2, Short) < 0.5, Wilcoxon Signed Rank test, p 
= 0.004] and between short and medium delay differences (Wilcoxon Signed Rank 
test, p = 0.014), but no significant change between medium and long delay differences 
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(Wilcoxon Signed Rank test, p = 0.398). These pairwise tests are post-hoc and 
therefore exploratory. Based on these results, an hypothesis is that negative time 
preference decreases at longer delay differences, rather than being constant.  
In particular the slope of the dependence of p(Choose S2) on delay provides a 
proxy for the rate of time preference. I therefore tested the hypothesis of decreasing 
negative time preference as noted above by performing a further 2-way repeated 
measures ANOVA, entering the slope of p(Choose S2) between each category of 
delay difference as the dependent variable. This second ANOVA demonstrated a 
significant main effect of frame on the rate of time preference [F(1,24) = 15.5; p = 
0.001)], as well as a significant main effect of delay [F(2,48) = 4.4; p = 0.033)], thus 
rejecting the null hypothesis of constant negative time preference. There was no 
significant delay by frame interaction in this analysis [F(2,48) = 1.6; p = 0.205)]. 
Non-parametric pairwise comparisons revealed that the effect of delay was driven by 
a significantly more negative slope between short and medium delays than between 
medium and long delays (Wilcoxon Signed Rank test, p = 0.013), consistent with 
diminishing negative time preference. This suggests the rate of accumulation of dread 
diminishes with increasing delay, suggesting that on average instantaneous dread 
increases in time, rather than being constant. 
 
6.1.2.3 Classification of Participants by Time Preference 
 
The group level data displayed in Figure 6.2 conceal substantial heterogeneity 
in the response patterns of individual participants. I therefore categorised the 25 
participants whose data contributes to Figure 6.2 according to their individual pattern 
of time preference. Four mutually exclusive categories were identified: zero time 
preference, positive time preference, negative time preference and reversing time 
preference (Figure 6.3).  
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Figure 6.3 Choice data of participants in Experiment 1A categorised by time preference. 
p(Choose S2) as a function of delay difference, expressed in units of trials, for all 25 
participants included in the modelling analysis. Choice probabilities shown are the mean of 
those on the two frames. Delay difference scaling is identical that in Figure 2. Time 
preference is approximated by the slope of the choice probability lines. A: participants with 
no significant time preference at any delay. B: participants who show positive time 
preference, but no significant negative time preference at any delay. C: participants who show 
negative time preference, but no significant positive time preference at any delay. D: 
participants with initial negative time preference followed by significant positive time 
preference at longer delays. Data are plotted as solid lines to assist visualisation of the choice 
patterns. Each gray line represents data from a single participant. The bold purple lines 
represent the between-subject means in each category. At delay difference of zero, S1 and S2 
would occur at the same time-point; since there are equal numbers of trials in which S1>S2 as 
in which S2>S1, the plots are theoretically bounded to cross the probability axis at p(Choose 
S2) = 0.5. 
 
Participants were classified as having zero time preference if p(choose S2) 
showed no significant deflections from 0.5 at any delay difference (Binomial test, 
p>0.05) (7/25, Figure 6.3A). The zero time preference group chose the option with 
the smaller shock rate on 88% of choices [mean p(choose smaller) = 0.88, SE = 2.8], 
demonstrating that this group did not simply respond randomly, but tended to choose 
the less painful stimulus, irrespective of delay. Participants were classified as having 
positive time preference if they displayed significant increases in p(choose S2), but no 
significant decreases (Fisher Exact test, 𝛼 =0.05) (4/25, Figure 6.3B), as having 
negative time preference if they displayed significant decreases in p(choose S2), but 
no significant increases (12/25, Figure 6.3C), and as having reversing time preference 
if they displayed significant increases in p(choose S2), as well as significant decreases 
(2/25, Figure 6.3D). The two participants with reversing time preference both 
displayed initial negative, followed by positive time preference, a pattern that would 
be consistent with prospective dread being itself discounted in time.  
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6.1.2.4 Group Level Modelling Analysis 
 
I compared alternative accounts for the observed patterns of time preference 
by fitting models of dread-discounting. The starting point for these models was the 
model of anticipatory utility introduced by Loewenstein (1987). Loewenstein used the 
term ‘dread’ to refer to the anticipation of events with negative utility, and 
‘savouring’ to refer to anticipation of positively valued events. Applied to the 
evaluation of future pain, Loewenstein’s model describes the utility for a decision-
maker at time 𝑡 = 0 of anticipated pain starting at time 𝑡 = 𝑑. Pain itself is assumed 
to produce a constant stream of disutility 𝑈(𝑥), beginning at time 𝑑 and lasting for 
duration 𝐿 such that: 
 𝑈! 𝑥, 𝑡,𝑑, 𝐿 =    𝑈 𝑥                   𝑖𝑓  𝑑 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑑 + 𝐿0                                        𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒          
 
        (6.1.1) 
 𝑈!  denotes instantaneous utility derived from pain itself. In applications of this model 
(and related versions of the model) in this thesis, 𝑈 𝑥   is implemented as a power 
function of the subjective intensity, 𝑥, of pain on a ten-point VAS: 
 𝑈 𝑥 =   −𝑥! 
       (6.1.2) 
 
where 𝑏  is a parameter governing the curvature of utility function; 0 < 𝑏 < 1 
produces concave (diminishing marginal) disutility of pain, 𝑏 = 1 denotes linear 
utility of pain and 𝑏 > 1 produces convex (increasing marginal) disutility of pain.  
In addition, whilst waiting for pain, the decision-maker is assumed to derive 
instantaneous disutility from anticipation, termed dread (𝑈!),  which in Loewenstein’s 
formulation is given by the (exponentially discounted) expectation of pain at each 
moment, 𝑡 ≤ 𝑑: 
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𝑈! 𝑥, 𝑡,𝑑, 𝐿     = 𝛼 𝑈 𝑥   𝑒!! !!!!!!! 𝑑𝜏 
                              =   !!   𝑈 𝑥   𝑒!! !!! 1− 𝑒!!"    
        (6.1.3) 
 
Here 𝛿  is an exponential discount rate governing the rate of increase in 
momentary anticipation as the pain draws nearer, and is distinct from the main 
discount rate. When evaluating delayed pain from 𝑡 = 0, the decision-maker is then 
assumed to derive disutility from two sources, the prospective disutility of pain itself, 
and a prospective estimate of the total moment-by-moment dread they can expect to 
experience whilst waiting for pain. Under Loewenstein’s formulation both sources of 
utility are simply added together, and each is also assumed to be exponentially 
discounted with rate, 𝑟, giving: 
 𝑈 𝑥,𝑑, 𝐿 =   𝛼𝛿 𝑈 𝑥 𝑒!! !!! 1− 𝑒!!"   𝑒!!"!! 𝑑𝑡                     𝑈 𝑥 𝑒!!"  𝑑𝑡!!!!  
         [Utility from dread]        [Utility from pain] 
(6.1.4) 
 
The first integral denotes prospective utility from dread, the second prospective utility 
from pain itself.  Integrating both terms gives: 
 𝑈 𝑥,𝑑, 𝐿               =   𝑈 𝑥 𝛼𝛿(𝛿 − 𝑟)    𝑒!!" −   𝑒!!"    1− 𝑒!!" +     1𝑟   𝑒!!" 1− 𝑒!!"  
          (6.1.5) 
 
The contribution of dread is governed by the parameters 𝛼 and 𝛿.  𝛼 can be 
viewed as a regression weight on dread, representing an individual’s propensity to 
dread future pain, while  𝛿 determines the change in dread as pain is delayed further 
into the future.  
Loewenstein’s model applies to outcomes occurring in continuous time. For 
the current experiment however, delays were described in discrete time, in units of 
trials. I therefore adapted the above model for the discrete-time case. Since each 
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painful outcome was considered to last for one time-period, dependence on the 
duration of pain, 𝐿 , was omitted. Loewenstein’s formulation uses exponential 
discounting.  Although different forms of discounting function, such as hyperbolic 
and quasi-hyperbolic, are of importance in standard models of financial discounting, 
they have a relatively subtle effect here, by comparison to the much coarser changes 
in the shape of the functions resulting from the addition of dread, and I therefore 
retained exponential discounting for computational expediency. To reflect notation 
used in reinforcement learning frameworks, exponential discounting was 
implemented by multiplying the utilities by a constant discount factor, 0 < 𝛾 < 1 for 
each added unit of delay. I sought to compare alternative restrictions to Loewenstein’s 
formulation above.  
Each model shares the same general form, but the models differ in the manner 
in which dread varies as a function of time and outcome magnitude (see Figure 6.4). 
Figure 6.5 displays choice probabilities on the paradigm itself predicted by 
representative parameterisations of each model (blue lines), as well as the mean 
choice probabilities from each of the four participant sub-groups. (Notably the shape 
is also dependent on the parameters of each model and the parameter dependence of 
the more complex models is illustrated in Figures 6.6 and 6.7). 
All models assume that the total aversive value of a prospective option, 𝑈(𝑥,𝑑) is equal to the aversive value associated with accumulated sum of future 
dread up until the time, 𝑑 − 1, immediately preceding the actual pain plus the 
aversive value related to the pain itself:        
 
𝑈 𝑥,𝑑 = 𝛼 𝑈! 𝑥, 𝑡,𝑑!!!!!! +   𝑈! 𝑥,𝑑    
        (6.1.6) 
As previously, the overall weighting given to dread is governed by 𝛼.  
All models in this case assumed linear instantaneous disutility of pain, such 
that: 
 𝑈 𝑥 =   −𝑥 
        (6.1.7) 
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where 𝑥 represents the expected shock rate (𝑏 = 1 in Equation 6.1.2). For all models 𝛾!  represents the discount factor applied to the future pain, and 𝑥 represents the shock 
rate. Thus: 
 𝑈! 𝑥,𝑑   = 𝑈 𝑥   𝛾!!    
        (6.1.8) 
 
What differs between the models is the time course of dread,   𝑈! 𝑥, 𝑡,𝑑 .  
Model 1: The first model, the Null model, assumes that the prospective 
disvalue of pain depends only on the stated number of shocks, and not on the delay, 
i.e. 𝛼 = 0 and 𝛾! = 1 such that: 
 𝑈 𝑥,𝑑 = 𝑈 𝑥 = −𝑥 
        (6.1.9) 
 
As shown in Figure 6.5, this model predicts a net 50% probability of choosing later 
shocks on the current choice paradigm. This arises from the fact that on half the 
presented options the later outcome carries a larger number of shocks and on half the 
options the later outcome carries a smaller number.  
Model 2: The second model, termed the Exponential Discount model, extends 
the Null model to include exponential discounting of pain, 𝛾!, but again assumes 𝛼 = 0, such that: 𝑈 𝑥,𝑑   =   𝑈(𝑥)  𝛾!! 
       (6.1.10) 
 
The Exponential Discount model predicts a preference for later shock (Figure 6.5).  
Model 3: The third model, which is the simplest model to incorporate dread, 
assumes a constant benefit or cost from anticipation accruing from any delayed 
outcome, which does not scale with the size of the outcome or the delay to its 
delivery. In other words, outcomes accrue a fixed cost from anticipation.  
 𝑈 𝑥,𝑑 = 𝐴 + 𝑈 𝑥   𝛾!! 
       (6.1.11) 
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Where 𝐴 is the fixed constant of dread, bounded to be negative.  
Model 4: The fourth model, Constant Dread, assumes that dread is constant 
over time, such that: 
𝑈 𝑥,𝑑 = 𝑈 𝑥   𝛾!! + 𝛼 𝑈(𝑥)!!!!!!    
       (6.1.12) 
Hence dread accumulates linearly with proportionality constant 𝛼  when pain is 
viewed from the perspective of an increasing delay: 
 𝑈 𝑥,𝑑 = 𝑈 𝑥 (𝛼𝑑 +   𝛾!!) 
       (6.1.13) 
 
Model 5: The fifth model, Exponential Dread, following Loewenstein, 
assumes an increasing time-course of instantaneous dread, such that dread increases 
exponentially until the actual time of pain. Parsimoniously, the model assumes that 
the exponential rate governing the increase in dread is identical to the rate by which 
pain is discounted, 𝛾! ,  such that dread becomes simply equivalent to the predicted 
(discounted) value of future pain. This differs from Loewenstein’s original 
formulation, where the increase in dread was separate from the main discount factor. 
The rationale for this difference was to separately parameterise discounting of dread 
itself, whilst keeping the total number of parameters within sensible limits. Thus the 
full Exponential Dread model allows the exponential rise of dread, governed by 𝛾! ,  to 
be itself discounted in time by a further discount factor, 𝛾! , such that prospective 
dread each time point 𝑡 during the delay,𝑑,  is given by: 
 
   𝑈! 𝑥, 𝑡,𝑑 = 𝑈(𝑥)  𝛾!  !!!  𝛾!! 
        (6.1.14) 
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Such that: 
𝑈 𝑥,𝑑 = 𝑈 𝑥   𝛾!! +   𝛼   𝛾!  !!!  𝛾!!!!!!!!         
        (6.1.15) 
Figure 6.6 outlines the parameter dependence of the general form Exponential Dread 
model. I tested this general form, as well as two nested variants. The first variant, 
termed Undiscounted Exponential Dread assumes that dread is not itself prospectively 
discounted, such that 𝛾! = 1, giving: 
 
𝑈 𝑥,𝑑 = 𝑈 𝑥   𝛾!! +   𝛼   𝛾!  !!!  !!!!!!       
        (6.1.16) 
 
Figure 6.7 outlines the parameter dependence of this Undiscounted 
Exponential Dread model, which predicts that the cost of waiting for pain increases 
with increasing delay, though at a decreasing rate. The second variant, Restricted 
Discounted Exponential Dread, assumes that the rate of exponential rise of dread is 
the same as the rate of exponential discounting of dread, such that 𝛾! =   𝛾!   =   𝛾, 
giving: 
𝑈 𝑥,𝑑 = 𝑈 𝑥 𝛾! +   𝛼   𝛾  !!!𝛾!  !!!!!!       
        (6.1.17) 
Which further simplifies as follows: 
 𝑈 𝑥,𝑑 =   𝑈 𝑥 𝛾! 𝛼𝑑      +     1  
        (6.1.18) 
If dread itself is prospectively discounted (𝛾! < 1), reversals of time preference can 
occur, such that prospective pain is maximally aversive at intermediate delays 
(Figures 6.4, 6.5 and 6.7). 
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Figure 6.4 Temporal value functions predicted by alternative dread-discounting models. 
For each panel the value of a shock is plotted against delay to its delivery. The value of 
immediate shock is given by the intersection of the curves with the vertical axis; the scales of 
the vertical axes are arbitrary and differ between the plots. Parameters of the function are 
displayed next to each. The top left panel depicts simple exponential discounting with 
positive rate, with the result that the prospective utility of shock becomes less negative the 
further it is delayed into the future. The top right panel depicts a model in which all values of 
delayed shock carry a fixed subtractive cost, A (here set arbitrarily to a value of 5), with the 
discount factor γ set to 0.95. The remaining panels depict dread-discounting models as 
labelled: Constant Dread, Undiscounted Exponential Dread (denoted by the prefix U) and 
Discounted Exponential Dread (denoted by the prefix D). Two versions of the Discounted 
Exponential Dread model are depicted, a restricted version in which the discount rate used to 
determine dread, γD  is equal to the discount rate applied to consumption of shock, γP  (bottom 
left) and an unrestricted version in which these parameters are independent (bottom right) 
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Utilities predicted by each model were transformed into predicted probabilities 
of choosing either option according to a softmax activation function, and models were 
fitted by maximum likelihood, using simplex optimisation in Matlab 
(Mathworks,MA, USA), with bound constraints by transformation (see General 
Experimental Methods). In addition, for models with smaller numbers of parameters, 
grid search was performed over the entire parameter space as a check against local 
minima. Models with differing architecture and complexity were compared using the 
Bayesian Information Criterion (𝐵𝐼𝐶 ) according to a fixed-effects scheme, by 
summing the 𝐵𝐼𝐶 values for model fits to individual data. According to conventional 
criteria, a 𝐵𝐼𝐶 difference of greater than 6 between two models corresponds to strong 
evidence in favour of one particular model (Kass and Wasserman, 1995).  
Consistent with the observed significant negative time preference at the group 
level, Null model did not adequately capture the group level data (𝐵𝐼𝐶   =   5009). 
The Exponential Discounting model, incorporating discounting of pain but not dread, 
improved the group-level likelihood by comparison with the Null model, consistent 
with some participants demonstrating positive time preference; however the 
improvement in likelihood was not sufficient to compensate for an increase in 
complexity over the null model (𝐵𝐼𝐶   = 5133). Despite the additional parameters, 
the Fixed Delay Cost model substantially outperformed both the Null and Exponential 
Discount models (𝐵𝐼𝐶 improvements of 368 and 492 respectively). In turn, the time 
dependence of total dread embodied by the Constant Dread model substantially 
improved the fit compared with Fixed Delay Cost (𝐵𝐼𝐶 improvement of 321, see 
Figure 6.8A). However, consistent with the observation of diminishing negative time 
preference, Exponential Dread models were the best performing at the group level 
(𝐵𝐼𝐶 improvement of 149 over Constant Dread for general form Exponential Dread). 
The restricted variants were favoured over the general form, with Undiscounted 
Exponential Dread providing the most parsimonious fit out of all models tested at the 
group level (𝐵𝐼𝐶 improvement of 150 over the general form), followed by Restricted 
Discounted Exponential Dread (𝐵𝐼𝐶 improvement of 57 over the general form).  
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Figure 6.5 Model predictions on the task: Experiment 1A p(Choose S2) as a function of 
delay difference according to alternative models of dread. Choice probabilities shown are the 
mean of those on the two frames. Delay difference scaling is identical that in Figure 6.3. The 
fine gray lines represent mean p(choose S2) for the four participant subgroups shown in 
Figure 6.3. Data points marked by blue squares, joined with lines for illustrative purposes, 
represent model data simulated at the parameter values denoted in each panel. These do not 
represent the results of model fitting, but serve to illustrate the basic form of the alternative 
model predictions. Notably different parameterisations of the more complex models can 
produce diverse shapes of choice frequency plot. Error bars represent one standard deviation 
of the binomial distribution. In each case the softmax inverse temperature parameter, β, is set 
to 0.25, a representative value.  	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Figure 6.6 Parameterisation of the general form Exponential Dread model. A range of 
temporal value functions predictable by an Exponential Dread model with separate 𝛾!  and 𝛾!  
, at different values of the three parameters 𝛾! , 𝛾! and 𝛼. The model allows for points of 
maximal aversion at intermediate values of delay. A: Effects of increasing 𝛼 (left to right) at 
lower (top row) and higher (second row) values of 𝛾! with a high value of  𝛾!. At small values 
of   𝛼  the model approaches positive exponential discounting (top left panel). Simple 
exponential discounting is produced when 𝛼 = 0. B: Effects of decreasing   𝛾! (i.e. increasing 
the discounting of dread; left to right) at lower (top row) and higher (second row) values of 𝛼.  
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Figure 6.7 Parameterisation of the Undiscounted Exponential Dread model. A range of 
temporal value functions predictable by an Exponential Dread model with 𝛾! = 𝛾!, where 
dread itself is not subject to discounting, at different values of the two free parameters 𝛾  and 𝛼. A: Effects of increasing 𝛼 (left to right) at lower (top row) and higher (second row) values 
of 𝛾 . It is evident that at small values of 𝛼  the model approaches positive exponential 
discounting (top left panel). Simple exponential discounting results when 𝛼 = 0. At positive 𝛼 aversiveness (negative value) increases at a decreasing rate with delay, where both 𝛼 and 𝛾 
influence the asymptotic boundary. B: Effects of decreasing 𝛾 (left to right) at lower (top 
row) and higher (second row) values of 𝛼.  
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6.1.2.5 Group Level Framing Effects 
 
  Across participants, the mean frequency of choosing sooner pain in the pain 
frame was 73.7% (SE = 3.95) and 67.3% (SE = 4.22) in the relief frame (Figure 
6.8B). A two-tailed paired t-test showed that this difference was significant: 𝑡(32) = 
2.84, 𝑝  = 0.0077. The result was confirmed with non-parametric testing for 
differences between paired samples using the Wilcoxon Signed Rank test, which 
revealed significant differences between the median choice frequencies (N = 33, 𝑍 = -
2.6, 𝑝 = 0.0093).  
Analysis of the framing effect was extended using the general form 
Exponential Dread model to test which parameters of the model best accounted for 
the differences in intertemporal choice between pain and relief frames. Thus, I 
performed a second model comparison whilst restricting which parameters were 
allowed to vary between frames. The general form model was chosen for this 
analysis, in order that predictions regarding the basis of the framing effects were not 
dependent on accepting a specific version of the model.  The results of model 
comparison across frames are shown in Figure 6.8C.  
The two models with the lowest 𝐵𝐼𝐶 were the model in which 𝛼 is allowed to 
be free (i.e. the discount factors 𝛾! and 𝛾! and the choice temperature 𝛽 are fixed; 𝐵𝐼𝐶 = 4142), and the model in which 𝛾! is allowed to be free (i.e. the dread discount 
factors 𝛾!, the dread weighting parameter, 𝛼, and the choice temperature are fixed; 𝐵𝐼𝐶 = 4115), with a 𝐵𝐼𝐶 difference of 27 between these two models, indicating 
substantial support for the 𝛾!-framing model. These results suggest that the framing 
effect was most parsimoniously accounted for by changes in the discount rate 
governing the rate of increase in the dread of future pain, 𝛾! .  Likelihood ratio tests 
rejected the (null) No-Framing model in favour of the γP -Framing model at both the 
group (fixed effects) (LR =10108:1, χ2 = 497.3, p <0.001, d.f. = 25) and individual 
(Mean individual LR = 2088:1, χ2 = 19.9, p <0.001, d.f. = 1) levels. 
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Figure 6.8 Model comparison and framing effects in Experiment 1A. A Bayesian 
Information Criterion (𝐵𝐼𝐶), summed across participants (N = 25) for the alternative models. 
Lower values of 𝐵𝐼𝐶 indicate better fits of the model. Exponential Dread outperformed other 
models, with Undiscounted Exponential Dread providing the most parsimonious fit at the 
group level, indicated by the red circle. B Mean frequency of choosing sooner pain across all 
choices by all participants in either frame. Error bars are one standard error. Two-tailed paired 
t-test showed significant difference between the two frames t(32) = 2.84, p = 0.0077. C 
Results of fitting the (Discounted) Exponential Dread model, whilst restricting which 
parameters were allowed to vary between frames. In the unrestricted model (All-Framing) all 
four parameters, the inverse softmax temperature, β, the discount parameters, γP and γD, and 
the anticipation parameter, a, were applied separately to each frame. In the fully restricted 
model (No-Framing) all parameters were constrained to be equal across frames. The best fit 
(red circle) was provided by a model in which β, γD and γ were fixed across frames, leaving 
between-frame differences explained by differences in γP (γP -Framing). Likelihood ratios are 
displayed at both the group level and the individual level, favoring γP -Framing over No-
Framing at both the group (fixed effects) (LR =10108:1, χ2 = 497.3, p <0.001, d.f. = 25) and 
individual levels (Mean individual LR = 2088:1, χ2 = 19.9, p<0.001, d.f. = 1). 
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6.1.2.6 Modelling Analysis of Sub-Groups 
 
At the sub-group level, I hypothesised that the Null model would perform best 
in the zero time preference group, that Exponential Discounting would perform best 
in the positive time preference group, Undiscounted Exponential Dread would 
perform best in the negative time preference group and either general form or 
Restricted Discounted Exponential Dread would perform best in the reversal group.  
In the zero time preference group, the two models with the lowest 𝐵𝐼𝐶 estimates were 
indeed the Null model (𝐵𝐼𝐶 = 755) and Undiscounted Exponential Dread (𝐵𝐼𝐶 = 
793), suggesting evidence in favor of the Null model in this group. In the positive 
time preference group the two models with the lowest BIC estimates were Fixed 
Delay Cost (𝐵𝐼𝐶  = 961) and Exponential Discounting (𝐵𝐼𝐶  = 964), with a 𝐵𝐼𝐶 
difference of 3.5, unexpectedly providing weak evidence in favor of the Fixed Delay 
Cost model in this group. Closer inspection revealed that the improved fit of this 
model was driven by a single participant’s data. As expected, in the negative time 
preference group the best performing model was Undiscounted Exponential Dread 
(𝐵𝐼𝐶 = 1868), followed by Restricted Discounted Exponential dread (𝐵𝐼𝐶 = 1941). 
As expected, in the reversal group, the best performing model was Restricted 
Discounted Exponential dread (𝐵𝐼𝐶 = 370), followed by the general form Discounted 
Exponential Dread (𝐵𝐼𝐶 = 372) (followed by Undiscounted Exponential Dread, 𝐵𝐼𝐶 
= 374), indicating evidence in favour of dread being discounted in this sub-group. 
Notably, alternative parameterisations of the general form Exponential Dread model 
are able to account for the patterns of time preference displayed by each of the four 
sub-groups, as shown in Figure 6.9, which presents data from a single participant 
within each group, along with the maximum likelihood estimates predicted by the 
general form Exponential Dread model. 
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Figure 6.9 Time preference of sample participants in Experiment 1A and fits of the 
(Discounted) Exponential Dread model. Observed p(Choose Later), combined across both 
frames, as a function of delay difference, expressed in units of trials, is displayed for a single 
participant from each of the four subgroups shown in Figure 6.3, indicated by the purple 
circles. Delay difference scaling is identical that in Figure 6.2. Data simulated from the 
general form Exponential Dread model at the maximum likelihood parameter estimates for 
each participant, subsequently combined across frames, are plotted as cyan squares. Error 
bars represent one standard deviation of the binomial distribution. A Participant with zero 
time preference. B Participant with positive time preference (left hand column). C Participant 
with negative time preference. D Participant with reversing time preference: showing initial 
negative time preference reverting to positive time preference at longer delay differences. The 
general form of the Exponential Dread model adequately captures all four patterns of time 
preference. 
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6.1.3 DISCUSSION 	  
Experiment 1A was designed to compare alternative accounts for how the 
prospective aversiveness of pain depends on its timing, using an experimental 
paradigm in which participants made choices between painful outcomes occurring at 
different delays in the future. In accordance with previous studies most participants 
(26 out of 33) exhibited negative time preference for pain. These participants 
preferred to experience the same pain sooner rather than later and were willing to 
accept more pain in order to hasten its occurrence. At the group-level, negative time 
preference initially increased with increasing delay, but saturated at long delay. This 
pattern was best accounted for by a dread-discounting model, termed Exponential 
Dread, in which dread increases exponentially as pain is approached in time. The total 
utility from dread is then given by the prospective sum of dread, where the extent to 
which an individual incorporates dread can be described in terms of the weighting 
parameter, α.  I also found that dread is modulated by relief framing, an effect which 
was captured by modulation in the rate of instantaneous dread increase. These 
findings extend an existing study of dread by Berns and colleagues (Berns et al., 
2006), who compared a Constant Dread model and an Exponential Discounting model 
without dread in the context of choice between delayed shocks predicted by a cue, 
finding that the Constant Dread model provided better fits to both the behavioural 
data and the BOLD response in several regions of interest (right primary and 
secondary somatosensory cortices, caudal anterior cingulate cortex and right posterior 
insula) than the model without dread.  
Whilst attempt was made to embed Experiment 1A within a naturalistic 
scenario, the outcomes are nevertheless brief and delays short by comparison to 
decisions regarding aversive treatments or preventive health behaviours in real life. 
Furthermore the above conclusions are based on only a relatively small sample of 
participants. To address this I implemented Experiment 1B, with outcomes of a 
hypothetical painful dental treatment, and delays ranging up to several months.  
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6.2  EXPERIMENT 1B: TIME PREFERENCE FOR HYPOTHETICAL DENTAL 
APPOINTMENTS 	  
In Experiment 1B participants made 70 choices between two possible timings 
for a hypothetical dental appointment. They were informed that the appointment 
would last for 15 minutes and that the experience would be painful. Participants were 
also informed that the appointment was routine and that the timing would not affect 
their dental health.  
 
6.2.1 METHODS 
 
Thirty healthy adult participants aged 18-55 took part in the experiment. 
Participants were recruited by advertisement on the website of the University College 
London Psychology Subject Pool (see General Experimental Methods 5.6).  Choices 
were administered online using Qualtrics software (Qualtrics.com; Provo, UT). 
Unfortunately specific demographic data of participant characteristics were not 
obtained for this experiment.  
 
Participants were introduced to the following scenario: 
 
 You are due to have a routine dental appointment. The appointment will last for 15 
minutes. The appointment is non-urgent but must be booked now to occur sometime in 
the next year. Importantly the timing will not affect your dental health: having the 
appointment sooner will provide no added health benefits. However the experience 
will be very uncomfortable, and at times painful. Exactly how painful will depend on 
when you choose to have the appointment. The pain will only last for the length of the 
appointment: you do not experience dental pain at any other time. The dental surgery 
is very close to where you live, so you will be able to attend an appointment almost 
immediately if you choose to. As far as your diary is concerned, any of the 
appointment times are equally possible for you.   
 
Participants were offered binary choices between different timings for the 
dental appointment, in units of days. The sooner appointment was always designated 
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as occurring “today”. The later appointment occurred at delays of 1, 5, 13, 32, 89 or 
237 days. In each case participants were told how painful they could expect the 
appointment to be on a scale of 0% to 100%, where 100% represents the worse 
imaginable dental pain. The outcome magnitudes were 60, 55, 51 46, 37 and 16% 
dental pain. At each possible delay, each possible magnitude was paired with an 
outcome of 60% dental pain. Options were counterbalanced, so that there were an 
equal number of choices in which the larger magnitude pain was the delayed option as 
choices in which the smaller magnitude pain was the delayed option. So that the 
timings appeared plausible, participants were asked to imagine that it was currently a 
weekday morning. Data analysis followed the same methodology as described above 
for Experiment 1A. Since outcome magnitude was described in experiential terms, a 
linear utility function was assumed over percentage pain intensities. 
After completing the questionnaire, participants were asked debriefing 
questions, requiring them to indicate when they last attended the dentist, and to what 
extent (on a 5-point scale) they were afraid of going to the dentist.  
6.2.2 RESULTS 	  	  
6.2.2.1 Group Level Time Preference 
 
All 30 participants were included in the analysis. As for Experiment 1A, there 
were an equal number of choices for which the larger magnitude pain was the sooner 
option as choices in which the (identical) larger magnitude pain was the later option, 
therefore the probability of choosing the later option, in this case p(Choose A2) where 
A2 refers to Appointment 2, reflects time preference in the same manner as for 
Experiment 1A.   
Consistent with Experiment 1A, at the group level, participants showed a 
strong preference for sooner dental appointments, at the expense of more severe 
dental pain: group mean p(Choose Later Appointment) averaged across all delay 
lengths was significantly less than 0.5, [mean p(choose S2) = 0.38, N = 30, SE = 
0.025, One sample t(29) = -4.56, p<0.001], a result which was confirmed with non-
parametric testing [median p(choose S2) = 0.39, One sample Wilcoxon Signed Rank 
test p<0.001], indicating overall negative time preference.  
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Figure 6.10 Time preference for a hypothetical painful dental appointment in 
Experiment 1B. Observed p(Choose A2) is plotted as a function of the delay to the later 
appointment; the sooner appointment was always at 0 days, i.e. “today”. Error bars represent 
one standard error from the group mean. A Group mean p(Choose A2) for all participants (N 
= 30). B Mean p(Choose A2)  in the zero time preference group (N = 12). C Mean p(Choose 
A2)  in the positive time preference group (N = 3). D Mean p(Choose A2)  in the negative 
time preference  group (N = 15).  
 
To facilitate comparison with Experiment 1, delays to the later dental 
appointment were grouped into short (1-5 days), medium (13-32 days) and long (89-
237 days) categories. A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed a 
significant main effect of delay [F(3,116) = 8.1 p <0.001)]. Non-parametric pairwise 
comparisons between zero, short, medium and long delays revealed a significant 
decrease in p(Choose A2) between zero and short delay differences [p(Choose S2, 
Later Appointment) < 0.5, Wilcoxon Signed Rank test, p < 0.001], between short and 
medium delay differences (Wilcoxon Signed Rank test, p = 0.0025), and between 
medium and long delay differences (Wilcoxon Signed Rank test, p = 0.022), 
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suggesting consistent negative time preference at the group level. Figure 6.10A 
displays the group mean p(Choose A2) at all delay lengths offered. The data reflect 
the finding of consistent negative time preference. Diminishing negative time 
preference with increasing delay can be clearly appreciated from the shape of the plot. 
 
6.2.2.2 Classification of Participants by Time Preference 
 
I categorised the 30 participants according to their individual pattern of time 
preference, using an identical method as for Experiment 1A: 12 out of 30 participants 
showed zero time preference, 3 out of 30 showed positive time preference, and the 
remaining 15 out of 30 showed negative time preference. In this experiment, no 
participants displayed reversing time preference, i.e. none displayed significant 
increases in p(choose S2), as well as significant decreases. Figures 6.10 B-D display 
group mean p(Choose A2) at each delay length for the zero, positive and negative 
time preference groups respectively. 
 
6.2.2.3 Group Level Modelling Analysis 
 
The results of group level model comparison are shown in Figure 6.11. 
Consistent with the shape of the group level choices (Figure 6.10), Undiscounted 
Exponential Dread was the best performing model at the group level (𝐵𝐼𝐶 = 1036), 
followed by Constant Dread (𝐵𝐼𝐶 = 1115). These two models outperformed both the 
restricted variant of Discounted Exponential Dread (𝐵𝐼𝐶  = 1162), general form 
Discounted Exponential Dread Constant Dread (𝐵𝐼𝐶 = 1179), Fixed Dread Cost (𝐵𝐼𝐶 
= 1418). Exponential Discounting (𝐵𝐼𝐶 = 1784) and the Null model (𝐵𝐼𝐶 = 1791).  
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Figure 6.11 Model comparison for Experiment 1B. Bayesian Information Criterion (𝐵𝐼𝐶), 
summed across participants (N = 30) for the alternative models. Lower values of 𝐵𝐼𝐶 indicate 
better fits of the model. Undiscounted Exponential Dread provided the most parsimonious fit 
at the group level, indicated by the red circle. 
 
6.2.2.4 Modelling Analysis of Sub-groups 
 
At the sub-group level, a plausible hypothesis was that the Null model would 
perform best in the zero time preference group, that Exponential Discounting would 
perform best in the positive time preference group and that Undiscounted Exponential 
Dread would perform best in the negative time preference group. In the zero time 
preference group, the best performing model was in fact Undiscounted Exponential 
Dread (𝐵𝐼𝐶 = 218), followed by the restricted form of Discounted Exponential Dread 
(𝐵𝐼𝐶 = 229), followed by the Null model (𝐵𝐼𝐶 = 232). This unexpected result is 
consistent with the observation that participants in the zero time preference group 
displayed a small but consistent degree of negative time preference, as shown in 
Figure 6.10B. In the positive time preference group the two models with the lowest 
BIC estimates were Exponential Discounting (𝐵𝐼𝐶  = 176) and Undiscounted 
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Exponential Dread (𝐵𝐼𝐶 = 179), a 𝐵𝐼𝐶 difference of 3.1, providing weak evidence in 
favor of Exponential Discounting in this group. Similarly, as predicted, in the 
negative time preference group the best performing model was Undiscounted 
Exponential Dread (𝐵𝐼𝐶 = 633), followed by Constant Dread (𝐵𝐼𝐶 = 674). 
 
6.2.2.5 Debriefing on Dental Attendance and Dental Fear 
 
The mean time since last attending the dentist was 24.6 months (s.d. 51.1 
months). The data were however considerably skewed, and median time since last 
attendance was 8.0 months (interquartile range 4.5-18.0). The mean level of dental 
fear was 2.73/5 (s.d. 1.08). Although I did not obtain direct data on whether 
participants had previously experienced dental pain, taken together these responses 
suggest that participants were familiar with attending the dentist and reported a degree 
of apprehension about attending.  
6.2.3 DISCUSSION 	  	  
A multitude of factors, which may interact with the effect of delay, are likely 
to influence the valuation of future pain in real-world contexts. Nevertheless 
Experiments 1A and 1B show the functional form of dread appears conserved across 
two very different experimental contexts: in the context of real painful outcomes 
experienced at delays of up to approximately 15 minutes, and in the context of an 
imagined painful experience at delays of up to approximately 8 months.   
Notably, although debriefing data suggest that many participants had attended 
the dentist in recent months, and that the mean participant exhibited some level of 
dental fear, the extent to which participants were able to adequately imagine dental 
pain is unclear.  A further key limitation of this experimental scenario is that 
participants may have held a prior belief that seeking sooner treatment is beneficial, 
either to ameliorate ongoing pain or to improve their dental health. I endeavoured to 
reduce this possibility by emphasising in the instructions that the appointment was 
routine and that the timing of the appointment would not affect dental health. 
Experiments described later in this thesis (Chapter 8) use a scenario designed to 
further minimise these possible confounds. The latter scenario requires participants to 
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imagine receiving a painful injection, said to prevent the onset of dementia later in 
life, and said to be 100% effective provided it is received sometime in the next ten 
years. In the dementia scenario, the time of onset of illness is distant relative to the 
treatment, hopefully circumventing a prior belief that earlier treatment might be more 
beneficial.  
A further relevant observation here is that the form of the dread function 
appears to demonstrate scale invariance, as evidenced by a similar shape when 
making choices over delays expressed in different units of time (trials or days). As a 
result the magnitude of prospective dread at a given delay is likely to depend upon the 
psychological construal of the time scale. Scale invariance is a feature of many 
psychometric functions, including temporal discounting with rewarding outcomes, 
and the scale invariance of dread presents a possible target for future study.  
 
6.3 EXPERIMENT 1C: TIME PREFERENCE FOR HYPOTHETICAL ILLNESS 
 
Experiment 1B examined how people might dread a future painful treatment, 
motivated by the idea that measures of dread might ultimately predict engagement in 
unpleasant preventive health procedures. However, people also exhibit negative time 
preference for future illness (e.g. Van Der Pol & Cairns, 2000), suggesting that 
attendance for preventive procedures might represent a complicated interplay between 
the dread of the procedure itself and the dread of delayed illness. (In many instances 
the procedure itself might be further dreaded for the reason that it might reveal that 
one is likely to become ill). To go some way towards examining this, Experiment 1C 
compares the ability of models of dread to account for peoples’ preferences for the 
timing of a transient illness.  
 
6.3.1 METHODS 
 
Thirty healthy adult participants (18 female, mean age 22.85 years, s.d. 5.45 
years) took part in the experiment. Participants were recruited by advertisement on the 
website of the University College London Psychology Subject Pool (see General 
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Experimental Methods 5.6). Choices were administered online using Qualtrics 
software (Qualtrics.com; Provo, UT).  
 I used a method for assessing illness discounting introduced by Van der Pol 
and Cairns (2002). Following Van der Pol and Cairns, participants received the 
following brief: 
 
Imagine an illness that affects you in the following ways: 
“You have some problems with performing your usual activities (e.g. work, study, 
housework, family or leisure activities) and you have moderate pain or discomfort. 
You have no problems in walking about, nor with washing or dressing yourself and 
you are not anxious or depressed.” 
 
All uses of 'ill' and 'ill-health' in the questionnaire refer to the above imagined illness. 
You will be asked some brief questions relating to this illness.  
 
In each case a treatment will be offered that will postpone the ill-health into the 
future, however this treatment may increase or decrease the number of days of ill-
health experienced. You are asked to state the maximum number of days of the future 
(postponed) ill-health which would still make it worthwhile for you to accept the 
treatment. 
 
Questions then assumed the following format: 
 
Imagine that you will be ill starting 2 years from now for 20 days. There is a minor 
one-off treatment available that will postpone this spell of ill-health to a point further 
into the future. If the ill-health would then start d years from now what is the 
maximum number of days of future ill-health (x) that would still make the treatment 
worthwhile? 
 
Each participant answered 9 of these questions, with delays, 𝑑!, of 4, 7, 10, 
12, 15, 21, 33, 45 and 53 years. The experimental data consisted of the stated number 
of days of future illness, 𝑥, termed 𝑥! to refer to the delayed illness option. Positive 
time preference (discounting) of illness is indicated by 𝑥! > 20, corresponding to 
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taking on extra days of illness so as to postpone it; by contrast 𝑥! < 20 indicates 
negative time preference, and corresponds to taking on extra days of illness so as to 
avoid postponing it.  
 
6.3.1.1 Models of Dread for Future Illness 
 
 The same models of dread-discounting introduced in Experiments 1A and 1B 
were tested here. To achieve continuity with the models above, I retained the discrete-
time framework and assumed that illness simply lasted for a single-time period, in this 
case one year. The disutility of illness was assumed to scale linearly with the number 
of days indicated by participants. These are radical assumptions, and further work is 
required to test whether they are justified, however they carry the advantage of 
allowing the severity of the illness, 𝑥, to be subsumed within the instantaneous utility 
function, rather than being time-extended, and thus greatly simplify the analysis. In 
each case the sooner illness option was given by an illness occurring in 2 years’ time 
(𝑑! = 2), and lasting for 20 days (𝑥! = 20), and participants were asked to state how 
many days of illness, 𝑥! , at a specified delay, 4 ≤ 𝑑! ≤ 52, would make them 
indifferent between the two options. Therefore to generate predicted values of 𝑥! for 
each model I solved the following: 
 𝑈 𝑥!,𝑑! =   𝑈 20,2  
        (6.3.1) 
 
Recall that the equation for the full Exponential Dread model (Equation 6.1.15 
above) can be decomposed into the instantaneous utility function, 𝑈 𝑥 , and the 
dread-discounting function (the terms within the square bracket), which depends only 
on 𝑑  and the parameters. Denoting the latter by ∆(𝑑) gives: 
 𝑈 𝑥!,𝑑! = 𝑈 𝑥! ∆ 𝑑! =   𝑈 20)∆(2  
        (6.3.2) 
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with linear disutility of illness this gives: 
 𝑥! =   20 ∆(2)∆ 𝑑!  
        (6.3.3) 
 
To implement a Fixed Dread Cost, I assumed a cost, 𝐴, associated with 
choosing the more delayed illness, such that: 
 𝑈 𝑥!,𝑑! − 𝐴 =   𝑈 20)∆(2  
        (6.3.4) 
Giving: 𝑥! =   20∆ 2 + 𝐴∆ 𝑑!  
        (6.3.5) 
 
To compare models with different numbers of parameters, conventional BIC 
was estimated from the least squares model fits, by assuming that errors were 
normally distributed around the model estimate and using the normal probability 
density as a likelihood function.  
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Figure 6.12 Time preference for illness in Experiment 1C predicted by an Undiscounted  
Exponential Dread model. A Discounted utility of 20 days of illness, 𝑈(𝑥 = 20,𝑑) as a 
function of delay, 𝑑, in years, to the onset of illness, for   𝛾! = 0.95 at increasing values of 𝛼. 
B Predicted behaviour on the illness discounting questionnaire at the same parameter settings 
as shown in A, given by the duration of delayed illness, 𝑥! , at each delay, 𝑑 , that is 
subjectively equivalent to 20 days of illness delayed by 2 years.  
 
6.3.2 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 	  
Figure 6.12A shows the dread-discounting functions predicted by an 
Undiscounted Exponential Dread model, for 𝑥 = 20,   𝛾! = 0.95 at varying settings of 𝛼 . Figure 6.12B shows the consequent predicted values of 𝑥!  on the illness-
discounting task. Exponential discounting alone (𝛼 = 0)  predicts exponentially 
increasing 𝑥! as a function of delay. Low values of 𝛼 combined with discounting (top 
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right panels) create concave increasing dependence of 𝑥! on delay. Higher 𝛼 gives 
rise to negative time preference, whereby 𝑥! declines as a function of delay.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.13 Time preference for illness in Experiment 1C. A Observed group level time 
preference (red circles) indicated by the mean duration of delayed illness, 𝑥!, at each delay, 𝑑, 
that is subjectively equivalent to 20 days of illness delayed by 2 years. Error bars represent 
one standard error above and below the group mean. Note that the first data point,  𝑥! = 20  at 𝑑 = 2 is not part of the observed choices, but is imposed in theory as an intercept. Hollow 
squares joined by a dashed line represent the mean least squares fit of a Discounted 
Exponential Dread model with Fixed Delay Cost (formed by taking the mean over individual 
least squares estimates). B Time preferences of four sample subjects displaying (from left to 
right), predominant discounting with low dread, predominant discounting, predominant dread, 
and predominant discounting with an initial cost. 
 
One participant was excluded from the analysis since they answered 𝑥! = 0 
for all questions. Observed group mean  𝑥! for the remaining 29 participants is plotted 
as a function of delay in Figure 6.13A;   𝑥! is an increasing concave function of delay, 
consistent with positive discounting combined with low 𝛼. However, the intercept of 
the curve lies below 20: mean 𝑥! for the shortest delay (4 years) was significantly less 
than 20 (95% CI [13.41- 19.27], one-sample t(28) = 2.56; p=0.01). A possible 
explanation is that participants judged there to be a cost associated with treatment, 
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such that a treatment which did not delay illness was only deemed worthwhile if it 
reduced the number of days of illness. This appears plausible in view of the fact that 
the wording of the scenario did not especially emphasise that the treatment was 
trivial.  Since the questionnaire did not incorporate a question in which treatment did 
not delay illness (𝑑! = 𝑑! = 2), this explanation is indistinguishable from a fixed 
cost associated with delaying illness.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.14 Model comparison for Experiment 1C A Bayesian model comparison: the best 
fitting model was Discounted Exponential Dread with a Fixed Delay Cost, indicated by the 
red circle. B Observed 𝑥! (vertical axis) is plotted against that predicted by the best-fitting 
model (horizontal axis) for all choices made by all participants, yielding R2=0.971. 
 
Participants showed heterogeneous responses, with four example patterns 
shown in Figure 6.13B. Notably several participants displayed a pattern consistent 
with negative time preference for illness at all lengths of delay, in keeping with the 
results of Experiments 1A and 1B. Also in keeping with the previous two 
experiments, Exponential Dread models outperformed Fixed Delay cost and Constant 
Dread models. In this case the full Discounted Exponential Dread model 
outperformed its Undiscounted counterpart (Figure 6.14A, Δ𝐵𝐼𝐶=75). To model the 
observation of an intercept less than 20, I also fitted post hoc a model which 
combined Discounted Exponential Dread with a Fixed Delay Cost (equivalent to a 
fixed cost associated with treatment). This model outperformed Discounted 
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Exponential Dread alone (Δ𝐵𝐼𝐶=59) and provided the most parsimonious fit at the 
group level (R2=0.971; Figure 6.14B).  	  
 In summary, Experiment 1C aimed to test the dread-discounting models 
introduced in preceding experiments against intertemporal choices for future illness, 
using a previously published paradigm. The sample size for this study was relatively 
small, given that the study was conducted online (N=30). The above data can 
therefore be seen as an exploratory attempt to characterise time preference for illness 
in terms of dread discounting. The current data support the hypothesis that models of 
dread-discounting can be used to delineate quite different patterns of time preference 
exhibited for hypothetical illness.  
 
6.4 DREADING FUTURE PAIN: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
The experiments described above address the phenomenon of negative time 
preference for aversive events, by offering participants choices between different 
intensities of pain at different delays. Analysis of such choices permitted mapping out 
the form of time preference for individual participants, and at the group-level. Model 
comparison indicated that choices across all three modalities were consistent with a 
model of dread in which the total prospective cost of waiting for pain accumulates 
with increasing delay (but at a decreasing rate), providing empirical support for the 
exponential model of anticipatory utility proposed by Loewenstein.  
Under the Exponential Dread model implemented here, as for Loewenstein’s 
original formulation (Loewenstein, 1987), both moment-by-moment dread and the 
temporally discounted value of pain itself increase as pain is approached in time. An 
increasing aversiveness by time function for the anticipation of pain bears similarity 
to observations in studies of fear conditioning. For example, the ability of fear to 
potentiate the startle response is specific to the learned time interval between 
conditioned stimulus (CS) and unconditioned stimulus (UCS) (M. Davis, Schlesinger, 
& Sorenson, 1989; Grillon, Ameli, Merikangas, Woods, & Davis, 1993; L. E. Ross, 
1961). Thus, following the CS, fear behaviours increase to reach a maximum at the 
predicted time of UCS onset. Similarly, in human subjects instructed to expect shock 
after a stated delay, physiological measures of fear such as galvanic skin response 
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(GSR) and heart rate both increase roughly exponentially in the period immediately 
preceding the predicted time of shock delivery (Boucsein & Wendt-Suhl, 1976; 
Breznitz, 1968; Estes & Skinner, 1941; Folkins, 1970). Consequently, the anticipation 
of pain can be considered as resembling a temporally discounted value signal, 
assuming a low level when pain is distant and increasing as pain is approached. The 
findings here suggest that pain-related decision-making incorporates, to a varying 
degree, a prospective sum of this anticipation, comprising the dread term of the dread-
discounting model.  
The current work on dread was motivated by the attempt to predict avoidance 
of unpleasant preventive health behaviour. A paradox arises with respect to the 
relationship between dread and avoidance. On the one hand dread increases the 
aversiveness of future pain, which ought to motivate avoidance; on the other hand if 
the pain is in fact unavoidable then dread motivates speeding up the onset of pain. It 
is therefore unclear on a priori grounds whether higher dread would predict greater 
avoidance of unpleasant preventive behaviours, or a tendency to get them over and 
done with. An important variable would appear to be whether a person believes 
(implicitly or explicitly) that the dreaded event can be avoided through delaying it 
(see General Discussion).  
Experiment 1A finds that choices to expedite pain were more frequent when 
the same outcomes were framed as an increase in pain than when framed as a 
decrease in pain, a demonstration that framing biases exert an effect in situations 
associated with dread. If dread can be shown to influence real-world behaviour, such 
as decisions to attend for preventive health screening, such framing effects might have 
implications for strategies designed to encourage attendance. For example, if dread 
were to be positively associated with the avoidance of unpleasant screening 
procedures, messages aimed at diminishing dread might prove successful. Such ideas 
are of course speculative at this stage and require further investigation.  
The observation of framing may be similar to that which underlies the well-
known sign effect, in where discount rates for rewards are typically different from 
those for punishments (Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992; MacKeigan et al., 1993; Odum 
et al., 2002; Ohmura et al., 2005; T. Takahashi, Ohmura, Oono, & Radford, 2009). 
Indeed, a model in which between-frame differences in temporal value functions were 
determined by changes in the rate of accumulation of dread, here equivalent to the 
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discount rate for pain, provided the most parsimonious account for these effects of 
framing, suggesting that differential anticipation is a sufficient explanation for the 
sign-effect in this context. This observation is however bound to the framework of the 
dread-discounting model. It is possible for example that framing induced changes in 
the instantaneous utility function for pain (Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992). 
 Why dread is a consistent feature of pain related decision-making is unclear. 
One possibility is that cognitive and emotional mechanisms associated with 
preparation for pain interfere with other behavioural processes, such as those involved 
in reward seeking. It is known for example that non-contingent prediction of shock, 
signaled by a conditioned stimulus, can reduce the vigor of instrumental responding, 
an effect referred to as conditioned suppression (Estes, 1948; Estes & Skinner, 1941).  
Dread, as the prospective sum of anticipated punishment, may therefore signal the 
likely degree of behavioural suppression during the delay. Another possibility is that 
dread represents a form of ‘stimulus substitution’ – the observation that cues 
associated with the prediction of aversive events evoke some of the core properties of 
the aversive events they predict themselves (Ploghaus et al., 1999; Waschulewski-
Floruss, Miltner, Brody, & Braun, 1994). An alternative explanation would be that 
people have an increasing uncertainty with time that they can engage in an adequate 
physical or psychological response to deal with pain. Further research is required to 
uncover the constitutive mechanisms of dread. The insights gained might carry 
importance for clinicians and health policy makers, since knowledge about the shape 
of pain value functions and their modulation by framing may be useful when 
presenting options regarding potentially painful investigations and treatments.   
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7. 
ALLOCATING PAIN ACROSS TIME 
 
“In the analysis of the supply of savings, it is extremely doubtful whether we can 
learn much from considering such an economic man, whose tastes remain unchanged, 
who seeks to maximise some functional of consumption alone, in a perfect world, 
where all things are certain and synchronised.”   
 
   Paul A. Samuelson – A note on the measurement of utility 
(1937) 	  
 
The preceding chapter of this thesis described how choices to advance the 
timing of unavoidable pain could be conceptualised as arising from the ‘dread’ of 
future pain. This work was motivated by the attempt to predict avoidance of 
unpleasant preventive health behaviour by measuring time preferences for pain or 
illness. As an intermediate step in this direction, the current chapter presents an 
experiment designed to test whether the derived dread functions are capable of 
predicting behaviour in a more naturalistic experimental context, modelled on the use 
of a personal health budget. Personal budgets ring-fenced for spending on one’s 
health have been recently introduced to the National Health Service in the UK, 
forming part of a wider trend towards giving patients more control over their own 
care (Darzi, 2008; Forder et al., 2012). Peoples’ time preferences for health or illness 
might influence how they choose to distribute such a budget over time, suggesting for 
example that people who tend to dread future illness might show a tendency to save a 
health-related budget, so as to mitigate the dread of future pain or illness.  
Conventionally, intertemporal preferences are estimated from ‘one-off’ binary 
choices between outcomes at varying delays.  By contrast, budgeting choices, in 
keeping with many real-world decisions, are made in a dynamic context, where the 
results of current choices influence the possibilities available for subsequent choices. 
Spending money on a holiday for example inevitably diminishes the amount one has 
available to save for retirement. The classical economic account of intertemporal 
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choice predicts that one-off and dynamic choices ought to be consistent, since in both 
cases a rational agent ought to simply allocate their resources over time so as to 
maximise total (exponentially) discounted utility (Samuelson, 1937; Strotz et al., 
1957). However, several features of the classical model are inconsistent with what is 
known about how people approach dynamic choices.  
 
7.1 DO PEOPLE REALLY PERFORM DYNAMIC UTILITY MAXIMISATION?  
 
A key simplifying assumption of the classical economic model is that utility is 
independent of that in other time periods, allowing the effect of delay to be entirely 
described by the temporal discount function (for critiques see Frederick et al., 2002; 
Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992). In reality however the assumption of additive utility is 
violated. For instance eating a meal reduces the utility of food for some time 
afterwards. Similar violations occur prospectively too. For example although, as 
noted, people overwhelmingly prefer sooner one-off rewards to delayed rewards of 
equivalent magnitude, when the same rewards are framed as sequences people tend to 
prefer sequences which improve over time—behaviour which cannot be reconciled 
with a single discount function whilst also preserving additive utility (Chapman, 
2000; Frederick & Loewenstein, 2008; Loewenstein & Prelec, 1993). 
The conventional economic model also assumes that humans have the 
necessary cognitive capacity to optimise their discounted utility. However, when 
deciding how to allocate reward over several time steps, the number of possible 
allocation plans grows exponentially as outcomes further into the future are 
considered, generating decision-problems of considerable complexity (Daw et al., 
2005; S. Johnson, Kotlikoff, & Samuelson, 1987). In response to this people 
apparently adopt simplifying strategies. For instance, transfers into retirement savings 
plans cluster around the minimum and maximum allowable contributions, as well as 
around multiples of five dollars, suggesting that investors choose these as convenient 
‘rules-of-thumb’ (Benartzi & Thaler, 2007). Such strategies are examples of 
‘heuristics’, which are approximate, generic solutions to classes of problems (Baron, 
2000; Gigerenzer, 2008; Gigerenzer et al., 2011). Notably the use of heuristics can 
generate behaviour in a dynamic context that is not consistent with the preferences 
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that the decision-maker exhibits in simpler, one-shot contexts (S. Johnson et al., 1987; 
Lettau & Uhlig, 1999). 
In addition the form of temporal discount function interacts with the ability to 
execute one’s best-laid plans. As discussed in previous chapters, a decision-maker 
with an exponential discount function (and an increasing concave utility function over 
outcome magnitude) has time-consistent preferences—i.e. will make the same 
decision between options with different temporal profiles no matter how close or far 
in time these are (Strotz et al., 1957). Such a decision-maker would naturally adhere 
to their plans, however frequently they were re-evaluated. By contrast if the discount 
function is hyperbolic then the decision-maker is expected to exhibit dynamically 
inconsistent behaviour: by seeking immediate reward, they would tend to undo 
previous long-sighted plans (Ainslie, 2001; Green et al., 1994; Kirby & Herrnstein, 
1995; Strotz et al., 1957; however see Chapter 4 of this thesis for alternative 
accounts). Temporally inconsistent preferences theoretically compound the 
complexity of planning resource allocations in real-time, since they necessitate a 
dynamic model of the behaviour of future selves (Ainslie, 1992; Ainslie, 2001). 
All the challenges and violations of the conventional economic wisdom 
described above make it unlikely that individuals exhibit fully optimal intertemporal 
allocations. However very few studies have directly examined budgeting decisions in 
real-time, tested the extent to which these are consistent with discount functions 
derived from one-off choices, or indeed found a parsimonious description that 
accounts well for actual choices. Furthermore no previous studies have tested this in a 
health-related context, where anticipatory utility is likely to be prominent.  
To address this I designed a task, referred to as Experiment 2, that involved 
allocating a limited budget in real-time. The task required participants to perform a 
series of 60 trials over 14 minutes wherein they were scheduled to receive a number 
of identical, moderately painful, cutaneous electric shock stimuli on each trial. At the 
outset, each participant was endowed with a fixed budget of computerised pain relief, 
an amount insufficient to relieve all shocks in the session. On each trial they were 
allowed to choose how much relief they wished to use, up to a maximum allowable 
“dose”. The scenario was embedded within a hypothetical health-related context, and 
pain relief was described in units of milligrams. Figure 7.1 illustrates the experimental 
protocol.  On each trial, participants received a number of shocks drawn from a 
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Poisson distribution. Without pain relief, the mean of this distribution was 14 shocks; 
for every 1mg of relief the participants spent on a trial, the mean decreased by 0.1 
shocks. Participants were allowed to spend a maximum of 120mg of relief on a trial; 
this reduced the mean number of shocks to two, a level termed the ‘baseline pain’. 
Participants had to spend within a total budget of 2400mg. Before making their 
choice, participants were informed of the total relief capital remaining, the number of 
trials remaining and the mean remaining relief per trial. The participants had, on the 
same day, also taken part in Experiment 1A, where they made binary choices between 
different numbers of, and delays to, painful shock stimuli, which were identical to 
those used for the consumption-savings experiment. This permitted testing for 
consistency between one-off and dynamic choices and examining evidence for 
possible simplifying heuristics.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1 Trial Structure of Experiment 2. Participants entered an experimental run of 60 
trials, on which they could expect to receive mildly painful electric shock stimuli on each 
trial, referred to as painful episodes. Each episode consisted of a five second stimulus in 
which there was a uniform probability of receiving a brief shock at each sampled time 
interval. By default participants could expect to receive a five second stimulus with 14 brief 
shocks on each trial, however they were provided with a budget of relief at the outset of the 
experiment, 2400 “milligrammes” in total. At the start of each trial a screen indicated the 
number of remaining trials, the remaining supply of relief in milligrammes (mg) and the mean 
relief remaining per trial. Participants then had the opportunity to indicate how much relief 
they wished to consume on that trial. The relief was then effective on the immediately 
subsequent painful episode. Each 10mg of relief consumed reduced the expected number of 
shocks in the stimulus train by one. Participants could consume up to a maximum of 120mg 
of on each trial, sufficient to reduce the expected number of shocks in the upcoming stimulus 
to two, referred to as the “baseline pain”. Since the budget of relief was insufficient to relieve 
all the shocks in the session, participants faced an intertemporal resource allocation problem. 
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Experiment 1A illustrated a range of intertemporal choice behaviour, with 
some participants exhibiting positive discounting, others negative discounting and 
others discounting very little or not at all. These three patterns would be expected to 
give rise in the dynamic task to spending relief early, saving relief for the end and 
spreading relief evenly over time, respectively (the latter assumes a concave utility 
function for relief). I therefore predicted that individuals who positively discounted 
one-off pains would tend to spend their relief early, those who displayed greater 
negative discounting (dread) for one-off pains would be more likely to save their 
relief (to mitigate dread, akin to savouring of relief), and those who did not discount 
pain at all would be more likely to spread their relief across time. I also compared 
behaviour with the optimal predictions of an anticipation-discounting model fitted to 
the one-off choices.  
The anticipation-discounting functions introduced in the previous chapter can 
generate non-adherence to past plans of a different form to that entailed by hyperbolic 
discounting (Figure 7.2) (see also Loewenstein, 1987). Since I did not elicit 
participants’ plans prior to the experiment, I could not directly test for this. However, 
to explore the theoretical implications of the model in more detail I simulated optimal 
consumption choices under various parameterisations of the utility and anticipation-
discounting functions, allowing for the possibility that participants might have 
different degrees of insight into their future tendencies, being either inaccurate (naïve) 
or accurate (sophisticated) (O’Donoghue & Rabin, 2003).  
 
7.2 METHODS 	  
7.2.1 EXPERIMENT 2: DYNAMIC CONSUMPTION OF PAIN RELIEF 
 
7.2.1.1 Participants 
 
Participant details, recruitment and informed consent are identical to 
Experiment 1A. The 30 healthy adult participants whose data were included in the 
study were those taking part in Experiment 1A. Anticipation-discounting parameters 
were estimable in 23 participants from these thirty. The remaining 7 participants 
	   145	  
always choose sooner pain on the binary choice experiment, precluding reliable 
model fitting. 
 
7.2.1.2 Procedure 
 
Participants were briefed with on-screen instructions that embedded the task in 
a naturalistic health-related scenario as for Experiment 1A. These were as follows: 
 
Imagine that you are suffering from pains as a result of damage to the nerves 
in your arm, which feel as if you are having brief electric shocks delivered to your 
hand. The pains come in clusters of ‘shocks’, which are roughly evenly spaced in 
time, with each episode lasting five seconds. Within each episode the shocks come 
randomly. You experience a usual baseline level of pain, of on average two shocks 
per episode. All the shocks are of the same intensity.  
You are about to have a severe attack of the pains, lasting about fifteen 
minutes in total. These severe episodes consist of 12 more shocks per episode than 
your usual baseline level.  
Before the attack you are given a supply of 2400mg of painkiller. On average 
10mg provides relief from one shock per episode. Before each episode you will be 
asked how much of your supply of relief you would like to use. There will be 60 
episodes in total, so you have on average 40mg to use per episode. You may wish to 
use more or less than this amount on each episode.  
You can use up to 120mg of painkiller for each episode. This will provide 
relief down to your baseline level of pain.  
 
As described above, at the start of the session participants were endowed with 
a fixed budget of computerised pain relief, described in units of milligrams, 2400mg 
in total. The budget was not sufficient to relieve all the shocks in the session, and 
participants were informed of this fact, and therefore the possibility that they might 
expend all their relief before the end of the session. Before each trial (of a total of 60), 
participants were informed of the total number of trials remaining, the number of 
units of relief remaining and the calculated mean relief remaining per trial in mg. 
They were then given the opportunity to indicate how much relief they wished to 
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consume on that trial, by moving a pointer along a visual scale using the keyboard. 
There followed a painful shock stimulus, the severity of which was determined by the 
amount of relief consumed.  
As for Experiment 1A, the painful shocks were drawn from a Poisson 
distribution within a five second stimulus train, where the intensity of each discrete 
shock, which consisted of a single 200μs square-wave pulse, did not vary. Each 5s 
stimulus was partitioned into 50 sampling intervals of 0.1s duration. There was a 
fixed probability of receiving a shock within each of these sampled 0.1s windows. For 
example, to achieve an expected shock rate of 10 shocks/5s, the probability of 
receiving a shock in a given 0.1s interval was set to 10/50 (i.e. 1/5).  By default 
participants were due to receive a series of 60 stimuli at the maximum expected shock 
rate of 14 shocks/5s (2.8 shocks/s).  Consuming 10mg of relief reduced the expected 
number of shocks in the immediately following stimulus train by one. Due to the 
probabilistic nature of the stimuli, this meant that the effectiveness of relief could 
vary somewhat from one trial to the next. Participants were fully briefed that the pain 
relief was probabilistic, chosen so as to achieve a more naturalistic context. To assist 
participants’ understanding of this fact, an analogy was drawn to the use of analgesia 
in real life, whose subjective effectiveness depends on factors other than simply the 
dose. The maximum allowable consumption of relief on each trial was 120mg, 
sufficient to reduce the expected shock rate to 2 shocks/5s (0.4 shocks/s), which was 
referred to as the “Baseline Pain”.  
Before the experiment, participants underwent a standardised procedure, to 
control for individual variability in pain perception (see Experiment 1A and General 
Experimental Methods 5.1.1). Also, prior to entering into the session, participants 
were given three samples of the maximum (default) and minimum (baseline) shock 
rates which they could expect to experience with using no relief or using maximum 
relief respectively. The choice phase was limited to 6 seconds, and each trial lasted 14 
seconds in total, the experimental session therefore lasted 14 minutes.  
 
7.2.1.3 Data Processing 
 
To reduce the computational complexity of the modelling and simulation 
analysis, relief consumption was rounded to the nearest 10mg, creating 13 possible 
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spending choices on each trial (0 to 12). This procedure produced occasional rounding 
errors such that the cumulative total rounded consumption exceeded the budget 
constraint. These errors were corrected by disallowing rounded consumption to 
exceed the remaining total relief, resulting in fictitious observations on the final trial 
for some participants. These discrepancies from the true observed consumption 
profiles were small by comparison to predominant patterns of consumption. 
 
7.2.2 DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING 
 
To simulate consumption paths predicted by the dread-discounting functions 
derived from one-off choices I implemented a dynamic program (Bellman, 1956; 
Bertsekas, 1976; Rust, 1989) over all possible states of capital at each time point.  A 
deterministic transition function, 𝑇(𝑐! , 𝑠!)  described how actions in the current state 
mapped to subsequent states, such that: 
 𝑠!!! =    𝑠! − 𝑐! 
   (7.1.1) 
 
Where 𝑠! , denotes capital at time 𝑡 , and 𝑐!  consumption at   𝑡 . Borrowing is not 
allowed, therefore 𝑠! ≥ 0  and 𝑐!   ≤    𝑠!. 
Consuming a quantity of relief, 𝑐!, was associated with utility 𝑈 𝑐!  at the 
current state, where 𝑈 𝑐!  is the utility function for relief. Since 𝑐!   ≤    𝑠!, by the 
budget constraint, the function 𝑈 also depends on current capital 𝑠!. The overall value 
of consuming relief,  𝑐!, when situated at time, 𝑡, with a state of capital, 𝑠!, termed a 𝑄 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒, was then described recursively as a function of the resulting relief utility 
at the current state, 𝑈 𝑐! , 𝑠! , followed by the expected utility of relief at all future 
states, given a future action policy, 𝜋  (see Chapter 5, General Methods) and a 
discount function, ∆(𝑑), giving rise to: 
 
  𝑄! 𝑠! , 𝑐! = 𝑈 𝑐! , 𝑠! + 𝐸 ∆(𝑑) ∙!!!!!! 𝑈 𝑐!!! , 𝑠!!! !!!!~!  
         (7.1.2) 
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The action policy, 𝜋, dictates the probability of consuming an amount of relief, 𝑐!  , 
given that the agent is currently situated at 𝑡  and has capital, 𝑠!, here represented by a 
softmax policy for action selection, such that: 
 
    𝑝 𝑐! 𝑠! , 𝑡 =   𝜋(𝑠! , 𝑡)   
       (7.1.3) 
Where:  
 
         𝜋 ∶ 𝑠! , 𝑡   →    !"#  (!∙!! !!,!!,! )!"#  (!∙!! !!,!!,! )!!            
        (7.1.4) 
 
Higher values of the inverse temperature parameter, 𝛽, increase the probability that 
the agent will choose the option with higher utility. ∆ 𝑑  was represented by the 
anticipation-discounting function derived from one-choices, which assumed the 
following form:  
∆ 𝑑 =     𝛾!   !   +   𝛼 𝛾!!!! ∙ 𝛾!  !!!!!!!     
        (7.1.5) 
In this case 𝛾!  represents the discount rate on future consumption, which also 
determines savouring of future relief, and 𝛾!  represents the discounting on savouring 
itself.  Parameters from the Exponential Dread model fitted to choices in Experiment 
1A (𝑦! –Framing; both Pain and Relief frames separately), namely 𝛼, 𝛾! and 𝛾! were 
carried forward to generate resulting optimal consumption paths on the dynamic 
experiment. To do so, discounting of relief consumption was set to be equivalent to 
discounting of pain (𝛾!  =𝛾!) and discounting of dread was set to be equivalent to the 
discounting of savouring (𝛾! = 𝛾! ). Figure 7.2 illustrates typical forms for an 
anticipation-discounting function for a positively-valenced outcome, where  𝛾! = 1.  
Where anticipation dominates, the overall value is an increasing function of delay. 
Linear utility function for pain and relief was assumed. Optimal policies were 
simulated using a high value of the softmax inverse temperature, 𝛽 = 10000.  
 
7.2.2.1 Sophistication vs Naivety  
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The value function 𝑄! 𝑠! , 𝑐!  expresses the notion that the value of consuming 
an amount,  𝑐, at the current capital level and time period depends on the immediate 
utility of consuming  𝑐 plus the expected value of (discounted) future consumption, 
given accurate knowledge of one’s likely future policy for action. This model 
therefore entails complete sophistication. Put simply, the sophisticated agent knows 
how they are likely to behave in future and takes this into account. In other words the 
model assumes for example that the agent at 𝑡 = 1  knows that a future decision-
maker at 𝑡 = 11 will apply the same degree of discounting to periods 𝑡   = 11, 𝑡   =12, 𝑡 = 13 and so on as the agent currently applies to periods 𝑡   = 1, 𝑡 = 2, 𝑡 = 3  and 
so on. Naivety by contrast would entail for example that the agent at 𝑡 = 1 assumes 
that the decision-maker at 𝑡 = 11 will apply the same discount factors to periods 𝑡   = 11, 𝑡   = 12, 𝑡 = 13 and so on as the agent currently applies to those time periods. 
Given dynamic inconsistency in the discounting function, a naïve agent would be 
expected to change their plans at each time step. 
To simulate this, the dynamic program was iterated once for each trial of the 
simulation, with the following recursive value function:   
 
    𝑄!"#$%! 𝑠! , 𝑐! , 𝑡, 𝑖 = ∆ 𝑡 − 𝑖 ∙ 𝑈 𝑐! , 𝑠! + 𝐸 ∆ 𝜏 − 𝑖 ∙!!!!!! 𝑈 𝑐!!! , 𝑠!!! !!!!~!  
          (7.1.6) 
 
Where each iteration is represented by 𝑖 , which ranges between 1 and 𝑇. Naive 
consumption plans at trial  𝑖 were sampled from a policy based on 𝑄!"#$%! 𝑠! , 𝑐! , 𝑖  over 
the remaining trials 𝑡 =   𝑖, 𝑖 + 1, 𝑖 + 2…   𝑇. Naïve consumption paths themselves 
were simulated by sampling from 𝑄!"#$%! 𝑠! , 𝑐! , 𝑡  over all trials 𝑡 =   1, 2, 3…   𝑇. In 
simple terms, the naïve agent continually unravels their previous plans, and must form 
a new plan at each time step. 
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Figure 7.2 Anticipation-discounting functions.  Anticipation-discounting functions are 
constructed from a linear combination of the conventionally discounted value of an outcome, 
i.e. its instantaneous anticipation, and the prospective sum of anticipation whilst waiting for 
the outcome, displayed here for an outcome with positive utility. A Where prospective 
anticipation (savouring) dominates, the overall value of the outcome decreases as it draws 
nearer, due to decreasing prospective anticpation. B These functions give rise to dynamic 
inconsistency. Where prospective savouring dominates, preference reverses towards deferral 
of consumption. Here r1 is a larger sooner reward and r2 is a smaller later reward, where both 
generate a large degree of savouring. When both rewards are distant, the sooner reward is 
preferred, however as the rewards approach, the delayed reward becomes preferable.  
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7.2.3 MODEL FITTING PROCEDURES 
 
As for Experiment 1A, model fitting followed a maximum likelihood 
framework (see Chapter 5, General Methods), using the softmax policy to generate 
the probability of observing each possible (rounded) level of relief consumption, 
given a particular set of model parameters. Simplex optimisation was performed using 
the Matlab (Mathworks, MA, USA) fminsearch optimisation tool (Nelder-Mead 
search algorithm,, Lagarias et al., 1998) with the addition of bound constraints by 
transformation. For each participant 10 iterations of the optimisation were performed, 
and the maximum likelihood estimate across all iterations was selected. On each 
iteration the optimiser was called within a random multi-started overlay (RMsearch), 
with 100 starting points selected from a uniform distribution between the parameter 
bounds, in order to reduce convergence on local minima.  
7.3 RESULTS 	  
7.3.1 SIMULATING CONSUMPTION BEHAVIOUR 
 
To illustrate the effects of changes to the instantaneous utility and 
anticipation-discounting functions, I used dynamic programming to simulate optimal 
behaviour on a reduced version of the task lasting 10 time periods (with a budget of 
400mg).  
 
7.3.1.1 Effects of the Instantaneous Utility Function 
 
Within the standard economic model, the instantaneous utility function can 
affect the optimal consumption path, even for a decision-maker who treats the same 
outcome as equally valuable regardless of its timing (Figure 7.3).  For the special case 
of linear utility, where 𝑈 𝑐! = 𝑐!, provided there is no discounting or interest rate, all 
possible consumption paths in which total consumption corresponds to spending the 
entire capital are equally valued.  As a result, at each time step, and each state of 
capital, all possible consumption levels have equal value. The result is that 
consumption in the first time period, 𝑐!, could be selected at random from a uniform 
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distribution, in which case, the expected consumption level, 𝑐!, is close to 60 units. 
Single-period consumption, 𝑐! , then continues in this manner until the capital is 
entirely consumed (The left panel of Figure 7.2A shows an example linear utility 
function, and the left panel of Figure 7.2B shows two example simulated consumption 
paths under this utility function with no discounting). A simple explanation for this is 
that, for the agent with linear utility and no time preference, increases in relief 
spending in one time period exactly outweigh the inevitable decreases in later time 
periods – so the agent is indifferent as to when they spend their relief.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.3 Effects of changes in the instantaneous utility function on dynamic 
consumption. A Two alternative utility functions, linear (left panel) and concave (right 
panel). B Simulated optimal consumption paths with no discounting or anticipation (zero time 
preference) under the two forms of utility function. In each case two sample simulated paths 
are displayed, to illustrate that, with linear utility (left panel) there is more than one optimal 
path. Left panel: under linear utility with no discounting or anticipation all paths which 
consume the entire budget are equally valued. Consumption is therefore chosen at random 
from a uniform distribution until the budget is expended. Right panel: concave utility 
motivates spreading consumption over time. 
 
With a concave utility function, here illustrated with 𝑈 𝑐! =    𝑐!! , where 0 < 𝑘 < 1, low levels of consumption are relatively more valuable than would be the 
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case under a linear function. Here, the optimal path is to spread consumption evenly 
across time (The right panel of Figure 7.3A, shows an example concave utility 
function, and the right panel of Figure 7.3B shows two sample consumption paths 
under this utility function with no discounting). This can be expressed as a desire not 
to be left with little or no relief in any given time period.  
 
7.3.1.2 Effects of Anticipation-Discounting Functions 
 
Figure 7.4 plots predicted consumption paths under four possible 
parameterisations of the anticipation-discounting function (Figure 7.4A), under both 
full naivety or full sophistication, for a concave utility function: 𝑈 𝑐! =    𝑐!!.!".  It 
can be appreciated from Figure 7.4B that, where discounting dominates (first 
column), optimal consumption is decreasing, corresponding to spending relief early. 
With no discounting (second column), optimal consumption is even over time, owing 
to concave utility. Where anticipation dominates (third column), the predicted 
consumption path is increasing, corresponding to saving relief. Where anticipation is 
itself discounted (𝛾! < 1; fourth column) non-monotonic consumption profiles result.  
Where there is a degree of savouring (𝛼 > 0), the consumption paths for naïve and 
sophisticated consumers diverge, albeit subtly in some cases. The underlying dynamic 
inconsistency is illustrated in Figure 7.4C, which plots consumption plans made at the 
first three time periods for fully naïve agents. Rather than consumption itself, these 
plots depict the naive plans for future consumption from the current time-period 
onwards. Where discounting dominates (left column), inconsistency similar to that 
implied by hyperbolic discounting results: consumption at the next period turns out to 
be greater than planned. Where savouring dominates (right hand two panels), the 
naïve decision-maker consumes less than planned. A sophisticated agent takes these 
future discrepancies into account and adjusts their plan accordingly.  
To summarise, normative considerations justify at least three obvious 
qualitative classes of relief spending – increasing, decreasing and flat (or spreading). 
They also make strong predictions about the relationship between single- and multi-
period decisions, and potentially the effect of degrees of game-theoretic 
sophistication.  
 
	   154	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.4 Anticipation-discounting and dynamic utility maximisation. A Four 
anticipation-discounting functions. From left to right: predominant discounting, no 
discounting, predominant savouring, discounted savouring. The parameters of each function 
are displayed on the plot. B Simulated optimal consumption paths under the same four 
discount functions, with concave utility, 𝑈(𝑐)   =   𝑐!.!". Green circles represent simulated 
consumption paths for a fully naïve decision-maker (See Main Text). Red circles represent 
consumption for a fully sophisticated decision-maker. C Plans for future consumption made 
in the first three time periods for a naïve decision-maker.  The red circles indicate planned 
consumption from the perspective of 𝑡 = 1, the blue circles from the perspective of  𝑡 = 2  and 
the green circles from the perspective of 𝑡 = 3. Where discounting dominates (left panel), the 
naïve decision-maker consumes more than planned, where savouring dominates (right hand 
two panels), the naïve decision-maker consumes less than planned.  
 
7.3.2 OBSERVED CONSUMPTION OF RELIEF 
 
The experimental data consisted of the number of units of relief consumed on 
each trial by each participant. Figure 7.5A plots the median consumption of relief on 
each trial at the group level (N = 30, bars indicate the interquartile ranges). Across 
participants, the profile of consumption is increasing over time, showing the tendency 
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for relief to be saved for towards the end of the experimental session. Robust linear 
regression on all choices made by all participants (N = 1980), using iteratively 
reweighted least squares with a bi-square weighting function, demonstrated a 
significantly positive effect of time on relief consumption (𝛽  = 0.47, p < 0.001).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.5 Observed distribution of relief consumption across time in Experiment 2.  A 
Median relief consumption on each trial at the group level is indicated by the solid black 
circles. Error bars indicate the upper and lower quartiles of consumption. B The distribution 
of group level consumption. The intensity of the grey bars represents the proportion of the 30 
participants included in the analysis choosing to consume each amount of relief on a 
particular trial. Relief is expressed in units, produced by rounding the raw consumption 
choices to the nearest 10 units of relief. A tendency to conserve relief is evident from below-
average consumption over the first 40 trials and above-average consumption over the last 20 
trials. A tendency to spread relief across time is evident from the high proportion of choices 
to spend 4 units of relief, the mean rounded relief per trial over the whole experimental run. 
 
However, the group-level presentation of the data conceals the complexity of 
subject-specific choices. To examine this I calculated the proportion of participants 
choosing a particular level of consumption on each trial. The observed distribution of 
rounded relief-consumption at the group level is displayed in Figure 7.5B. Darker 
bars indicate a higher proportion of participants choosing a given consumption level 
on each trial. There were very few choices to consume close to the maximum quota of 
relief early in the experimental session. Rather, higher intensities corresponding to 
spending close to zero relief in the first 40 trials, and above-average consumption 
across the final 20 trials, demonstrated that participants tended to conserve relief for 
the final portion of the session, which would be consistent with savouring. Since there 
was a budget of 240 rounded units of relief, to be allocated across 60 trials, even 
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spreading of relief would entail spending 4 units per trial.  Notably, high intensities 
corresponding to spending close to 4 units of relief indicate that participants also 
demonstrated a tendency to spread relief across time, which would be consistent with 
participants having concave utility for relief. There is also a weak tendency to sample 
the maximum allowable quota of relief throughout the experimental run. An 
additional interesting feature is that participants were more likely to consume close to 
the mean relief remaining early in the experiment, tending to switch to consuming 
zero relief during the middle of the experiment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.6 Consumption paths from six sample participants in Experiment 2. Hollow circles 
denote the consumption choices on each trial. The bold dashed line denotes the mean relief 
remaining at the start of each trial. These six participants are selected as representative of the 
key patterns observed. The first two participants (i and ii) on spread relief over time. The 
subsequent three participants (iii-v) predominantly conserve relief, as evidenced by an 
increase in the mean relief remaining per trial over time. Participant vi) consumes above the 
mean relief remaining towards the start of the session and subsequently adjusts consumption 
downward. 
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Figure 7.7 Histograms of relief consumption over time in Experiment 2. A Relief 
consumption expressed as mg. Each plot represents the distribution of relief 
consumption over a period of 10 trials. Multiples of 10mg are over-represented.  B 
Relief consumption rounded to the nearest 10mg, expressed as ‘units’. Each plot 
represents the distribution of relief consumption over a period of 10 trials.  
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At the individual level, participants appeared to display one or more of the 
above three tendencies, though strikingly, no participant systematically consumed 
close to the maximum available relief at the outset of the experiment. To illustrate 
this, consumption profiles from six sample participants are displayed in Figure 7.6, 
overlaid with the mean relief remaining per trial (dashed lines), termed 𝜌!. This 
quantity (displayed to participants on-screen before each choice) is given by the total 
remaining relief on that trial, 𝑠! ,  divided by the number of trials remaining: 
 𝜌!   =    𝑠!/[60– (𝑡 − 1)]   
For any trial during the experiment, consuming exactly 𝜌!  units of relief on every 
remaining trial would entail even consumption of relief over the remainder of the 
experiment.  
Figure 7.7A plots raw consumption choices (in mg) as a series of histograms 
over time, illustrating that multiples of 10mg are over-represented. This suggests that 
participants used strategies to reduce the dimensionality of the task, rather than 
performing optimisation at the native resolution. When rounded consumption (in 
units) is also plotted in this manner (Figure 7.7B), choices to consume zero relief or 4 
units of relief are prominent. 
 
7.3.3 PREDICTING CONSUMPTION FROM ONE-OFF CHOICES BETWEEN DELAYED PAINS 
 
Although the participants exhibited the same qualitative patterns of behaviour 
as expected from the normative accounts (Figure 7.4), this does not mean that each 
participant’s own choices were consistent with their one-off preferences. To compare 
one-off and dynamic behaviour, I first derived summary measures of behaviour on 
both tasks. In the one-off choice task, the frequency of choosing sooner pain is a 
correlate of dread. As described previously, in Experiment 1A one-off choices 
between delayed pains were elicited under two descriptive ‘frames’, a pain frame, and 
a relief frame. The latter corresponds to that used in the relief consumption 
experiment. Nevertheless I examined the relationships between dynamic relief 
consumption behaviour and sooner choice frequency on both frames. The signed 
slope of the dynamic consumption path (fitted with least-squares linear regression) is 
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a measure of the overall tendency to conserve relief, while the absolute magnitude of 
the slope is a measure of the deviation, in either direction, from even spreading of 
relief.  
Contrary to a normative account, there was no significant positive relationship 
between the tendency to dread (on either frame) and the slope of the consumption 
path (Figure 7.8A; 𝑝 >0.25, 𝑁 = 30), although there was a trend in this direction for 
the relief frame choices (Pearson 𝑟 = 0.2). Neither was there a significant relationship 
between dread and the tendency to spread relief over time (Figure 7.8B; 𝑝 >0.25, 𝑁 = 
30).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.8 Relationships between one-off (binary) and dynamic intertemporal choices.  
The frequency of choosing sooner pain in the binary intertemporal choice experimentwhich 
provides a summary behavioural measure of dread, in both pain (i) and relief (ii) frames (see 
main text), is plotted against: A the slope of the spending profile in the dynamic consumption 
task (positive slope indicates saving relief) and B the absolute slope of the spending profile (a 
measure of deviation from even spreading of  relief). Solid lines indicate a linear least-squares 
fit through the data. There are no significant relationships between the behavioural metrics on 
the two tasks.  
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It is possible that variability in the utility function and softmax temperature 
parameters could account for some of the observed differences between one-off and 
dynamic choices. To explore this I implemented a model in which the softmax 𝛽, and 
the exponent governing the utility function, 𝑘, were fitted freely, whilst holding the 
previously derived anticipation-discounting parameters constant (for those 
participants for whom estimates of anticipation-discounting functions were available 
from one-off choices, N = 23, see Methods). The group-level distribution of 
consumption predicted by this model is displayed in Figure 7.9B, (Figure 7.9Bi, pain 
frame preferences; Figure 7.9Bii, relief frame preferences), alongside the observed 
group level distribution in Figure 7.9A. Although the optimal preferences predict 
saving of relief at the group level, they underestimate the tendency to spread relief 
over time, even allowing for concave utility, and the fitted policies are relatively 
imprecise. To estimate the proportion of variance in the observed data accounted for 
by the model, I found the mean consumption level for each participant across each 10 
trials of the experiment, before calculating the same measure by simulating 10000 
consumption paths resulting from the maximum likelihood parameterisation of the 
model. As shown in Figures 7.9Ci (pain frame preferences) and 7.9Cii (relief frame 
preferences), there was a significant positive relationship between predicted and 
observed consumption paths (robust regression, pain frame: 𝛽! = 0.22,𝑝 < 0.001; 
relief frame: 𝛽! = 0.44,𝑝 < 0.001). However least squares fits indicated that the 
model accounted for only a relatively small proportion of the observed variance (pain 
frame 𝑅! = 0.03,  relief frame 𝑅! = 0.07).  
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Figure 7.9. Fits of an anticipation-discounting model with variable utility and choice 
randomness to consumption choices in Experiment 2.  A Observed consumption by 
participants for whom anticipation-discounting functions derived one-off choice tasks were 
available (N = 23). Warmer colours indicate that a higher proportion of participants chose to 
consume that amount of relief on a given trial. B Consumption predicted by the anticipation-
discounting functions. These plots denote the mean predicted probability across participants 
of consuming an amount on each trial given the total remaining relief (at the maximum 
likelihood parameters of each model). i) Anticipation-discounting functions derived from 
one-off pain frame choices, with softmax temperature and utility parameters freely fitted. ii) 
Anticipation-discounting derived from one-off relief frame choices, with softmax temperature 
and utility parameters freely fitted. C Mean predicted consumption levels simulated from the 
maximum likelihood parameterisations of each model over each 10 trials of the experiment 
for each participant are plotted against the same metric derived from the observed data.  
	   162	  
7.3.4 MODELLING RELIEF CONSUMPTION USING HEURISTICS 
 
Given that consumption behaviour showed only weak correspondence with the 
predictions of anticipation-discounting as derived from one-off choices, I tested 
alternative generative accounts. This analysis was performed post hoc, and focussed 
on characterising simple computations that might feasibly have produced the 
observed consumption choices.  
The first model, termed the Direct Action Heuristic model, proposed that 
participants implemented the three observed behavioural tendencies directly as 
heuristics, with some propensity to choose between them. The three are termed spend-
now-suffer-later (with propensity 𝑀!"#$% ), spread-spending (with propensity 𝑀!"#$%&), and save-now-spend-later (with propensity 𝑀!"#$). The extent to which 
observed relief consumption,  𝑐!, fell below the mean relief remaining on each trial,  𝜌! , 
is given by: 
 𝑑! = 𝜌! − 𝑐!   
Positive 𝑑!  entails using less than the mean relief remaining per trial, while |𝑑!| 
indicates the extent of deviation from spreading.  Formally, the three heuristics were 
defined as:: 
 𝑀!"#$% 𝑠! , 𝑐! , 𝑡 = 𝑐! 
 𝑀!"#$%& 𝑠! , 𝑐! , 𝑡 = −|𝑑!| 
 𝑀!"#$ 𝑠! , 𝑐! , 𝑡 = 𝑑!    𝑖𝑓  𝜌! <   120        𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒  
 𝑀!"#$% formalises a spend-now-suffer-later heuristic, by assuming linear utility for 
relief consumption, and thus a propensity to consume the maximum allowable relief. 𝑀!"#$%& formalises a spread-spending heuristic, by penalizing deviations from the 
mean relief remaining, and so generates a propensity to spread relief over time. 𝑀!"#$ 
formalises a save-now-spend-later heuristic, by assigning higher value to consuming 
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less relief, provided that the mean remaining relief per trial is less than the maximum 
possible consumption level.  𝑀!"#$ therefore generates a propensity to consume as 
little relief as possible until there is sufficient remaining relief to reduce pain to the 
baseline level for the remainder of the experiment, at which point the remaining 
heuristics encourage spending this quantity.   
The three action propensities were implemented as separate policies, each with 
a unique softmax inverse temperature parameter. The final probability of consuming 
each level of relief was assumed to arise from a weighted average across these 
policies with weight for a policy determined by its inverse variance, such that:  
 
𝜔! = 1𝑣𝑎𝑟 𝜋! / 1𝑣𝑎𝑟 𝜋!!!!!  
 
where 𝜔! is the weighting on policy, 𝜋!. This procedure ensured that the Direct Action 
model had only three parameters: the inverse temperatures of each softmax function, 
respectively termed 𝛽!"#$%, 𝛽!"#$%& and 𝛽!"#$. In each case higher 𝛽! had the effect of 
increasing the weighting on that particular policy, by reducing the variance of  𝜋!.  
The group-level distribution of observed consumption choices is reproduced in 
Figure 7.10A, for comparison with the model fits. The distribution predicted by the 
Direct Action heuristic model is displayed in the left-hand panel of Figure 7.10B. The 
model provided a parsimonious summary of observed consumption choices, albeit not 
convincingly capturing the observation that some participants were more likely to 
consume close to the mean relief remaining per trial (𝜌!)  near the start of the 
experimental run, before switching to conserve relief.  	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Figure 7.10. Heuristic model fits to consumption choices in Experiment 2 A Observed 
consumption by all 30 participants. Warmer colours indicate that a higher proportion of 
participants consumed that amount on a particular trial. Black arrows indicate spending zero 
relief, which becomes more prominent during the middle of the experiment. B Relief 
consumption predicted by alternative heuristic models. These plots show the mean probability 
across all participants of consuming an amount on each trial given the total remaining relief 
(at the maximum likelihood parameters of each model). The Direct Action model combines 
the three observed behavioural tendencies as heuristics: save-now-spend-later, spread-
spending or spend-now-suffer-later. The Income Maximisation model implements the saving 
tendency as an attempt to maximise the mean remaining relief per trial, over a limited future 
horizon. This model captures the relatively greater tendency to save relief during the middle 
of the experiment (black arrows). C Mean predicted consumption levels simulated from the 
maximum likelihood parameterisations of each model over each 10 trials of the experiment 
for each participant are plotted against the same metric derived from the observed data.  
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The above pattern might have several different explanations. One 
simplification in the model is that the explicit relative weightings of the heuristics are 
assumed to be constant. However, participants may have adopted the spread-spending 
heuristic at the outset, before learning the extent that they were able to tolerate pain as 
the experiment progressed then switching to save-now-spend-later. Similarly they 
may have consumed the mean relief at the outset as a default option, until they 
learned to trust the experimental setup.  A further possibility is that participants, rather 
than using a save-now-spend-later heuristic directly as defined above, may have 
sought to maximise the mean relief remaining per trial (𝜌!) over the near future: since 
saving relief would have more immediate effect on 𝜌!   later in the experiment 
compared with at the start, the propensity to save would be expected to increase as the 
experiment continued.  
The data do not admit a direct distinction between the above hypotheses. 
However in order to illustrate one of the possibilities I fitted a modified version of the 
above model in which the save-now-spend-later heuristic described above is replaced 
with a heuristic to maximise 𝜌!  over a limited future horizon, which I term an income 
maximisation heuristic  (and eponymous model). Thus 𝑀!"#$  in this model was 
replaced by a action-value function, which described the value of consuming an 
amount,  𝑐!, at the current capital level, 𝑠!, and time period, t, given knowledge of the 
future policy for action, π. In other words this model assumed that participants were 
in part attempting to maximise the expected mean relief remaining per trial, akin to 
maximizing their expected income: 
 
  𝑄!!!"#! 𝑠! , 𝑐! , 𝑡, 𝛾   =   𝜌!(𝑠! , 𝑡) +   𝐸 𝛾! ∙ 𝜌!!!(𝑠!!!,𝑡 + 𝑑)!!!!~!!!!!!! 	  
 
 To account for limited computational resources, the above formula incorporates a 
probability, 1− 𝛾, that the decision-maker terminates their search at every level 
deeper into the tree (the 𝛾 parameter is mathematically equivalent to an exponential 
discount rate). I fitted this part of the model using dynamic programming. The 
remaining two action propensities, 𝑀!"#$%  and 𝑀!"#$%& were implemented in the same 
manner as the Direct Action model, and policies were combined using the same 
weighting method.  
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The distribution of consumption at the group level predicted by the Income 
Maximisation model is shown in the right-hand panel of Figure 7.10B. It can be seen 
that this model accounts for the tendency to save relief being higher during the middle 
part of the experiment.  As expected, the Income Maximisation model produced an 
improvement in BIC of 78 at the group level over the Direct Action model. (Notably 
however the Income Maximisation model was optimised post hoc to account for a 
particular feature of the observed data). Least squares fits indicate R2 = 0.56 for the 
Direct Action model and 0.80 for the Income Maximisation model (Figure 7.10C). 
To illustrate the contribution of each of the three heuristics, the policy 
weightings of the two heuristic models are displayed in Figure 7.11. The Income 
Maximisation model results in a larger relative weight being placed on saving during 
the middle half of the experiment (Figure 11A). Also throughout the experiment 
saving (save-now-spend-later and income maximisation) and spread-spending receive 
considerably higher weightings (Figures 7.11A and 7.11B) than spend-now-suffer-
later.  
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Figure 7.10 Policy weightings of heuristic models in Experiment 2 A Mean weighting 
across participants on each of the three policies (see Methods) on each trial under the 
maximum likelihood fits of the Direct Action (left) Income Maximisation (right) models. 
Spend-now-suffer-later has low weighting early in the experiment.  Spread-spending has high 
weightings throughout.  For the income maximisation model, saving is weighted most highly 
in the middle part of the experiment. B Box plot showing distribution over participants of 
policy weightings, averaged over all trials of the experiment.  Saving and Spread-Spending 
heuristics dominate. 
 
7.4 DISCUSSION 	  
People are often required to choose between improving their immediate or 
future wellbeing. In reality such choices are often made sequentially, such that 
today’s choices influence the possibilities available tomorrow for example, when 
distributing a limited budget, early spending limits the capital available in later 
periods.  Economic theory proposes that budgeting choices ought to be predictable 
from choices between equivalent one-off delayed outcomes (Rust, 1989; Strotz et al., 
1957), however the theory faces considerable theoretical challenges. Experiment 2 
tested this in an experiment analogous to the use of personal health budget, in a group 
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of participants whose intertemporal preferences for one-off future pains of the same 
nature had been elicited previously.  
Interestingly, no participant systematically consumed close to the maximum 
available relief at the outset of the experiment, as conventional temporal discounting 
would predict. Whilst two out of the thirty participants analysed did generate 
declining profiles of relief, these two participants also showed trial-to-trial variability 
in consumption, suggesting that they may have chosen consumption levels largely at 
random (with the decline resulting from exhausting the budget). Tendencies to 
consume the minimum allowable relief early on, thus saving for the end, and to 
consume close to the mean remaining relief were prominent, with several participants 
alternating between these two tendencies. Consistent with ‘round number’ heuristics 
in retirement-savings decisions (Benartzi & Thaler, 2007), choices to spend multiples 
of 10mg of relief were over-represented in the data.  
Perhaps surprisingly there was no significant correlation between a preference 
for sooner pain in one-off choices and the tendency to save relief in the dynamic task 
(although there was a trend towards a positive relationship). This null finding appears 
to cast some doubt on the idea that dread-discounting might be capable of predicting 
pain-related choices in the field, and appears particularly surprising given a near exact 
correspondence between the two sets of choices in the timing and nature of the 
outcomes. The data suggest either that additional processes are at play when choices 
are made sequentially, that are not well specified by the existing analysis of one-off 
choices (Frederick & Loewenstein, 2008), or that faced with the complexity of 
budgeting choices, people choose relatively arbitrary heuristics.  
A factor that is poorly specified in the previous analysis of one-off choices is 
the instantaneous utility function for pain/relief. This is important, since the form of 
utility function chosen when estimating dread-discounting will influence the resulting 
estimates. Also, as shown here through simulation, the instantaneous utility function 
has marked effects on budgeting choices. This suggests that researchers interested in 
predicting sequential choice might do well to estimate the instantaneous utility 
function independently from time preferences.  
A further effect that is poorly specified in one-off choices is the degree of 
sophistication – i.e. whether people can predict their own tendency to renege on their 
plans. As demonstrated here (as well as in existing studies), the anticipation-
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discounting functions described previously for one-off choices predict a novel form of 
inconsistent choice, distinct from that of hyperbolic discounting, which entails the 
perpetual deferral of consumption against one’s long term interests (Figure 7.2; 
Loewenstein, 1987). Notably such inconsistent behaviour is the reverse of that 
conventionally associated with ‘failure of self control’, and is referred to by 
Loewenstein (1987) as ‘reverse time inconsistency’. It is unclear whether such 
behaviour is manifest in real-time, or indeed influences the kind of consumption 
choices demonstrated here.  
Finally, relative valuation processes might be expected to have played a 
greater role in the sequential task. Relative valuation processes involve comparison of 
outcomes against an assumed baseline, or reference-point (Elliott, Agnew, & Deakin, 
2008; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). For example, due to psychological adaptation to 
the current pain level, a moderate intensity pain can appear more severe when 
following a low intensity pain than when following a high intensity pain (Vlaev et al., 
2009; Winston et al., 2014). Thus if consumption levels are compared with those that 
precede them, people might be led to choose deliberate privation in order to increase 
the hedonic impact of subsequent consumption, in this case predicting saving of relief 
(Dayan, 2009; Elster & Loewenstein, 1992; Frederick & Loewenstein, 2008). The 
opposite effect may also occur, namely sensitisation to repeated high-level pain, 
leading participants to occasionally consume the maximum relief as ‘respite’. A 
further possibility is that decreases in consumption from one time period to the next 
are valued as more negative than equivalent increases are valued positively, i.e. loss 
aversion (Kahneman et al., 1991; Tom, Fox, Trepel, & Poldrack, 2007; Usher & 
McClelland, 2004).  Loss aversion would be expected to further penalise deviations 
from either even spreading or saving, for the reason that any increases in consumption 
above even spreading inevitably lead to future decreases (Loewenstein & Prelec, 
1993).  
In summary this plurality of possible mechanisms contributing to dynamic 
behaviour (summarised in Table 7.1), in combination with the challenging complexity 
of dynamic choices, might explain the low correlation between one-off and dynamic 
tasks. Perhaps disappointingly, the current data do not permit firm conclusions to be 
drawn regarding the valuation processes underlying the observed behaviour, however 
they do suggest a wealth of interesting directions for future investigation. The current 
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findings also suggest that researchers interested in predicting real-world health-related 
behaviour might do well to consider a broader range of metrics, besides measures of 
time preference alone.  
Here, I conceptualised deviations from optimality in terms of heuristics, rule-
of-thumb strategies designed to ease computational demands (Gigerenzer, 2008; 
Gigerenzer et al., 2011). I generated putative heuristics post hoc, in light of the three 
observed behavioural tendencies, finding that consumption behaviour was well-
described by a combination of three corresponding simple rules, namely save-now-
spend-later, spread-spending and, to a much lesser extent, spend-now-suffer-later. 
Since the heuristic models were developed post hoc, they require independent 
validation in related experimental contexts to establish their generalizability. 
However, in their support, preferences for spreading rewards evenly across time and 
for improvement over time are evident in choices between predetermined sequences 
of outcomes, including wages (Loewenstein & Sicherman, 1991), health (Chapman, 
1996a, 2000) and other desirable or undesirable events such as dining at a favorite 
restaurant or scheduling a visit from a troublesome relative (Loewenstein & Prelec, 
1993). Loewenstein and Prelec (1993) propose a model for classifying these 
preferences, which resembles the Direct Action heuristic model used here, albeit not 
in the context of whole sequences of choices over time, as here. These data would 
suggest that people might be likely to show similar tendencies when allocating a 
health-related budget over time, and also that individuals might differ considerably in 
their preferred budget allocations over time. From a policy perspective, such 
individual differences will be interesting to examine as more data on the use of 
personal health budgets emerge (Forder et al., 2012).  
Finally, the behavioural tendencies identified here might be relevant to how 
patients use pain-relieving medication in clinical practice. Under-use of analgesia 
relative to clinicians’ recommendations is prevalent in both acute and chronic pain 
(Broekmans, Dobbels, Milisen, Morlion, & Vanderschueren, 2009; Jacobsen, 
Møldrup, Christrup, & Sjøgren, 2009; Yates et al., 2002), and is a barrier to achieving 
effective pain relief (Broekmans et al., 2009; Chang, Wray, Sessanna, & Peng, 2011; 
Gunnarsdottir, Serlin, & Ward, 2005; Miaskowski et al., 2001; Yates et al., 2002). 
Fears of addiction, tolerance and side effects are frequently cited attitudinal barriers to 
the use of analgesics (Levin, Cleeland, & Dar, 1985; Lewis, Combs, & Trafton, 2010; 
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Ward et al., 1993). However, patients also commonly report saving pain relief, to use 
only in the event that pain becomes intolerable. For example Yates et al. (2002) 
examined attitudinal barriers to effective pain management in hospitalised patients 
with cancer, finding that almost one-third (32.5%) agreed that pain-relieving 
medication should be saved in case pain gets worse. Whether underuse of analgesia 
might be predicted from a tendency to save relief in simulated relief-scheduling tasks 
such as this one forms an interesting subject for future enquiry.  
 
 Valuation Mechanism 
 Relative Absolute 
 
Save-Now-Spend-Later 
 
       
Adaptation 
 
Anticipation 
Risk aversion 
 
Spend-Now-Suffer-Later 
 
    
Sensitisation 
 
Temporal 
discounting 
 
Spread-Spending 
 
Loss aversion 
 
 
Risk aversion  
(concave utility) 
 
Table 7.1. Putative Mechanisms Underlying Save-Now-Spend-Later, Spend-Now-Suffer-
Later and Spread-Spending Heuristics. The psychological processes motivating the choice 
of heuristics might be classified as both relative (reference-dependent) and absolute valuation 
mechanisms. Relative valuation mechanisms include adaptation to current consumption 
levels, sensitisation to repeated punishment and loss aversion. Absolute valuation processes 
include anticipatory utility, temporal discounting and risk aversion.  
 
In summary this chapter examines how people allocate resources for the 
mitigation of pain, showing that behaviour is not consistent with conventional 
economic models of intertemporal preference, but is consistent with a simple set of 
heuristics that encapsulates saving in the present to spend in the future, spreading 
consumption out evenly over time and (less prominently) spending in the present at 
the expense of the future. Applied measures of choice over time have tended to focus 
exclusively on one-off choice paradigms (e.g. Bickel et al., 2012; Bickel et al., 2014), 
and the modelling of dynamic decision-making tasks suggests a novel and 
quantitatively rich behavioural predictor. 
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8. 
SOCIAL PREFERENCE FOR PAIN 
 
Primum est ut non nocere 
(First, do no harm)  
 
   -arr. Thomas Sydenham 
 	  
The work described in previous chapters focussed on how people make 
decisions regarding their own future pain or illness, and sought to validate models of 
such decisions, with a view to predicting of an individual’s engagment in unpleasant 
preventive health behaviour. Here I test whether decisions regarding other peoples’ 
future pain systematically differ from decisions regarding one’s own future pain. 
Healthcare professionals and policy-makers are by definition required to make 
decisions regarding other peoples’ health, and such putative preference gaps might 
thereby have implications for shared decision-making in clinical settings. 
Furthermore, existing studies have shown that social and temporal preferences for 
reward are correlated across individuals, with more patient individuals also tending to 
be more altruistic (Curry, Price, & Price, 2008; Rachlin & Jones, 2008). Were a 
similar relationship to hold for aversive outcomes also, measuring an individual’s 
preferences for others’ pain might even contribute to predicting their own health 
behaviour.  
 
8.1 SOCIAL DISCOUNTING 
 
A reader of previous chapters of this thesis needs no reminder of the fact that 
humans and animals often accept smaller immediate rewards over larger delayed 
rewards (Ainslie, 1974, 1975; Kalenscher & Pennartz, 2008), indicating that the 
subjective value of reward decreases with delay, termed temporal discounting 
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(Frederick et al., 2002; Samuelson, 1937). In a related sense, the subjective value of 
giving reward to others decreases with social distance, termed social discounting 
(Jones & Rachlin, 2006; Jones & Rachlin, 2009; Rachlin & Jones, 2008). Social 
distance can be formalised by asking people to create an imaginary rank ordering of 
the people closest to them, starting with their dearest friend or relative (Jones & 
Rachlin, 2006). Remarkably, both temporal and social (Jones & Rachlin, 2006; Jones 
& Rachlin, 2009; Rachlin & Jones, 2008) discount functions for reward are well 
approximated by a decreasing hyperbolic function (Ainslie, 1974, 1975; Chung & 
Herrnstein, 1967; Green et al., 1994; Mazur, 1987; Myerson & Green, 1995), in its 
simplest form given by: 
 𝑈(𝑥,𝑑)   =      𝑥1+ 𝐾𝑑 
       (8.1.1)  
 
For the case of temporal discounting  𝑈(𝑥,𝑑)  denotes the subjective utility of a reward 
with instantaneous utility, 𝑥, received after delay, d. In the case of social discounting 𝑑 denotes the social distance of the recipient from the decision-maker. In each case, 
the rate at which value declines with increasing 𝑑 is governed by  𝐾, a subject specific 
hyperbolic discount rate.  
Interestingly, temporal and social discount rates for money are correlated, with 
more patient individuals tending also to be more altruistic (Curry, Price, & Price, 
2008; Rachlin & Jones, 2008), and also cooperating more in economic games such as 
the Prisoner’s Dilemma (Harris & Madden, 2002), suggesting that temporal and social 
valuations of reward engage similar computational processes. This observation 
dovetails with a theory that choosing delayed outcomes can be seen as analogous to 
choosing for a future self (Ainslie, 2001; Bartels & Rips, 2010; Ersner-Hershfield, 
Wimmer, & Knutson, 2009; Jones & Rachlin, 2006; Jones & Rachlin, 2009; Parfit, 
1971; Thaler & Shefrin, 1981; Pronin, Olivola & Kennedy, 2008). Indeed, 
interpersonal choice can also be couched in intertemporal terms, such that choosing to 
cooperate with another individual carries deferred benefits if the other returns the 
kindness at a later date.  However, the overwhelming majority of studies in this area 
have examined rewarding outcomes. How these two forms of discounting operate and 
interact for painful events is less well understood.  
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Positive social discounting for pain would imply that people ought to find the 
prospect of causing pain in themselves more aversive than the prospect of causing 
pain in others. However, in experimental settings people often choose to take on pain 
to relieve the pain of others (Batson, O'Quin, Fultz, Vanderplas, & Isen, 1983; Hein et 
al., 2011). Furthermore a recent study has found that people will pay more money to 
relieve others’ pain than they will pay to relieve their own pain of equivalent 
subjective severity (Crockett et al., 2014; for a related methodology of paying to 
relieve others’ pain see Feldman-Hall et al., 2012). This ‘hyperaltruistic’ behaviour 
implies a greater aversion to harming others than to harming oneself, and might be 
branded ‘negative social discounting of pain’. However, no previous studies have 
examined how this tendency depends on the social proximity of the other person. In 
other words, the generic form of social discounting for pain has been hitherto 
unknown. A plausible prior prediction is that people exhibit negative social 
discounting for close others (i.e. will take on pain to relieve even a milder pain for 
someone close to them), but that this effect diminishes with increasing social distance. 
I refer to this behavioural hypothesis as ‘discounted harm aversion’, for the reason 
that it implies an aversion to harming others that is positively discounted with social 
distance.  
 
8.2 DREADING THE PAIN OF OTHERS? 
 
A further question is whether and how people incorporate temporal 
discounting and/or anticipatory utility when choosing the timing of events on behalf 
of others. This question is relevant to situations in which healthcare professionals 
must advise patients on the timing of medical or surgical procedures, or control how 
long patients must wait for potentially painful procedures. In previous chapters of this 
thesis I have described how people frequently choose to expedite, rather than defer, 
inevitable pain (Badia et al., 1966; Berns et al., 2006; Cook & Barnes, 1964; 
Loewenstein, 1987), termed negative temporal discounting (Loewenstein & Prelec, 
1991; Van Der Pol & Cairns, 2000), with an explanation being that people find 
waiting for pain intrinsically aversive, aptly termed ‘dread’ (Berns et al., 2006; 
Loewenstein, 1987). However no previous studies have formally examined whether 
people take dread into account when evaluating others’ pain.  
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People are known to show empathic responses to others’ pain (Batson et al., 
1988; Batson et al., 1983; Jackson, Meltzoff, & Decety, 2005; Lloyd, Di Pellegrino, 
& Roberts, 2004; Singer et al., 2004), suggesting that people might empathise with 
others’ dread. An illustrative real-world scenario would be that of a nurse or doctor 
responsible for overseeing a painful procedure, such as taking a blood sample. A 
nurse who is empathic to the patient’s dread might attempt to reduce the salient 
waiting time before the procedure, for example by preparing their equipment before 
bringing the patient into the clinic room. However, given heterogeneity in preferences 
for delayed pain (seen in Chapter 6 of this thesis), people are also likely to be 
uncertain about others’ tendency to dread pain. Faced with this uncertainty, people 
might be expected to place more emphasis on the intensity of pain itself (a more 
reliable indicator of aversiveness). This hypothesis would predict diminished dread, 
and thus diminished emphasis placed on waiting time, when choosing on behalf of 
others. I term this the ‘diminished social dread’ hypothesis.   
To test these two hypotheses I implemented three experiments, (Experiments 
3A, 3B and 3C) in which participants were asked to decide between different painful 
outcomes, whilst varying the subjective intensity, timing and recipient of the pain. 
Experiment 3A was implemented in the laboratory, with outcomes of moderately 
painful brief cutaneous electric shock stimuli of different intensities across different 
stated delays, of up to 29 seconds (there was a fixed inter-trial interval of 30 seconds, 
such that choosing sooner shocks did not hasten the end of the experiment). In 
condition one (presented in a counterbalanced order), termed self-now-self-later, all 
participants (N=60 complete datasets) made binary choices between immediate and 
delayed shocks for themselves. In condition two, termed other-now-other-later, 
Deciders (N=27 complete datasets) chose between immediate and delayed shocks on 
behalf of another participant, the Receiver. In conditions three and four, respectively 
termed self-now-other-later and other-now-self-later, Deciders chose between 
immediate shocks for themselves and delayed shocks for the other participant, or vice 
versa. This design permitted measurement dread for one’s own delayed pain, and that 
of others, as well as allowing an estimate of altruism. Figure 8.1 illustrates the 
experimental protocol for Experiment 1.  
Experiments 3B and 3C (N=67 and 70 respectively) were carried out online, 
with outcomes of a hypothetical painful medical treatment. Experiment 3B consisted 
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of a replication of the first two conditions of Experiment 3A, and a set of social 
discounting questions, in which participants chose between immediate pain for 
themselves and another person at varying degrees of social separation from 
themselves. Finally, to test for an interaction between delay and social distance, in 
Experiment 3C I also replicated the self-now-self-later and other-now-other-later 
conditions, whilst manipulating whether the other person was either a close 
friend/relative, or a more distant friend/acquaintance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.1 Protocol for Experiment 3A. A In each of four possible conditions (order 
counterbalanced across participants) the Decider was asked to choose between two possible 
combinations of intensity, delay and recipient of shock. B Choices were selected to be 
realised with a 1/10 probability, in which event participants saw a yellow warning screen 
followed by a countdown, C, to shock delivery, D. All participants performed self-now-self-
later choices (N=60). Only Deciders (N=27 included) performed the remaining conditions. 
For these conditions Deciders were informed that, in the event that an outcome was chosen to 
count for real, the Receiver would see the Decider’s choice, followed by an identical 
countdown to the shock outcome. 
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8.3 EXPERIMENT 3A: PREFERENCES FOR OTHERS’ DELAYED PAIN  	  
8.3.1 METHODS 	  
8.3.1.1 Participants 
 
63 healthy participants (23 males 40 females; mean age 23.6 years, sd =4.6 
years) were recruited from the UCL Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience subject 
database. The experiments took place at the Wellcome Trust Centre for 
Neuroimaging, UCL. Each experimental session lasted for 2 hours and participants 
were compensated at a rate of £10 per hour. Participants were recruited in pairs. The 
two participants in each pair did not meet each other, but were informed that they 
would be interacting through the computer via an intranet link. The reason for this 
was to maintain anonymity and to ensure that choices were not influenced by 
characteristics of the other participant, such as their age or gender.  
 
8.3.1.2 Briefing and Role Allocation 
 
Before the experiment, the participants were randomly allocated to the role of 
either 'Decider' or 'Receiver', by a method designed to reassure participants that no 
deception was involved (Crockett et al., 2014), whilst maintaining their anonymity. 
While hidden from each other, and remaining silent, both participants were 
simultaneously asked to reach into an opaque box and take one of two plastic balls 
concealed therein. The balls were labeled 'D' and 'R', designating their respective roles 
of Decider and Receiver. Once allocated, the roles did not reverse, and participants 
were given information on this fact in advance. All participants were fully briefed 
before the study that the experimental setup did not involve deception.  All 
participants gave full informed consent before taking part in the study, and were free 
to withdraw their consent at any time.  
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8.3.1.3 Participant Flow and Exclusions 
 
Of the 63 participants recruited, 58 (29 pairs) completed all parts of the study. 
In the remaining five cases, either the second participant in the pair did not arrive or 
time constraints forced the experiment to end before all blocks had been completed. 
Thus, these five participants completed the self-now-self-later block alone.  Data from 
four participants were lost due to experimenter error. As a result, choice data from all 
four conditions were available from 27 participants designated as Deciders, while 
self-now-self-later choices were available from 60 participants (the decrease from the 
60 participants recruited to 27 Deciders is largely due to the fact that they performed 
the task in pairs, with one Decider in each pair). 
 
8.3.1.3 Pain Stimuli and Thresholding 
 
Throughout the experiment each participant sat in front of a computer screen. 
The package COGENT 2000 (University College London) was used for presentation 
of choices and response acquisition. Cutaneous electrical stimuli were delivered 
through two silver chloride surface electrodes placed approximately 3cm apart on the 
dorsum of the hand, 1cm distal to the wrist, via a DS5 Digitimer (Letchworth Garden 
City, London) constant current stimulator. A single ‘shock’ was composed of five 10 
millisecond square-wave pulses at 49 millisecond intervals. After providing consent, 
participants underwent a standardised thresholding procedure, which allowed 
selection of shock intensities corresponding to an equivalent subjective level of 
discomfort on a 10-point Visual Analogue Scale (VAS) for each participant (see 
General Methods).  
 
8.3.1.3 Passive Trials and Physiological Measurements 
 
After thresholding participants were first presented with a sequence of 10 
‘passive trials’ in which the outcome was a shock of 7/10 intensity on the VAS. These 
trials gave participants an opportunity to become familiar with the delays and the 
experimental setup. In addition, participants were fully briefed on the nature of the 
choices and their understanding was checked verbally. Delays of 0, 2, 4, 8, 16 and 29 
	   179	  
seconds were used for the main experiment. The 0s delay was not sampled for the 
passive trials; all other delays were sampled once in a randomised order. In each of 
two blocks, in randomised order, shocks were delivered to either the Decider or the 
Receiver. Each passive trial commenced with a screen detailing the intensity of the 
shock, recipient and delay, for example: “7/10 shock for the other participant, delay 8 
secs”. After this screen a countdown timer began, displayed on the screen as a pie 
chart, with the segment of time remaining decreasing each second, up until the time of 
the shock outcome (see Figure 8.1). Participants were informed that the other 
participant would see an identical countdown timer.  
During passive trials, the skin conductance response (SCR) and heart rate of 
the Decider were recorded. Skin conductance was recorded from two silver chloride 
surface electrodes attached to the tips of the first and middle fingers, on the same 
hand to which the shock stimuli were being delivered. Heart rate was recorded from a 
pulse oximeter attached to the ring finger of the same hand. 
Conductance recordings were received by a constant voltage coupler DC-
powered by a 12 V battery, the output of which was converted into an optical pulse 
frequency and transmitted using fiber optics to a PC running the data acquisition 
package Spike2 (Cambridge Electronic Design, Cambridge). The latter PC also 
received pulses of 10ms length via the parallel port of the stimulus PC, marking the 
timing of the two events of interest, namely the start of the countdown timer and 
administration of shock. The analysis software, SCRalyze (SCRalyze b2.1.8, 
scralyze.sourceforge.net), run from within Matlab (Mathworks, MA, USA), was used 
to analyze physiological responses. Prior to analysis, conductance data were 
converted back to a waveform signal with 100 Hz time resolution, bandpass filtered 
using a first order Butterworth filter (cut-off frequencies of 5 Hz, and 0.0159 Hz; 
corresponding to a time constant of 10 s), and down-sampled to 10 Hz sampling rate. 
The time-series was then z-transformed to account for between-participants variance 
in SCR amplitude. 
To analyze skin conductance responses I generated a General Linear 
Convolution Model (GLM) with regressors corresponding to the pre-shock delay 
period and shock onset. These were convolved with a canonical skin conductance 
response (no temporal or dispersion derivatives) for analysis at the within-subject and 
group levels (Bach, Flandin, Friston, & Dolan, 2010).  For each event responses of 
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Deciders to shocks for themselves were distinguished from responses to shocks for 
the other participant, creating four events in total: anticipation-self, anticipation-
other, shock-self and shock-other.  Events were compared with the mean baseline 
SCR signal and with each other using one-sample and paired two-sample t-tests 
respectively. 
 
8.3.1.4 Choice Trials 
 
Immediately after the passive trials the main experiment commenced (Figure 
8.1). Four experimental conditions were presented block-wise in a counterbalanced 
order. In the first, termed self-now-self-later, participants chose between immediate 
and delayed shocks for themselves. Both Deciders and Receivers completed these 
choices. The remaining three conditions were completed by Deciders only. In the 
second, termed other-now-other-later, the Decider chose between immediate and 
delayed shocks for the Receiver. In the third, termed other-now-self-later, the Decider 
chose between immediate shocks for themselves and delayed shocks for the Receiver. 
Finally in the fourth, self-now-other-later, condition the Decider chose between 
immediate shocks for the Receiver and delayed shocks for themselves. There was no 
opportunity for reciprocity and participants were informed of this fact at the outset. 
Within each condition, choices followed a symmetrical adjusting-sooner-
amount and adjusting-later-amount design (see Appendix, Table A2 for the full set of 
choices).  For each choice there were two options: an immediate and a delayed pain. 
In adjusting-sooner pain choices the delayed shock was always of intensity 5/10, 
while the intensity of the immediate shock varied from one choice to the next, 
between 1/10 and 9/10. In adjusting-later pain choices, the immediate shock was 
always of intensity 5/10, while the intensity of the delayed shock varied from one 
choice to the next, between 1/10 and 9/10. Choices in which the immediate shock was 
the larger shock were designed to assess for negative temporal discounting, while 
choices in which the delayed shock was the larger were designed to assess for positive 
temporal discounting. The symmetrical procedure ensured that the number of choices 
in which the delayed shock was the higher intensity was equal to the number in which 
the immediate shock was the higher intensity. The self-now-other-later, other-now-
self-later conditions also incorporated otherwise identical choices in which both 
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shock options were immediate (0s), allowing an estimate of the intensity of pain 
which the Decider was willing to endure to avoid a given intensity of pain for the 
Receiver, to be calculated independently from the effect of delay.  
After each choice, the chosen option was highlighted.  In the social conditions 
the Receiver was shown the options presented to the Decider and their subsequent 
selection. In each condition, each choice had a 0.1 probability of being realised. In 
this event a yellow warning screen was first displayed to both participants for 2 
seconds, after which the countdown timer appeared, followed by the occurrence of a 
shock at the relevant delay. This form of ‘incentive-compatible’ design in which 
selected choices count for real is widespread in studies of reward-guided choice. The 
timing of outcomes for the two participants was synchronised via an intranet link 
between the two stimulus PCs. Deciders were informed that, in the event that an 
outcome was chosen to count for real, the Receiver would see the Decider’s choice, 
followed by an identical countdown to the shock outcome. 
 
8.3.1.5 Model Fitting Procedures 
 
To fit alternative models of temporal and social discounting, I used mixed 
effects model-fitting, whereby the group-level distribution of parameters forms an 
empirical prior for individual-level parameter estimation (see General Experimental 
Methods, Chapter 5; Huys et al., 2011; Huys et al., 2012), constraining unreliable 
parameter estimates at the individual level. For each model, the probability of 
choosing an option over the alternative depended on their relative utilities according 
to a softmax function. Model comparison was performed at the group level using the 
integrated Bayesian Information Criterion (BICint), which unlike conventional BIC, 
approximates the Bayesian model evidence by integrating over subject-level 
parameters (Huys et al., 2011; Huys et al., 2012, see Chapter 5). Since the above 
approach assumes that parameters are distributed log normally in the population, 
throughout I firstly analysed choice data directly with no such distributional 
assumptions.  
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8.3.1.6 Subjective Questionnaire Data 
 
After the experiment both participants completed three behavioural 
questionnaires in a secure online format (Qualtrics, Provo, US) namely: the Personal 
Altrusim Level (PAL) Scale (Rushton, Chrisjohn, & Fekken, 1981), the Behavioural 
Approach - Behavioural Inhibition System scale (BIS/BAS) (Carver & White, 1994) 
and the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) (M. H. Davis, 1983). I analyzed 
information from the following sub-scales of each survey: the ‘willingness to help 
strangers’ subscale of the PAL, the BIS subscale of the BIS/BAS scale, and the 
‘empathic concern’ subscale of the IRI, intended to assess “other orientated feelings 
of sympathy and concern for unfortunate others”. I hypothesised that dread would 
correlate positively with BIS scores and that social discounting would correlate 
negatively with PAL-willingness to help strangers and IRI-empathic concern scores. 
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8.3.2 RESULTS 	  
8.3.2.1 Model-free Analysis of Self now-self later Choices 
 
To test statistical hypotheses based on choice proportions without making 
assumptions about the distribution of the data, sampling distributions for one-sample 
tests were generated by randomly resampling the data with replacement (for paired 
tests by randomly reassigning data to either condition) with 100,000 iterations.  The 
analysis follows that described in Chapter 6, whereby a 50% probability of choosing 
the delayed shock, p(choose later) = 0.5 indicates indifference between immediate and 
delayed shocks, , p(choose later) < 0.5 indicates a preference for sooner pain and , 
p(choose later) > 0.5 a preference for delayed pain.  
To test for negative discounting in this study I calculated the area between the 
curve of p(choose later)  vs delay and the 50% indifference line, using the trapezium 
method (Myerson, Green, & Warusawitharana, 2001).  I termed this the area-under-
the-curve (AUC), although its meaning here differs from conventional usage for 
positive temporal discounting.  Here a negative area indicates negative discounting 
(preference for sooner pain), and a positive area indicates positive time preference 
(preference for delayed pain). Mean p(choose later) in self now-self later choices 
(N=60 participants)  was below 50% (Figure 8.2A, solid grey circles) and decreased 
as delay increased. Across participants mean AUC (Figure 2B) was indeed 
significantly negative (mean AUC = -1.16, p<0.001, permutation test) consistent with 
negative discounting.  
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Figure 8.2 Negative discounting for pain in the self-now-self-later condition in 
Experiment 3A. A Observed p(Choose later) (solid green circles) vs delay in seconds for all 
participants (N=60). Overlaid are the equivalent probabilities derived from the maximum a 
posteriori (MAP) policies of alternative models of dread: Exponential Dread (hollow circles), 
Hyperbolic Dread (hollow squares) and Non-Scaled Hyperbolic Dread (solid gray triangles). 
Error bars are one standard error. B The area between a line joining the observed data points a 
horizontal line at p = 0.5 was significantly negative, indicating negative discounting at the 
group level (permutation test; *** denotes p<0.001). The error bar represents the 95% 
confidence interval of the mean (resampling method). C p(Choose later) (solid blue circles) in 
adjusting-sooner (i) and adjusting-later (ii) pain choices vs delay, overlaid with the MAP 
policies of the alternative models. Models in which the cost of waiting scaled with the 
intensity of the pain tended to underestimate dread at longer delays in adjusting-later pain 
choices. This was not so for the Non-Scaled model (see main text). Error bars represent one 
standard error. D Integrated Bayesian Information Criteria (BICint) of the alternative models. 
‘Exp Dread (R)’ denotes a restricted Exponential Dread model (see main text). The red circle 
indicates the model with the highest evidence (lowest BICint), Non-Scaled Hyperbolic Dread. 
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8.3.2.2 Model-based Analysis of Self now-self later Choices 
 
I first tested the model of dread proposed by Loewenstein (Loewenstein, 
1987), here referred to as ‘Exponential Dread’. The delays in Experiment 3A were 
experienced in continuous time; therefore in this instance Loewenstein’s original 
formulation was fitted, rather than the discrete time version described in Chapters 6 
and 7. For a description of both versions the reader is referred to Chapter 6. In this 
case the instantaneous utility of pain, 𝑈 𝑥 ,  was implemented as a power function of 
the subjective intensity, 𝑥, of pain on a ten-point VAS (see Chapter 6, Equation 
6.2.1), where 𝑏  is a parameter governing the curvature of utility function. The 
resulting utilities were normalised by dividing by the utility of the most severe pain 
option, in this case intensity 𝑥 = 9.  In total the Exponential Dread model therefore 
has five free parameters at the subject level: 𝛼,  𝛿 , 𝑟,  𝑏 and the softmax inverse 
temperature 𝛽. In Chapter 6 I proposed a modification of Loewenstein’s model, which 
posits that dread itself is not discounted, and that the rate of increase in dread is 
governed by the same discount factor as applied to the pain itself (in the current 
notation 𝑟 = 𝛿). I also tested this restricted version here. In this case the full model 
marginally outperformed the restricted model, though there was insufficient evidence 
to conclude in favour of either version (Δ𝐵𝐼𝐶!"# = 1.45).   
 Here I also tested a dread-discounting model based on hyperbolic discounting, 
termed ‘Hyperbolic Dread’. This model makes some heuristic assumptions. The first 
is that painful events are not temporally extended, but simply yield momentary utility, 𝑈(𝑥), an assumption which appears reasonable, since in this experiment the duration 
of pain itself was small by comparison to the delay. The second is that total 
prospective dread is simply proportional to delay, under the assumption that time 
perception is logarithmic (i.e. obeys the Weber-Fechner law, see for example Han & 
Takahashi, 2012; Takahashi, Oono, & Radford, 2008), giving: 
 𝑈 𝑥,𝑑 = 𝑈 𝑥 𝛼 log 1+   𝜌𝑑 +    11+ 𝐾𝑑    
         (8.3.1) 
The first term represents the contribution of dread, where 𝜌 is a parameter governing 
the slope of logarithmic time perception, while the second term denotes hyperbolic 
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discounting with rate 𝐾. Notably a similar dread term would result from the forward 
integral of hyperbolically discounted utility. This model has five free parameters at 
the subject level: 𝛼 ,  𝜌, 𝐾 ,  𝑏 and 𝛽 . For both Exponential and Hyperbolic Dread 
models all parameters were bounded to be greater than zero by an exponential 
transform.  
Figure 8.2A shows the mean maximum a posteriori (MAP) policies of the 
(unrestricted) Exponential Dread and Hyperbolic Dread models, overlaid with the 
observed data. Whilst Hyperbolic Dread provided a better fit to the data than 
Exponential Dread (Δ𝐵𝐼𝐶!"# = 33), both models tended to underestimate the extent 
of dread at longer delays. Closer examination of the data revealed that this 
discrepancy was driven by greater-than-expected dread in choices where the 
immediate pain intensity was 5/10, and delayed pain intensity varied (adjusting later 
pain choices), compared with choices in which the delayed pain intensity was 5/10 
and the immediate pain intensity varied (adjusting sooner pain choices), as shown in 
Figure 8.2C. For example, in adjusting later choices, the average participant chose an 
immediate 5/10 pain to avoid waiting for a 3/10 pain on 68% of choices (mean 
p(Choose sooner)=0.68). However in adjusting sooner choices participants only chose 
a 7/10 pain to avoid waiting for a 5/10 pain on 24% of choices (mean p(Choose 
sooner)=0.24; two-sample permutation test p<0.001). This behaviour is not accounted 
for by non-linear disutility over pain intensity, since the models already incorporate 
this. A possible explanation is that the cost of waiting for pain increases with 
increasing delay, but not with increasing pain severity, inflating the relative cost of 
waiting for minor pain.  To test this, I implemented a ‘Non-scaled Hyperbolic Dread’ 
model where: 
 𝑈 𝑥,𝑑 = 𝛼 log 1+   𝜌𝑑 +    𝑈 𝑥1+ 𝐾𝑑 
        (8.3.2) 
 As shown in Figures 8.2A and C, this model provided a close correspondence 
to the observed data, successfully accounting for the above effects and outperforming 
the scaled Hyperbolic Dread model (Δ𝐵𝐼𝐶!"# = 62).  
To estimate of the proportion of variance in participants’ choices explained by 
the Non-Scaled Hyperbolic Dread model, I regressed the observed probability of 
choosing delayed pain, p(Choose later) for each participant at each delay against the 
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equivalent probability predicted by the model; this procedure returned 𝑅!=0.89. I also 
tested the parsimony of a restricted version of the Non-scaled Hyperbolic Dread 
model, in which  𝑏 was constrained to equal one, giving rise to linear disutility of pain 
(𝑈 𝑥 =   −𝑥). The assumption of linear utility marginally improved the model fit 
(Δ𝐵𝐼𝐶!"# = 3).   
  
8.3.2.3 Model-free Analysis of Social Choices 
 
Figure 8.3 displays mean p(choose later) in Deciders (N = 27) in the four 
conditions as a function of delay. I tested the ‘diminished social dread’ hypothesis by 
comparing p(choose later) across the four experimental conditions. Mean AUC was 
significantly less than zero in both the self-now-self-later (Figures 8.3A and 8.4A; 
mean AUC = -2.02; two-tailed permutation test uncorrected p=0.002) and other-now-
other-later conditions (mean AUC = -1.16; two-tailed permutation test uncorrected 
p=0.039), and significantly more negative in the self-now-self-later condition than in 
the other-now-other-later condition  (two-tailed permutation test uncorrected p = 
0.002). These results indicate that participants indeed displayed negative discounting 
when choosing pain on behalf of others, though to a lesser extent than when choosing 
their own pain, consistent with the ‘diminished social dread’ hypothesis.  
Secondly I compared AUC in other-now-self-later and self-now-other-later 
conditions, where Deciders were required to trade-off their own pain with that of the 
Receiver (Figures 8.3B and 8.4A).  Here AUC was calculated relative to the point at 
which these curves cross the vertical axis, at p(choose other, delay =0), rather than the 
50% indifference line, to correct for social-discounting. AUC was significantly 
negative in the other-now-self-later condition (mean = -1.14, two-tailed uncorrected p 
= 0.014) and marginally significant in the self-now-other-later condition (mean= -
0.70, two-tailed uncorrected p=0.084). However the difference in AUC between the 
two conditions was not significant (two-tailed permutation test p >0.250). A possible 
explanation is that the increased complexity of the trade-off conditions lead to greater 
noise in participants’ value estimates, tending to diminish the effect of dread and 
obscuring self-other differences.  
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Figure 8.3 Time preference for pain for self and other in Experiment 3A. A Mean 
probability in Deciders (N=27) of choosing the delayed shock option at each delay in self-
now-self-later (hollow gray squares) and other-now-other-later (hollow blue squares) 
conditions. B The same is plotted for other-now-self-later (hollow gray squares) and self-
now-other-later (hollow orange squares) conditions. In both A and B, error bars are one 
standard error above and below the mean. Overlaid are maximum a posteriori policies of a 
Restricted Dread Noise model (hollow circles joined by dashed lines), fitted jointly to all four 
conditions.  
 
In some choices, termed self-now-other-now choices (36 in total per 
participant), the shock for both participants was immediate (delay 0 in Figure 8.3B). 
Since there were an equal number of these choices in which the Decider’s shock was 
the more intense as in which the Receiver’s shock was the more intense, the 
proportion of these choices on which Deciders chose a shock for the Receiver, termed 
p(choose other), provides an approximate measure of their social discounting. While 
p(choose other)=0.5 suggests no social discounting (i.e. that participants were 
indifferent as to the recipient of the shocks),  p(choose other)< 0.5 would imply 
negative social discounting (hyperaltruism) and p(choose other)>0.5 would imply 
positive social discounting (self-oriented behaviour). A one-tailed permutation test 
with the alternative hypothesis mean p(choose other)<0.5  returned p=0.12, indicating 
a non-significant trend towards negative social discounting (mean p(choose other) = 
0.45; Figure 8.4B).  
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Figure 8.4 Social modulation of dread and social discounting in Experiment 3A A Mean 
AUC in the four conditions, abbreviated by their initials. Error bars represent 95% confidence 
intervals (resampling method). AUC was significantly more negative in the self-now-self-
later condition than in the other-now-other-later condition (two-tailed permutation test 
p=0.002), but did not differ significantly between other-now-self-later and self-now-other-
later (p>0.250). B In self-now-other-now choices there was a non-significant trend towards 
negative social discounting (mean p(choose other)=0.45; p=0.12, permutation test). Error bars 
represent a 95% confidence interval (resampling method). C Distribution of posterior (log 
transformed) parameter estimates of an unrestricted Dread Noise model. 𝜔𝑟  is the 
proportional change in the dread parameter, 𝑟 , when evaluating others’ pain, 𝜔!    the 
proportional change in the softmax gain, 𝛽, in choices involving others’ pain, and 𝑘 is a social 
discount factor applied to others’ pain. Cyan bars show the group mean parameter estimates, 
green error bars the 95% confidence interval. Black dots represent individual parameter 
estimates, with error bars of the square root of the second moment around the individual 
estimates. Mean log 𝜔! < 0 <0 at the group level, consistent with diminished social dread. Mean log 𝑘   > 0 (mean 𝑘 > 1), consistent with negative social discounting. D Integrated 
Bayesian Information Criteria (BICint) of alternative models. The red circle indicates the 
model with the highest model evidence (lowest BICint), a Restricted Dread Noise Model. 
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The distribution of p(choose other) across participants (shown in Figure 8.4) 
did not appear to be unimodal, but appeared to consist of up to three peaks – a central 
peak with a mode marginally below 0.5 and two smaller peaks at the extremes. I 
tested whether there was sufficient evidence to conclude in favor of a multimodal 
distribution by fitting a Gaussian mixture models to the data. In this case, the most 
parsimonious model was a unimodal Gaussian with parameters  𝜇 = 0.45 and 𝜌 =  0.05 
(conventional BIC = 3.15), with next best fit provided by a mixture of three Gaussians 
(BIC=8.65), indicating insufficient evidence to support a trimodal form in this 
instance.  
 
 
 
Figure 8.5 Distribution of social discounting across participants in Experiment 3A. 
Histogram of the probability of choosing a shock for the other participant, p(Choose other), in 
self-now-other-now choices in Experiment 1.  
 
 
8.3.2.4 Model-based Analysis of Social Choices 
 
To investigate how the findings above might be instantiated in terms of a 
model of dread-discounting, I fitted a Non-scaled Hyperbolic Dread model jointly to 
all four conditions, in which the effect of delay interacted with the recipient of the 
pain such that: 𝑈!"#$ 𝑥,𝑑 = 𝛼 log 1+   𝜌𝑑 +    𝑈 𝑥1+ 𝐾𝑑 
         (8.3.3) 
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𝑈!"!!" 𝑥,𝑑 = 𝜅 𝛼 log 1+   𝜔!𝜌𝑑 +    𝑈 𝑥1+ 𝜔!𝐾𝑑  
         (8.3.4) 𝑈!"#$ 𝑥,𝑑  indicates disutility which the Decider derives from their own shocks, and 𝑈!"!!" 𝑥,𝑑  disutility which they derive from the Receiver’s shocks. 𝜅  is a social 
discount factor representing the extent to which shocks for the Receiver create 
disutility for the Decider, independent of the effect of delay. 𝜅 = 1  indicates that the 
Decider disvalues (immediate) shocks for the Receiver equally to their own shocks, 
i.e. no social discounting. 𝜅 < 1 indicates that the Decider derives more disutility 
from their own shocks than from the Receiver’s shocks, i.e. positive social 
discounting.  𝜅 > 1  indicates that the Decider derives more disutility from the 
Receiver’s shocks than from their own shocks. The weighting factors 𝜔! and 𝜔! 
represent the extent to which the effect of delay is altered when evaluating others’ 
pain, relative to one’s own pain. Under the Null hypothesis of no interaction between 
delay and recipient, 𝜔! = 𝜔! = 1.  
Three forms of the model were compared against the Null model, firstly a 
general modulation of the effect of delay when evaluating others’ pain, termed the 
Delay model (𝜔! = 𝜔!), secondly a specific modulation of discounting, termed the 
Discounting model (𝜔!;𝜔! = 1)  and thirdly a specific modulation of dread, termed 
the Dread model (𝜔!;𝜔! = 1). Each of these models had seven free parameters at the 
subject level (to fit 396 choices per subject across four conditions): 𝛼,𝜌,𝐾, 𝑏,𝜔, 𝜅 and 𝛽, corresponding to seven group level priors. A previous study (Crockett et al. 2014) 
found that participants exhibited noisier choices when also required to evaluate 
others’ pain. To test for this here, I fitted additional versions of the models above in 
which the softmax inverse temperature, 𝛽, was diminished by a factor 0 < 𝜔! < 1 in 
all conditions except self-now-self-later. These models are referred to as Null-Noise, 
Discounting-Noise, Delay-Noise and Dread-Noise respectively. Each of these Noise 
models therefore had eight free parameters at the subject level. 
Finally, for all models except the Null and Null-Noise models, I tested the 
parsimony of two forms of population prior on the social weighting factors 𝜔! or 𝜔!. 
The first form of prior (termed Unrestricted) represents a modulation of dread in 
either direction, and allows all 𝜔! or 𝜔! > 0, achieved by exponentially transforming 
the fitted parameters. The second enforces diminished social dread, or increased 
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social discounting, by restricting 𝜔 such that 0 < 𝜔 < 1 for Delay and Dread models, 
and 𝜔 > 1 for Discounting models (Restricted), achieved by sigmoid and exponential 
transformation respectively. In particular the Restricted Dread model proposes that all 
participants exhibit either no social modulation of dread, or diminished social dread. 
This is a strong form of the diminished social dread hypothesis, and the comparative 
performance of this model therefore provides a conservative test for diminished social 
dread. 
The most parsimonious fit was provided by the (Restricted) Dread-Noise 
model (Figure 8.3E; ∆𝐵𝐼𝐶!"#  compared with Null model 102). The mean MAP policy 
of this model, formed by taking the mean of the subject-level policies, is overlaid with 
the observed choice probabilities in Figure 8.3A. It can be appreciated that the model 
reproduces the gross pattern of the data adequately. To estimate of the proportion of 
variance explained, I regressed p(Choose later) for each participant at each delay 
against the equivalent probability predicted by the model; this procedure returned 𝑅! =0.91. That this restricted model, which enforces diminished social dread, 
outperformed its unrestricted counterpart (∆𝐵𝐼𝐶!"#=43) supports the diminished social 
dread hypothesis. The distribution of (log transformed) MAP estimates of  𝜔!, 𝜔! and 𝜅 for the unrestricted Dread-Noise model are shown in Figure 8.3D; 24 out 27  𝜔! 
estimates lie below 0 (corresponding to   𝜔! < 1 ), consistent with the superior 
performance of the restricted model. 
Finally, to test for an effect of social discounting, I tested the parsimony of a 
version of the best fitting (Restricted Dread-Noise) model in which 𝜅 = 1, i.e. no 
social discounting. This restriction substantially decreased the quality of model fit 
(Δ𝐵𝐼𝐶!"# > 1000), indicating that social discounting was an important source of 
variance in the data. The posterior estimate of mean log  (𝜅) was greater than zero 
(mean log 𝜅 = 0.36), indicating 𝜅 > 1, i.e. negative social discounting. However 
there was substantial between-subject variability (s.d.  log 𝜅 = 0.91), consistent with 
non-significant negative social discounting at the group level in direct analysis of 
choice data above.  
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8.3.2.5 No Relationship between Social and Time Preferences for Pain 
 
There was no direct relationship between dread of one’s own pain and social 
discounting for pain. To test for this AUC in the self-now-self-later condition was 
regressed against p(choose other, delay =0) using robust linear regression with 
weighted least-squares, yielding no significant relationship between the two 
(𝛽! = 0.19;   𝑝 > 0.25; ordinary least squares 𝑅! = 0.014). 
 
8.3.2.6 Skin Conductance to Others’ Shock Correlates with Altruism  
 
Of the 27 participants designated as Deciders, skin conductance and heart rate 
data were collected from 21 out of the 27. Physiological data from the remaining 6 
Deciders were not obtained due to time constraints.  Skin conductance data from two 
of the 21 were unsuitable for analysis, in one case due to movement artefacts and in 
another due to hyperhidrosis. Heart rate data from 6 out of the 21 were unsuitable for 
analysis, due to poor signal from the pulse oximeter.   Due to this unexpectedly high 
rate of data loss, resulting in a small number of complete datasets for this analysis 
(N=19) the findings below should be interpreted as exploratory.   
The mean skin conductance response (SCR) at each delay across all 
participants whose data were suitable for analysis is displayed in Figure 8.6. There 
was a significant group-level responses to receiving a shock oneself (shock-self t(18) 
= 5.68, p < 0.001). However, surprisingly there was no significant conductance 
response at the group level to either the anticipation of shocks for oneself 
(anticipation-self t(18) = 0.41, p>0.250), anticipation of shocks for the other 
participant (anticipation-other t(18) = -0.76, p >0.250) or administration of shocks to 
the other participant (shock-other t(18) = 0.69, p>0.250).   
There was no significant relationship between GLM 𝛽 values for anticipation-
self and dread parameters 𝛼 or 𝜌 from the Non-Scaled Hyperbolic Dread model above 
(Robust linear regression with bisquare weighting function, p>0.250). GLM 𝛽 values 
for the event-related conductance responses to the other participant’s shock were also 
regressed against the social discount factor, 𝜅. As predicted, this yielded a significant 
positive relationship (𝛽 -shock-other vs log  (𝜅):  𝛽! = 0.45,𝑝 < 0.001), indicating 
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that individuals with a greater sudomotor response to the other participants’ shock 
tended to be more altruistic. 
Finally I compared heart rate responses to the anticipation of a shock for 
oneself, with those to the anticipation of a shock for the other participant. To do so I 
extracted the mean heart rate across the longer delay periods (8, 16 and 29s). A 2x3, 
self-other vs delay repeated measures ANOVA (in the 15 participants whose data was 
suitable for analysis) yielded no significant main effect of either delay (F(2,28) = 
0.80, p >0.250) or recipient, (F(1,14) = 1.37, p >0.250) and no significant interaction 
(F(2,28) = 1.10, p >0.250). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.6 Skin conductance responses to delayed pain for self or other in Experiment 
3A. The mean skin conductance response across Deciders with suitable data (N=19) is 
displayed for each delay to shock, time-locked at time zero to the onset of the countdown 
timer. The blue vertical line in each plot indicates the onset of shock. The solid trace depicts 
the mean response when the shock was for the participant themself, the dashed trace the 
response when the shock was for the other participant. We found a significant group-level 
responses to receiving a shock oneself (shock-self t(18) = 5.68, p < 0.001). However, 
surprisingly there was no significant conductance response at the group level to either the 
anticipation of shocks for oneself (anticipation-self t(18) = 0.41, p>0.250), anticipation of 
shocks for the other participant (anticipation-other t(18) = -0.76, p >0.250) or administration 
of shocks to the other participant (shock-other t(18) = 0.69, p>0.250).  
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8.3.2.7 Questionnaire Data 
 
Complete questionnaire data were available from 55 participants who made 
self-now-self-later choices. Robust regression of dread parameters (𝑎 and 𝜌) against 
Behavioural Inhibition System (BIS) score (Carver & White, 1994) yielded no 
significant relationship (p > 0.25 for both 𝛽! and 𝛽!). Of the 27 Deciders, complete 
questionnaire data were available from 25. For these participants there was no 
significant relationship between the social discount factor (𝜅) and the willingness to 
help strangers subscale of the Personal Altruism Level scale (Rushton et al., 1981) 
(𝛽! = 1.08; p=0.193) nor between the social discount factor and the empathic 
concern subscale of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (M. H. Davis, 1983) 
(p>0.250). 
 
8.3.3 SUMMARY OF RESULTS FROM EXPERIMENT 3A 
 
In summary Experiment 3A replicated previous findings that participants are 
averse to waiting for pain, showing that this tendency was best accounted for by a 
Hyperbolic Dread-Discounting model in which the cost of waiting did not scale with 
the intensity of pain. As predicted, there was evidence for diminished social dread 
when evaluating others’ pain. Model comparison indicated that participants valued 
others’ pain differently from their own, with a trend towards negative social 
discounting for pain at the group level. Experiments 2 and 3 test whether these effects 
replicate in a different context.   
 
8.4 EXPERIMENT 3B: SOCIAL DISCOUNTING OF AN HYPOTHETICAL PAINFUL 
TREATMENT 
 
 Experiment 3A was conducted in the laboratory, with delays in the order of 
seconds. By contrast, the real-world examples evoked above entail longer delays. 
Experiment 3B was designed to test whether the self-other difference in dread 
reported in Experiment 3A was robust to changes in context and in the timescale of 
choices, as well as to test for effects of social distance.  
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8.4.1 METHODS 
 
8.4.1.1 Participants 
 
 Healthy participants who had worker accounts on Amazon Mechanical Turk 
(AMT) were recruited via an advertisement on the AMT account of one of the authors 
(MC). AMT is an online marketplace for work, now widely used as a method of data 
collection for psychology experiments (Mason & Suri, 2012). Responses on AMT 
have been shown to be reliable (Rand, 2012) and replicate well-established findings in 
the cognitive psychology literature (Crump, McDonnell, & Gureckis, 2013).   
67 participants completed Experiment 3B (34 females; mean age 34.0 years, 
s.d. =9.3 years; median yearly income category 25-30,000 USD; 48/67 university 
educated). All workers had a record of a high consistency of responding in similar 
tasks. The mean time to completion was 21 minutes. Participants were compensated 
$3, the current market rate for AMT. All participants gave full informed consent 
before taking part in the study, and were free to withdraw their consent at any time by 
simply discontinuing the online questions.  
 
8.4.1.2 Experimental Choices 
 
Experiment 3B required participants to consider hypothetical painful 
outcomes whilst both the timing and intensity of the hypothetical pain and the social 
distance of the recipient were manipulated.  In the first of two sets of choices, 
participants (N=67) made choices between two possible timings for a hypothetical 
medical treatment, termed Treatment A, which was said to prevent the onset of 
dementia later in life, and was said to be completely safe, free of charge and 100% 
effective. Participants were told that the treatment would involve an injection into the 
bone marrow causing pain lasting for half an hour. The intensity of the pain was said 
to depend on which nurse was available to perform the injection. Participants were 
explicitly instructed that neither the level of pain, nor identity of the nurse, nor the 
timing of the appointment would alter the effectiveness of the treatment.  In each 
case, participants were told the timing of the appointment, and how painful the 
treatment would be on a 10-point scale.  
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This first set of choices recapitulated self-now-self-later and other-now-other-
later conditions from Experiment 3A, following the same form of symmetrical 
adjusting design; participants made 72 choices between two possible treatment 
appointments either for themselves, or on behalf of another person (in this case the 
50th person on an imagined list of their 100 people closest to them, see below). For 
each choice, one appointment option was always ‘this week’ (delay 0 weeks), and the 
other was delayed 4, 17, 52 or 416 weeks. To avoid habitual responding, half of the 
time the sooner appointment appeared on the left of the screen and half of the time on 
the right. 
A second set of choices examined effects of social distance on choices 
between pain for oneself and pain for others. Here a second treatment, Treatment B, 
was said to be available, involving a donation of immune cells from another person, 
and requiring a painful injection into the bone marrow for the donor, but no pain for 
the person receiving the treatment. Participants chose between two different treatment 
options for another person: either Treatment A, entailing a painful injection for the 
other person, or Treatment B, entailing a painful injection for them but no pain for the 
other person, whilst the social distance of the other person was varied, using the 
following instruction introduced by Jones and Rachlin (Jones & Rachlin, 2006; Jones 
& Rachlin, 2009; Rachlin & Jones, 2008): 
 
This experiment asks you to imagine that you have made a list of the 100 people 
closest to you in the world ranging from your dearest friend or relative at position #1 
to a mere acquaintance at #100. The person at number one would be someone you 
know well and is your closest friend or relative. The person at #100 might be someone 
you recognise and encounter but perhaps you may not even know their name. You do 
not have to physically create the list—just imagine that you have done so. 
 
As in previous experiments, choice options followed a symmetrical adjusting 
amount design (N=90 choices per participant), with social distances of #1, #5, #14, 
#45 and #97 (see Appendix, Table A4 for a full list of choice options). All choices 
were administered via the online survey software, Qualtrics (www.qualtrics.com; 
Provo, UT), which participants accessed via an anonymous link from their AMT 
account, and participants made choices by clicking on their preferred option using the 
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computer mouse.  The order of conditions and trials within conditions was 
randomised between participants. Pain intensity was described using the following 
ten-point pain scale: 0 = not at all painful, 2 = mild pain, 4 = annoying, unpleasant 
pain, 6 = discomforting, troublesome pain, 8 = intense, distressing pain and 10 = 
excruciating pain. The structure of choices was identical to that of the self-now-self-
later condition in Experiment 1, with pain levels of 1, 3, 5, 7 or 9 on the above scale.  	  
8.4.2 RESULTS 	  
8.4.2.1 Self now-self-later and other-now-other-later Choices 
 
In keeping with Experiment 3A, and previous findings with hypothetical 
dental pain, participants showed highly significant negative temporal discounting for 
the delayed appointments, for both self (Figure 8.7A; mean AUC = -87.3, one-
sample, two-tailed permutation test, p<0.0001) and other (mean AUC =-86.4, 
p<0.0001). However, here there was no significant difference between negative 
temporal discounting for self and other (permutation test by randomly reassigning 
conditions, p>0.250). I explore this null finding in more detail below.  
Consistent with Experiment 3A, Hyperbolic Dread models outperformed their 
Exponential counterparts in accounting for self-now-self-later choices, with Non-
Scaled Hyperbolic Dread the most parsimonious model (Figures 8.7A and B; Δ𝐵𝐼𝐶!"# = 255 compared with Scale Hyperbolic Dread). As previously, I also tested 
the parsimony of constraining 𝛼 = 1 (such that 𝜌 alone governs the effect of dread) or 𝑏 = 1 (linear disutility of pain). The former did not improve model fit (Δ𝐵𝐼𝐶!"# =−98), however in this case linear utility was found to be a parsimonious assumption 
(Δ𝐵𝐼𝐶!"# = 60).  Regressing p(choose later) for each participant at each delay against 
the equivalent probability predicted by the model returned 𝑅!=0.95. Given the lack of 
a significant group-level difference in negative discounting for self versus other, in 
this experiment I did not perform model comparison of social effects on dread. 
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Figure 8.7 Experiment 3B: Dread-discounting of hypothetical painful treatments 
for self and other. A Mean probability for all participants in Experiment 3B (N=67) 
of choosing a delayed treatment at each delay, when choosing on behalf of oneself 
(self-now-self-later, dark blue circles) or another person at social distance #50 (other-
now-other-later, cyan circles). AUC did not significantly differ between the two 
conditions (p>0.1). Overlaid are the maximum a posteriori fits of Exponential Dread 
(hollow circles), Hyperbolic Dread (hollow squares) and Non-scaled Hyperbolic 
Dread (solid gray triangles) models to the self-now-self-later data. Error bars 
represent one standard error above and below the group mean. B Integrated Bayesian 
Information Criteria (BICint) of alternative dread models fitted to self-now-self-later 
choices; the red circle indicates the model with the highest model evidence (lowest 
BICint), Non-Scaled Hyperbolic Dread. ‘Exp Dread (R)’ denotes a restricted 
Exponential Dread model (see main text).  
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8.4.2.2 Self-now-other-now Choices: Social Discounting for Pain 
 
A model-free metric of social discounting is provided by p(choose other) with 
direct equivalence to p(choose later) in delay discounting analyses. Mean p(choose 
other) across participants (N=67) is plotted as a function of social distance in Figure 
8.8A. As predicted, participants displayed negative social discounting for close 
others, i.e. chose pain for themselves to relieve a close other of a less severe pain 
(mean p(choose other #1) = 0.4, 95% CI by resampling method [0.33 – 0.47], one-
sample two-tailed p=0.003), however this tendency was steeply discounted with 
social distance, such that by social distance #5 participants showed neither negative 
nor positive discounting (mean p(choose other #5) = 0.5, 95% CI [0.44-0.56]) and 
exhibited significant positive social discounting by social distance #45 (mean 
p(choose other #45) = 0.57, 95% CI [0.50-0.64], p=0.04).  
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Figure 8.8 Social discounting of hypothetical painful treatment in Experiment 3B A 
Mean probability (N=67) of choosing a treatment which entailed pain for the other person, 
rather than pain for oneself (p[choose other], solid green squares), as a function of social 
distance, ranging from the participant’s closest friend or relative at distance #1, to a mere 
acquaintance at #100. Error bars represent one standard error. P=0.5 indicates parity between 
the disvalue of pain for self and other (solid horizontal line). Participants displayed negative 
social discounting for close others, which decayed with social distance. Overlaid are fits of 
Subtractive Harm Aversion models. B BICint of alternative models of social discounting: 
hyperbolic discounting (Hyp), Multiplicative Harm Aversion (M-HA), Subtractive Harm 
Aversion (S-HA), Precautionary Cost (PC) and Subtractive Harm Aversion with 
Precautionary Cost (S-HA PC). The red circle indicates the model with the highest model 
evidence, in this case S-HA PC (see main text). 
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An intuitive explanation for this pattern is that people are generally averse to 
harming others (Crockett, Clark, Hauser, & Robbins, 2010; Crockett et al., 2014; 
Cushman, Gray, Gaffey, & Mendes, 2012), but that this tendency decays with social 
distance (Jones & Rachlin, 2006). I tested this possibility formally through model 
comparison. Since all treatment options were due ‘this week’ (0 delay), no dread or 
temporal discounting terms were required here. Given the parsimony of linear utility 
for the same form of outcome above, all models assumed linear utility: 
 𝑈!"#$ 𝑥 ≡ 𝑈!"!!" 𝑥 ≡ −𝑥 
        (8.4.1) 
Here the null model was taken to be simple Hyperbolic Social Discounting, of 
the form shown in Equation 8.1.1. I first tested an alternative model, termed 
Multiplicative Harm Aversion, in which harming others incurs a proportional cost, 𝜅, 
(relative to harming oneself): 
 𝑈!"!!" 𝑥,𝑑 =    𝜅  𝑈 𝑥1+ 𝐾!"#𝑑 
        (8.4.2) 
where 𝑑 indicates social distance and 𝐾!"#  a subject-specific social discount rate.  
This model had three free subject-level parameters: 𝐾!"# , 𝜅  and 𝛽 (to fit 90 choices 
per subject). I also tested a model, termed Subtractive Harm Aversion, in which 
harming others incurs a subtractive cost, 𝜃, which is itself hyperbolically discounted 
with rate 𝐾! such that: 𝑈!"!!" 𝑥, 𝛿 =      𝑈 𝑥1+ 𝐾!"#𝑑     −   𝜃1+ 𝐾!𝑑   
(8.4.3) 
This model had four free subject-level parameters: 𝐾!"# ,𝐾! , 𝜃  and 𝛽. As shown in 
Figure 8.8B, both Multiplicative and Subtractive Harm Aversion models conclusively 
outperformed Hyperbolic Social Discounting, with Subtractive Harm Aversion the 
better performing of the two (Δ𝐵𝐼𝐶!"# =1099 and 1135 respectively).  To estimate of 
the proportion of variance in participants’ choices explained by the Subtractive Harm 
Aversion model, I regressed p(choose other) for each participant at each delay against 
the equivalent probability predicted by the model; this procedure returned 𝑅!=0.92. 
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Closer examination of the data revealed heterogeneity in subject-level 
responses. Example patterns are shown in Figure 8.9. The first three patterns represent 
no significant degree of social discounting (8.9A), solely positive social discounting 
(8.9B) and the archetypal pattern of initial negative social discounting followed by 
positive discounting (8.9C). The participant whose data is shown in Figure 8.9D 
exhibits initial negative social discounting (hyperaltruism for close others), which is 
discounted back to the 50% indifference line, but not beyond (𝐾! > 0,𝐾!"# ≃ 0).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.9 Social discounting of pain in individual participants in Experiment 
3B. p[Choose other] as a function of social discounting for five example subjects, 
illustrating heterogeneity in responses: A non-significant social discounting, B 
positive social discounting C and D initial negative social discounting (discounted 
harm aversion) and E consistent negative social discounting. Overlaid are the best fits 
of a S-HA PC model (gray circles joined by solid gray lines). Error bars represent one 
standard error of the binomial distribution (N=18 choices per data point, with the 
exception of the intercept, which is set to 0.5 on a priori grounds). 
 
 
Figure 8.9E shows a pattern that is accounted for by neither of the models 
above, namely steep negative social discounting that appears to increase with social 
distance, in a manner resembling the dread functions seen for delayed pain. This 
pattern would be consistent with growing uncertainty regarding the other person’s 
response to inflicted pain with increasing social distance, generating a precautionary 
motive to avoid harming distant others. To examine whether this pattern of persistent 
or increasing negative social discounting appeared to have support at the group level, 
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I also fitted post-hoc a model with an additional term in which an aversion to harming 
others increased with delay, in a manner directly equivalent to dread: 
 𝑈!"!!" 𝑥, 𝛿 =      𝑈 𝑥1+ 𝐾!"#𝛿     −   𝜃1+ 𝐾!𝛿 − α!"#log 1+   𝜌!"#𝑑    
         (8.4.4) 
 
This model had six free parameters at the subject level: 𝐾!"# ,𝐾! , 𝜃, α!"# ,𝜌!"#   and 𝛽. 
Despite the additional parameters, this ‘Subtractive Harm Aversion with 
Precautionary Cost’ model improved fit quality compared with Subtractive Harm 
Aversion alone (ΔB𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 17;  𝑅!=0.95). However notably this more complex 
model was developed after seeing the data, and so may not be considered as plausible 
a priori as the two simpler models.  A restricted model with Precautionary Cost alone 
(𝜃 = 0) performed relatively poorly (ΔB𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑛𝑡 = −187 compared with Subtractive 
Harm Aversion). Mean MAP policies of Subtractive Harm Aversion and Subtractive 
Harm Aversion with Precautionary Cost models are overlaid with the observed data in 
Figure 8.8A. 
Unexpectedly there was no significant relationship between social and 
temporal discounting for pain (robust regression of 𝐴𝑈𝐶!"#$!"  vs 𝐴𝑈𝐶!"#$% , 𝛽! = −0.04, 𝑝 > 0.250), suggesting that dread of pain and hyperaltruism for others’ 
pain may be distinct phenomena. 
 
8.4.3 SUMMARY OF RESULTS FROM EXPERIMENT 3A 
 
In summary, Experiment 3A revealed significant negative temporal 
discounting for both self and other, where in this case the ‘other’ was a friend or 
acquaintance (social distance #50). However, unlike in Experiment 3A, there was no 
significant self-other difference in negative temporal discounting. There was however 
robust evidence for negative social discounting (hyperaltruism) for close others, and 
this tendency appeared to be hyperbolically discounted with social distance.  
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8.5 EXPERIMENT 3C: INTERACTION OF SOCIAL AND TEMPORAL 
DISCOUNTING FOR PAIN 
 
  In Experiment 3B, other-now-other-later choices were on behalf of a person at 
social distance #50. In fact, the mean participant actually exhibited a small degree of 
positive social discounting at social distance #50 (see Figure 8.8A); this is in contrast 
to Experiment 3A where the mean participant exhibited negative social discounting 
for the other participant. An explanation for the lack of significant social modulation 
of dread at the group level in Experiment 3B might therefore be that the diminished 
social dread is dependent on negative social discounting. To test this hypothesis 
directly, in Experiment 3C, participants made other-now-other-later choices for 
people at two different social distances, #1 (their closest friend or relative) and #50 (a 
friend or acquaintance). Based on the considerations above I predicted diminished 
social dread for #1 but not for #50.  
 
8.5.1 METHODS 	  
Participants were recruited via AMT and completed the study online. 70 
participants completed Experiment 3C (32 females; mean age 36.8 years, s.d. =10.5 
years; median yearly income 30,000 USD; 31/70 university educated). and 16 minutes 
for Experiment 3; for each experiment participants were compensated $3, the current 
market rate for AMT. All participants gave full informed consent before taking part in 
the study, and were free to withdraw their consent at any time by simply 
discontinuing the online questions. The experimental scenario and design was 
identical to Experiment 3B, with the exception that the 416-week delay was omitted, 
to reduce the overall duration of the questionnaire. The order of the three conditions 
and trials within conditions was randomised between participants.  
 
8.5.2 RESULTS 
 
As predicted, participants exhibited significantly diminished negative 
temporal discounting when choosing the timing and intensity of pain on behalf of 
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their closest friend or relative compared with when choosing their own pain (Figures 
8.10A and 8.10B; mean AUC self-now-self-later = -6.28, mean AUC other-now-
other-later #1 = -4.47; two-sample permutation test p=0.022). Mean AUC when 
deciding on behalf of the person at social distance #50 was intermediate between 
these two conditions and significantly different from neither (mean AUC other-now-
other-later #50 = -5.24; two-sample permutation tests p>0.10).  
Given the reduced range of delay choices in Experiment 3C, power to resolve 
differences between alternative models was limited. Nevertheless, by way of 
demonstration that this finding was consistent with the models introduced above I 
fitted the same categories of model here. In this instance 𝜅 and the social weighting 
on the softmax temperature, 𝜔! , have identical effects, both multiplying with 𝑈!"!!"; 
I therefore simply set 𝜅 = 1 and fitted 𝜔!. Since in this case other-now-other-later 
choices were made at two levels of social distance, the social weighting factors on the 
softmax temperature (𝜔!) and dread (𝜔!)  were fitted separately for each social 
distance.  Based on the findings of Experiment 3B, linear utility was imposed. Each 
model, besides the null model, therefore had 8 free parameters at the subject level (to 
fit 162 choices per subject over 3 conditions): 𝛼,𝜌,𝐾,𝜔!#!"  ,𝜔!#!  (or 𝜔!#!", ,𝜔!#!  ), 𝜔!#!",𝜔!#!  and 𝛽. For the null model fitted parameters were 𝛼,𝜌,𝐾, 𝜔!#!",𝜔!#! 
and 𝛽, with 𝜔!#!"   = 𝜔!#! = 1  (or 𝜔!#!" = 𝜔!#! = 1). 
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Figure 8.10 Social modulation of dread in Experiment 3C. A Mean p(choose later) across 
subjects (N=70) for self-now-self-later (solid blue squares), other-now-other-later #1 (solid 
cyan squares) and other-now-other-later #50 (solid green squares) conditions. Error bars are 
one standard error. Overlaid are maximum a posteriori policies of a Delay Noise model 
(hollow circles joined by dashed lines), fitted jointly to all three conditions. B Mean AUC in 
the three conditions, abbreviated by their initials. Error bars represent 95% confidence 
intervals by resampling. AUC was more negative in self-now-self-later than in the other-now-
other-later #1 choices (two-tailed permutation test p = 0.02), but did not differ between the 
remaining conditions (p>0.250). C Integrated Bayesian Information Criteria (BICint) of 
alternative models. Delay Noise had the highest model evidence (red circle, lowest BICint). 
Delay-Noise, Dread-Noise and Restricted Delay-Noise all outperformed the Null model. D 
Distribution of posterior (log transformed) parameter estimates of an unrestricted Delay-
Noise model. 𝜔!#50 is the proportional change in the dread parameter, 𝑟, when evaluating 
the pain of a person at social distance #50 (a friend or acquiantance) pain, 𝜔!#1  the 
equivalent for distance #1 (closest friend or relative). Bars represent the group mean 
parameter estimates, green error bars the 95% confidence interval. Black dots are individual 
parameter estimates, with error bars representing the square root of the variance on the 
individual estimates. Mean log 𝜔!#1  was negative at the group level, consistent with 
diminished social dread for close others.  
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The results of model comparison are shown in Figure 8.10C. In this instance 
an unrestricted Delay-Noise model provided the most parsimonious account of the 
data (although an unrestricted Dread-Noise model also outperformed the Null-Noise 
model). For this model 𝑅! =0.93 (calculated as previously described). Log 
transformed posterior estimates of 𝜔!#!  and 𝜔!#!"  are displayed in Figure 8.9D; 
posterior mean  𝜔!#! was lower than the posterior mean  𝜔!#!" (mean log 𝜔!#! = -
0.69, s.d. = 1.30; mean log 𝜔!#!" = -0.40, s.d. = 1.42), consistent with the behavioural 
data. In summary Experiment 3C indicates diminished negative temporal discounting 
when deciding on behalf of close, but not socially distant others, an effect which is 
parsimoniously accounted for by a general down-weighting of delay when deciding 
for close others. 
 
8.6 SOCIAL PREFERENCES FOR PAIN: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
The three experiments described above examine the interaction between social 
and temporal preferences for pain.  A prior prediction was that people would exhibit 
negative temporal discounting of pain for both themselves and others. However it was 
hypothesised that negative discounting would be less marked when evaluating others’ 
pain, termed the ‘diminished social dread’ hypothesis. A further prediction was that 
people would choose to endure pain to relieve an even milder pain for another person, 
termed negative social discounting, and that this effect would be most pronounced 
when the other person was a close friend or relative, referred to as the ‘discounted 
harm aversion’ hypothesis.  
Consistent with previous findings (Chapter 6; Berns et al., 2006; Loewenstein, 
1987), participants indeed displayed negative temporal discounting for their own pain, 
indicated by choices to expedite pain. Also consistent with previous findings (Chapter 
6), across all three experiments the cost of waiting for pain increased with increasing 
delay, though the rate of increase declined at longer delays. Models of dread based on 
hyperbolic discounting outperformed the exponential models tested previously 
(Chapter 6). Under the best performing model, hyperbolic discounting of pain was 
combined with a waiting cost (‘dread’), which increased logarithmically with 
increasing delay, but did not scale with the intensity of pain.  
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Participants also preferred sooner pain when deciding on behalf of another 
person. In Experiment 3A, where the other person was another experimental 
participant in an adjacent room, the extent of this negative temporal discounting was 
significantly less than when choosing their own pain. However this effect was not 
significant when participants were asked to trade-off their delayed pain with the other 
participant’s immediate pain or vice versa. A possible explanation is that participants 
exhibited greater choice stochasticity in these more complex choices, in support of 
which models incorporating greater choice noise for the social conditions, as well as 
diminished social dread, provided a parsimonious account of the observed data.  
I had predicted that people would give less emphasis to waiting costs, relative 
to the intensity of pain itself, when choosing on behalf of others, as a precaution 
against misjudging the other’s preferences. As described above the data indeed 
support this diminished social dread hypothesis. However, the results suggest a 
different explanation for the effect than originally thought. Uncertainty regarding 
others’ preferences for delayed pain would be expected to grow with increasing social 
distance from the other person, predicting greater diminution in dread for distant 
others than for close others. In fact the opposite pattern was seen: in Experiments 3B 
and 3C, with outcomes of a hypothetical painful medical treatment, at delays of up to 
8 years, participants exhibited diminished social dread when choosing on behalf of a 
close friend or relative, but not when choosing on behalf of a more distant friend or 
acquaintance. A possible explanation would be that although uncertainty regarding 
the other’s preferences ought to be lower when the other person is a close friend or 
relative, a putative precautionary motive is heightened, although this possibility is of 
course speculative.  
In a subset of participants with suitable data, there were significant skin 
conductance responses (SCRs) to the receipt of shock itself, but not to the anticipation 
of shock, nor to the delivery of shock to another person. The latter null findings are 
surprising, given that such responses have been previously documented (Hein et al., 
2011). A possible explanation for the lack of significant anticipatory responses would 
be that in this setup participants received reliable information as to the timing of 
shock, putatively tending to diminish anticipatory anxiety, which is known to be 
sensitive to uncertainty regarding the properties of the noxious stimulus (S. Epstein, 
Epstein, & Roupenian, 1970). A possible explanation for the lack of response to 
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others’ shocks would be that the SCR data for the response to others’ shocks were 
collected block-wise, and participants may have stopped attending to events on the 
screen for these trials. Despite the lack of significant group-level response to others’ 
shock, the magnitude of response to others’ shock correlated with the tendency to take 
on pain in lieu of the other person, a finding that has also been reported previously 
(Hein et al., 2011).  Since these particular analyses were relatively underpowered 
(N=19) compared with the remainder of the analyses, owing to the number of 
participants with incomplete or un-usable data, I interpret them as preliminary data 
worthy of further investigation.  
Participants’ choices implied that they valued others’ pain differently from 
their own, consistent with social discounting for pain. In Experiment 3A model fitting 
indicated a mean tendency towards negative social discounting for pain at the group 
level (17/27 showed negative social discounting, as indicated by fitted 𝜅 > 1) , 
consistent with previous findings (Crockett et al., 2014). In Experiment 3B, with 
outcomes of a hypothetical painful medical treatment, participants exhibited negative 
social discounting for close others, choosing to endure pain to relieve even a milder 
pain for someone close to them. This hyperaltruistic tendency was steeply discounted 
with social distance, and reverted to positive social discounting for distant others, 
supporting a ‘discounted harm aversion’ hypothesis. Interestingly, this group-level 
tendency was also seen to a lesser extent in a previously published study of social 
discounting choices with money, where participants on average gave up close to $80 
in order to win $75 for to a close friend or relative (Jones & Rachlin, 2006).  An 
interesting question for future work would be to directly compare social discounting 
for monetary and non-monetary outcomes within participants. The apparently greater 
degree of hyperaltruism seen here for pain would be in keeping with the observation 
that people are more generous when choosing how to share non-monetary rewards, as 
compared to money, with others (A. L. Davis, Miller, & Weber, 2011). Why 
participants consistently display hyperaltruism for pain is unclear. One possibility is 
that people overestimate their own ability to deal with pain (relative to that of others). 
This could be easily tested, by asking participants to rate their perceived ability to 
cope with pain, relative to other people, and regressing this against hyperaltruism.  
Based on previous studies showing that temporal and social discounting for 
rewards are correlated (Curry et al., 2008; Rachlin & Jones, 2008), I had expected to 
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find a correlation between social and temporal discounting for pain. Such a 
correlation would support the idea of a ‘patient-altruistic’ phenotype across domains, 
such that social preferences for pain might even be used to predict personal pain-
related decisions. Surprisingly however there was no significant correlation between 
the two measures. This might be taken as evidence that discounting for rewards and 
for aversive stimuli engage distinct processes (see General Discussion).  
Finally I would like to draw attention to the finding that a dread-discounting 
model in which the cost of waiting for pain did not scale with pain intensity provided 
the most parsimonious fit to the intertemporal choice data, raising the question as to 
whether the tendency to expedite pain represents a more generic form of impatience, 
i.e. a simple desire to ‘have things sooner’. In normative terms, this might result from 
a cognitive (computational) cost associated with keeping track of future events. Since 
this explanation is subtly different from the notion of anticipatory disutility, one must 
question whether the term ‘dread’ remains valid. However the non-scaled model was 
developed post hoc, and therefore warrants further investigation with a design 
intended to directly disambiguate scaled and non-scaled waiting costs. 
A possible implication of the effect of diminished social dread is that policy-
makers and caregivers, though acting with precaution and with the aim of minimizing 
harm to patients, might nevertheless tend to underestimate the extent to which patients 
dislike waiting for unpleasant treatments or procedures.  To illustrate this hypothesis 
with an example, say that a nurse is preparing to take a blood sample from a patient, 
and to diminish the pain itself applies a topical anaesthetic cream, which takes a few 
minutes to reach maximum effect. The nurse then faces a trade-off between getting 
the procedure over and done with (to minimise the patient’s dread) and waiting for the 
cream to take full effect (to minimise the pain itself). According to an hypothesis of 
‘diminished social dread’, the nurse would be archetypally predicted to wait for the 
cream to take effect, to diminish the intensity of pain, while the patient would prefer 
to get the procedure over and done with, to minimise their dread. Such scenarios are 
interesting subjects for a future applied study. Taken together, the findings of the 
above experiments suggest that people hold a powerful aversion to harming others 
that is focused on concrete markers of harm such as the intensity of pain, rather than 
more abstract effects such as dread, and decays steeply with social distance.  
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9.  
SOCIAL ALLOCATION OF PAIN 
 
“To each according to his needs.” 
 
- Louis Blanc, Plus de Girondins, (1851) 	  	  
This chapter extends the study of social preferences for pain introduced in the 
preceding chapter, to ask how people might apportion a ‘budget’ of pain between 
themselves and others.  Just as Chapter 7 considers issues of intertemporal equity in 
apportioning health, the current chapter considers interpersonal equity in health. From 
an applied perspective, the current chapter seeks to explore effects of health inequality 
on personal wellbeing and as such diverges from the prevailing theme of this thesis 
concerning prediction of health behaviour.    
In 1980 the Department of Health and Social Security in the UK published an 
influential report overseen by Sir Douglas Black, which showed that health inequality 
had increased, rather than decreased, since the introduction of the NHS in 1948 (see 
A. Gray, 1982). Since the time of this eponymous ‘Black Report’ marked health 
inequalities have endured, for example between 2001 and 2003 for men aged 25-64, 
mortality from ischaemic heart disease was 2.9 times higher in social class 7 (routine 
occupations) than in social class 1 (higher managerial and professional occupations) 
(White, Edgar, & Siegler, 2007). Inequality tends to be viewed as unjust and 
undesirable, for example in a recent study of US citizens, 90% indicated that their 
society was more unequal than they would like it to be (Norton & Ariely, 2011). Here 
I explore possible hedonic and motivational effects of health inequality at an 
individual level, by observing how people respond to, and choose to reapportion, 
unequal allocations of pain between themselves and others.  
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9.1 INEQUITY AVERSION 
 
Psychologists have studied the effects of social comparison on individual 
wellbeing for over half a century. In an early account, Adams (1965) proposed a 
theory of inequity, arguing that deprivation relative to others provokes feelings of 
injustice, which in turn lead to dissatisfaction. A corresponding thought process in a 
health context might be:  “She and I have both been waiting to see the doctor for over 
two hours. She arrived after me but was seen first. That seems unfair (unjust). I am 
dissatisfied with my treatment here.” Under this view, unfairness is a subjective cost 
associated with having worse prospects than others, which engenders dissatisfaction. 
More recently, economists have studied the value of fairness through 
behavioural experiments, introducing quantitative theories describing the cost of 
inequity (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Fehr & Schmidt, 2006; Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin, 
& Sefton, 1994; Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986). These theories have emerged 
from analysis of formal economic games, in which the rules of social exchange are 
tightly constrained and responses can be quantified in monetary terms. An archetypal 
example is a scenario referred to as the ‘Dictator Game’, in which one participant, the 
Dictator, must choose how to allocate an endowment (usually of money) between 
themselves and another participant, who is anonymous to them (Kahneman et al., 
1986). Classically the game is played as a ‘one-shot, one-way’ interaction, with no 
reciprocity between the two players. Meta-analysis of many hundreds of such games 
reveals that on average Dictators donate close to a third of the endowment to the other 
player, despite no financial return for themselves (Engel, 2011). This behaviour has 
been taken to indicate that people have a basic preference for fairness (Fehr & 
Schmidt, 1999; Kahneman et al., 1986). In economic models, the latter is often 
approximated as cost associated with having either more or fewer resources than 
others, termed inequality aversion (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Fehr & Schmidt, 2006).  
Psychological and economic methodologies offer complementary means to 
understand individual responses to health inequality. A specific question of interest 
from an economic perspective is whether people disvalue inequalities in health in a 
similar manner to monetary inequality, as revealed through their choices to distribute 
both health and money. For example, are people more sensitive to health inequality 
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than to wealth inequality? A route to studying this is to examine how people respond 
to allocations of either pain or money between themselves and others. 
 
9.2 ARE PEOPLE INEQUITY AVERSE FOR PAIN? 
 
Although many experimental studies have examined how humans redress 
monetary inequality, how humans respond to unequal allocations of pain between 
themselves and others is little studied. Commensurate with documented empathic 
responses to pain in others (Batson et al., 1988; Batson et al., 1983; Jackson et al., 
2005; Singer et al., 2004), people will pay money to relieve others’ pain 
(FeldmanHall et al., 2012) and will take on painful stimuli to relieve the apparent 
suffering of a confederate (Batson et al., 1983; Hein et al., 2011). Furthermore, a 
recent study implementing a dictator game with painful outcomes found that 
participants were particularly egalitarian, allocating on average 48% of the pain (time 
spent immersing one’s hand in ice water) to themselves, while in a monetary dictator 
game the same participants were significantly less charitable, donating only 30% of 
the endowment on average (A. L. Davis et al., 2011). These findings might suggest 
that people are more inequality-averse for pain than money, in other words that 
people particularly dislike having either more or less pain than others. However an 
alternative possibility is that people are simply more altruistic for pain than for 
money, in the sense that relieving others’ of their physical suffering carries greater 
motivational weight than does increasing others’ wealth.  
In support of the idea that pain evokes particularly altruistic responses, people 
will often take on pain to relieve even a less severe pain for another person (see 
Experiments 3A and 3B, Chapter 8), and will even pay more money to reduce others’ 
pain than to reduce their own pain by an equivalent subjective amount (Crockett et al., 
2014). The latter behaviour, referred to as ‘hyperaltruism’ (or in Chapter 8, negative 
social discounting), can be taken to imply that people in fact sometimes even assign 
greater disvalue to harming others than to harming themselves. In a pain dictator 
game, hyperaltruistic participants ought to take on more pain than they allocate the 
other player; indeed in the dictator game study described above, 30% of participants 
retained more than half the pain, while only 2% gave away more than half the money 
(A. L. Davis et al., 2011). 
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A key question emerges, namely how can a putative preference for equal 
allocations of pain be reconciled with hyperaltruism? Models of social utility which 
solely implement an heuristic penalty for inequality (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Fehr & 
Schmidt, 2006) cannot account for hyperaltruism. These models assume that people 
derive utility from the size of their own payoff, but incur a utility cost to having either 
more or fewer resources than others. Under the simplest of such models (Fehr & 
Schmidt, 1999), both sources of utility are assumed to be linear. Such a model 
predicts that in dictator games with an endowment of reward people should either 
retain all of an endowment for themselves (offering nothing to the other player) or 
split the endowment equally. This model cannot account for the finding that in 
dictator games many people choose other allocations that are neither maximally 
selfish nor maximally equal (Engel, 2011), of which hyperaltruistic allocations for 
pain are an example (A. L. Davis et al., 2011). A more nuanced account implements a 
non-linear penalty for inequality (Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000). This model allows for a 
preference in dictator games to offer the other player something less than half of the 
endowment, but is nevertheless unable to account for hyperaltruistic offers.  Here I 
show that both hyperaltruism and equality-seeking can be accounted for within a 
social utility model in which the utility of one’s own and others’ payoffs are 
combined in a weighted sum (e.g. Charness & Rabin, 2002), but where each are non-
linear in the size of the payoff (obey diminishing marginal utility for rewards and 
increasing marginal disutility for pain). Under this model, given that people have 
some degree of concern for others, inequality aversion derives from the more 
fundamental principle of diminishing marginal utility over individual payoffs. 
  The conventional dictator game setup is not ideally suited to disambiguating 
alternative models of social utility, since it provides information only about a person’s 
preferred allocation, and does not allow for an estimate of how a person values 
different degrees of pain inequality (pertinent for example to whether inequality 
carries a linear or non-linear cost). To address this, I implemented a modified dictator 
game with mildly painful cutaneous electric shocks as the outcomes, where 
participants were given an opportunity to leave unchanged or adjust default 
allocations of 24 shocks between themselves and an anonymous recipient. 
Adjustments could be made by giving or taking fixed numbers of shocks. Three 
‘action frames’ were implemented (see also List, 2007): a Give frame, a Take frame 
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and a Give or Take frame, with names corresponding to the permissible actions 
(Figures 9.1 and 9.2). By observing how frequently participants adjusted the default 
allocations at differing levels of inequality (see Figure 9.3), I mapped out a pattern of 
inequality aversion for pain, albeit coarsely.  
I also aimed to test an hypothesis, supported by previous studies, that people 
are more altruistic when allocating pain, compared with money. To do so, in a subset 
of participants, I implemented an equivalent set of choices with monetary outcomes 
where, in two sub-conditions, these choices were framed as either gains or losses of 
money, where losses were described as debts to be repaid from an endowment. 
Allocations of monetary losses (debt) were compared with those of pain, since these 
conditions were matched for valence. It was predicted that participants would adjust 
the default allocations in the direction of equality for both pain and debt. Based on 
greater altruism for pain than money in standard dictator games, it was predicted that 
participants would allocate more debt than pain to the other participant. Finally, based 
on existing findings of hyperaltruism for pain it was also predicted that hyperaltruism 
would be more prevalent for pain than for debt.  
 
9.3 DOES UNFAIR TREATMENT EXACERBATE PAIN? 
 
A more ‘psychological’ question is: does perceived unfair treatment 
negatively impact upon a patient’s experience of pain or illness? Yoda and Kumakura 
(2007) examined the impact of perceived unfairness on satisfaction with care, 
characterizing subjective unfairness for medical encounters by asking respondents 
(N=162) to rate their agreement with statements such as ‘“The nurses were more 
caring and attentive towards other patients than towards me”, with the finding that the 
effect of unfairness on overall patient satisfaction was comparable to that of perceived 
symptom improvement or physician competence. However it is also possible that 
perceived unfairness interacts with the perception of health outcomes themselves. In 
support of this idea, social rejection and physical pain have overlapping 
representations (DeWall & Baumeister, 2006; DeWall et al., 2010; Eisenberger, 2012; 
Eisenberger, Lieberman, & Williams, 2003; MacDonald & Leary, 2005), and 
perceived injustice following injury is associated with greater subsequent pain and 
disability (McParland & Eccleston, 2013; Sullivan et al., 2008) (Furthermore social 
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comparison is known to influence neural responses to reward, e.g. Fliessbach et al., 
2007; Takahashi et al., 2009; Tricomi, Rangel, Camerer, & O’Doherty, 2010). 
However prior to the current work no previous studies had examined how pain 
inequality influences pain perception.  
An intuitive prior prediction is that favorable inequality should reduce pain 
perception, while unfavorable inequality should increase it. A further prediction is 
that pain resulting from the benevolent actions of another person is perceived as less 
severe than an equivalent unintentional pain, and vice versa. Two previous studies 
support this prediction, though these studies did not directly test an effect of 
inequality (K. Gray, 2012; K. Gray & Wegner, 2008). To test these hypotheses I 
assessed the impact of pain inequality, and perceived intentionality, on the perception 
of pain itself, by asking participants to rate identical pain outcomes received under 
differing social conditions. Selected allocations of pain from the dictator game were 
implemented for real, and attributed either to the play of chance or to the decisions of 
the dictator (shown in Figure 9.4), whilst participants were asked to rate the intensity 
of the painful stimuli.  
 
9.4 EXPERIMENT 4: RESPONSES TO PAIN INEQUALITY 	  
9.4.1 METHODS 	  
9.4.1.1 Participants 
 
78 participants (46 female) were recruited from the University College 
London Psychology Subject Pool. A power calculation based on a Student’s t-
distribution indicated that a sample size of 34 would be required to detect a medium 
sized effect (Cohen’s 𝑑=0.5), while a sample size of 15 would be required to detect a 
large effect (Cohen’s 𝑑=0.8) at 80% power (J. Cohen, 1992).  I therefore aimed to 
elicit dictator game choices from at least 35 participants. The final sample size easily 
exceeded this total (N=47; 29 female, mean age 27.7 years, s.d. 8.5 years). A 
monetary questionnaire was issued at a later date to these 47 participants; here the 
sample size was determined by the number responding to this request (N=25; 16 
female, mean age 29.6 years, s.d. 11.6 years). Of the 47 participants completing pain 
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dictator game games, 31 took part in the experiential component of the study. For this 
component, 31 participants were separately recruited to act as ‘responders’. Due to 
experimenter error, datasets from 6 of these 31 pairs were incomplete, resulting in full 
experiential data from 25 pairs (N=50; 30 female, mean age 27.8, s.d. 10.2). Dictators 
and responders did not actually meet each other, but each was briefed that they would 
be interacting with another participant in an adjacent testing room through an intranet 
link; they were informed that there was no opportunity for reciprocity. All participants 
gave full informed consent prior to the experiment. After the experiment participants 
were debriefed and given the opportunity to provide feedback. Experiments were 
carried out at the Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, University College 
London. Participants were compensated for their participation at a rate of £10 per 
hour. 
 
9.4.1.2 Painful Stimuli 	  
Throughout the experiment each participant sat in front of a computer monitor 
while choice options were presented on-screen, and indicated their decisions using the 
keyboard. The presentation package COGENT 2000 (University College London) 
was used for stimulus presentation and response acquisition. Electrical stimuli were 
delivered using a DS5 Digitimer (Letchworth Garden City, England) constant current 
stimulator. A single “shock” consisted of a train of seven 10ms square-wave pulses 
delivered at 40ms intervals. When multiple shocks were delivered these were spaced 
250ms apart. After providing consent, participants underwent a standardised 
thresholding procedure, which allowed selection of current levels (in mA) for use 
during the experiment, which corresponded to visual analogue scale pain ratings of 
5/10 and 8/10 respectively (see General Experimental Methods, Chapter 5).  
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Figure 9.1 Experiment 4: Modified pain dictator game protocol, Give and Take frames. 
In each of three possible action frames (shown here for Give and Take frames) the Dictator 
was given the opportunity to alter or leave unchanged default allocations of 24 brief, 
moderately painful, cutaneous electric shocks between themselves and another participant, 
termed the Responder. In a Give frame the Dictator could choose to either give six of their 
allocated shocks to the Responder, or leave the allocation unchanged. In a Take frame the 
Dictator could choose to either take on six of the Responder’s shocks, or leave the allocation 
unchanged.  
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Figure 9.2 Experiment 4: Modified pain dictator game protocol, Give or Take frame. In 
each of three possible action frames (shown here for the Give or Take frame) the Dictator was 
given the opportunity to alter or leave unchanged default allocations of 24 brief, moderately 
painful, cutaneous electric shocks between themselves and another participant, termed the 
Responder. In a Give or Take frame both giving and taking options were available, as well as 
the option to leave the default unchanged.  
 
9.4.1.3 Dictator Game Choices 
 
Dictator game choices were elicited through an online interface 
(Qualtrics.com; Provo, UT); on each the computer suggested a default allocation of 
24 shocks between dictator and receiver, and the dictator chose whether to alter this 
allocation, or leave it unchanged (Figures 9.1, 9.2 and 9.3). Dictators were informed 
that the subjective intensity level of the shocks would vary between 4/10 and 8/10 on 
a VAS, but that the subjective level for themselves and the other player would always 
be the same on a given trial. In a Give or Take condition default allocations (number 
of shocks for the dictator listed first) were [18-6], [12-12] or [6-18]. The dictator 
chose whether to give 6 shocks to the responder from their own allocation, to take 6 
shocks from the responder’s allocation (which would be added to their own 
allocation) or to leave the allocation unchanged. In a Give condition default 
allocations were [24-0], [18-6], [12-12] or [6-18]. The dictator chose whether to give 
6 shocks of their shocks to the responder or to leave the default allocation unchanged. 
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In a Take condition default allocations were [18-6], [12-12], [6-18] or [0-24]. The 
dictator chose whether to take 6 shocks from the responder’s allocation, or to leave 
the allocation unchanged. Notably equivalent outcomes were attainable in all frames. 
Each choice option was presented twice, creating 22 choices in total. Dictators were 
informed that a selection of their choices would be played for real in the experiential 
part of the experiment, should they consent to take part. The order of conditions and 
trials within conditions was randomised. 
In a follow-up experiment I elicited equivalent choices with money in a subset 
of the same participants, where the numbers of shocks were replaced with quantities 
of money in pounds sterling. In a Money Gain condition participants were told that 
they had won a prize of £24 between themselves and the other participant. On each 
choice the computer suggested a default allocation for the money and the dictator 
chose to either alter this allocation, or leave it unchanged. In a Money Loss condition 
participants were informed that they and the other participant had each won a prize of 
£24, however that they must also pay a debt of £24 between them both. Net 
allocations in the Money Loss condition were equivalent to the Money Gain 
condition. Participants were informed that some choices from the entire set of choices 
made by all participants would be randomly selected to be paid out for real.  
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Figure 9.3 Experiment 4: Modified pain dictator game, choice options within each 
frame. Allocations are in the format [shocks for Dictator – shocks for Responder]. The 
number of shocks allocated to the Responder, highlighted in bold, was termed the ‘offer’. 
Asterisks indicate the default allocation (which would result if participants chose ‘leave 
unchanged’). We also implemented equivalent choices for money, in which shocks were 
simply replaced with sums of money in pounds sterling (money gain condition) or with 
amounts of debt in pounds sterling (money loss condition). Since debt in the money loss 
condition was subtracted from an endowment of £24, the net allocations under the two 
conditions were equivalent. In both forms of the task a selection of choices were 
implemented. 
 
 
9.4.1.4 Experiential Phase 	  
To examine the effects of inequality and intentionality on the subjective 
experience of pain, selected shock allocations were played for real in the laboratory. 
This phase consisted of three types of trial (Figure 9.4). On ‘Shocks for You: Chance’ 
(the Non-Social-Chance condition) trials participants were informed that they would 
receive either 6, 12 or 18 shocks, which would be randomly assigned to them by the 
computer. On ‘Split Shocks: Chance’ trials (the Social-Chance condition) participants 
were informed that 24 shocks would be split between themselves and the other 
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participant, according to one of three possible allocations [6-18], [12-12] or [18-6], 
which would be randomly selected by the computer. Finally a third type of trial 
(forming the Social-Intentioned condition) was referred to as ‘Split Shocks: You 
Decide’ for the dictator and ‘Split Shocks: Other Player Decides’ for the responder. 
The responder was informed that the dictator had chosen allocations of shocks in 
advance, and that on each trial of this type one of the dictator’s chosen allocations 
would be implemented. Dictators were informed that on each trial of this type one of 
their previously chosen allocations would be implemented, and that each allocation 
may be implemented more than once.  
Both players were told that the intensity of the shocks could vary from trial to 
trial and that whilst they would not be told the intensity, the subjective level of the 
shocks for themselves and their partner would always be the same (both players 
would be told the number of shocks they were due to receive). All dictators made 
several choices resulting in the three allocations 6-18, 12-12 and 18-6 shocks. In fact, 
so as to control for context effects in the perception of pain, these three outcomes 
were selected with equal probability in both the Social-Intentioned and Social-Chance 
conditions. Similarly in the Non-Social condition, participants received 6, 12 or 18 
shock with equal probability. Although participants were not informed of this 
sampling process, they were otherwise given faithful information regarding the setup.  
The three trial types (conditions) were interleaved in 6 short blocks of 12 trials each. 
Within each condition, the three possible allocations of shocks were repeated twice at 
each of two different intensity levels (5/10 and 8/10). The order of conditions and of 
trials within each condition was randomly counterbalanced. The outcome allocation 
on each trial was indicated by a pie chart. In Non-Social and Social-Chance 
conditions, this was preceded by a “roulette-wheel” effect, emphasizing that the 
computer was randomly selecting the shocks. After the outcome was displayed shocks 
were administered to both players accordingly.  
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Figure 9.4. Experiential phase of Experiment 4: Trial structure for receivers. A On 
Shocks for you: Chance trials participants were informed that the outcomes would only be 
relevant to them, and did not involve the other participant. The computer then selected an 
allocation of shocks at random.  The participant received the stated number of shocks and was 
then asked to rate the intensity of the shocks on a visual analogue scale. We subsequently 
elicited participants’ willingness to pay to avoid three further repeats of the same outcome 
(not shown in this figure). B Split Shocks: Chance trials proceeded in the same manner, 
though in this case the computer ‘randomly’ chose how to allocate 24 shocks between the two 
participants. C The trial structure was identical in Split Shocks: Partner Decides trials, though 
on these trials the receiver was informed that an allocation chosen by their partner would be 
selected and played for real.  
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In the first session, after shock delivery each player rated the intensity of the 
shocks on a visual analogue scale. Immediately afterwards participants’ willingness-
to-pay to avoid the shocks was obtained by means of a simulated “auction” (not 
shown in Figure 9.4) (G. M. Becker et al., 1964). Participants were endowed with 40 
pence on each trial and were asked to indicate their willingness to pay from this 
endowment to avoid three repeats of their allocated shocks. On one in ten randomly 
selected trials their bid was compared to a market price, sampled from a uniform 
distribution in the range of 0 – 40 pence. If the participant’s bid exceeded the market 
price, they would avoid repeated instances of the allocated shocks, and would pay the 
amount they bid; otherwise they would receive three repeats of their allocation of 
shocks and would pay nothing. Participants took home as a “bonus” any money which 
they did not spend on these auction trials. Participants were informed that their bids 
only affected their own shocks, and did not alter the other participant’s shocks. In a 
second session, participants rated the fairness of the outcomes, the extent to which 
they perceived the other player to be responsible for the allocation and the extent to 
which they felt inclined to punish the other player for the allocation, each on a VAS 
ranging from 0 to 100. 
 
9.4.1.5 Model Specification and Fitting 
 	  
I tested alternative social valuation models for the choices made by the 
dictators. In particular I sought to test a simple form of social welfare preference that 
is capable of accounting for hyperaltruism. Under this model, termed Social 
Discounting, a person’s social utility is given by a weighted sum of their own utility 
and that of others, shown here for the two-person case: 
           𝑈!" 𝑠! ,   𝑠! = 𝑢! 𝑠! +   𝜅 ∙ 𝑢! 𝑠!  
        (9.1.1) 
Here 𝑈!" 𝑠! ,   𝑠!  is a social utility function governing the utility to player 𝑖 of an 
allocation with payoff 𝑠! to player  𝑖 and  𝑠! to player 𝑗, 𝑢(𝑠) is a utility function over 
individual payoffs and 𝜅  is a social discounting parameter which governs the 
contribution of player 𝑗’s payoff. Note that this function is equivalent to the models of 
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social discounting proposed in Chapter 8 of this thesis. If 𝑢(𝑠) is concave for both 
gains and losses (decreasing marginal utility for gains and increasing marginal utility 
for losses/harms) then, for 𝜅 > 0 the above function predicts a tendency to spread the 
payoff across individuals. (Note also the direct analogy here to concave utility 
producing spreading of resources over time in Chapter 7). This has an intuitive 
interpretation as a motive to give to those most in need.  Owing to concave utility, 
individuals with lower payoffs will value the same increase in their payoff more than 
individuals with higher payoffs. To fit the model, the utility functions over individual 
payoffs were assumed to be identical and concave, such that 𝑢!(𝑠) ≡ 𝑢!(𝑠), both 
given by the quadratic function 𝑢 𝑠 = 𝑠 − 𝑏𝑠!, where 𝑏 = 0.01. 
I tested this model against three existing social utility models: Fehr-Schmidt 
utility (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999), Charness-Rabin social preferences (Charness & 
Rabin, 2002), and the Equity, Reciprocity and Competition model (ERC) (Bolton & 
Ockenfels, 2000). The Fehr-Schmidt model penalises unequal allocations, with 
separate penalties for advantageous inequality and disadvantageous inequality: 
               𝑈!" 𝑠! , 𝑠! =    𝑠! −   𝛼max   𝑠! − 𝑠! , 0 −   𝛽max   𝑠! − 𝑠! , 0  
         (9.1.2) 
   𝑈!" 𝑠! , 𝑠!  is a social utility function governing the utility to player 𝑖 of an allocation 
with payoff 𝑠! to player  𝑖 and  𝑠! to player 𝑗, and 𝛼 parameterises the linear effect of 
disadvantageous inequity, 𝛽 the effect of advantageous inequity. As is conventional, 
parameter bounds were set such that 𝛼 ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ 𝛽 ≤ 1. 
The ERC model also implements a penalty for unequal payoffs, though in a 
non-linear manner, achieved by penalizing squared deviations from an even 
distribution of payoffs:               𝑈!"# 𝑠! , 𝑠! =    𝑠! ∙ 𝑎  + 𝑏2 ∙ (𝜎! − 0.5)! 
        (9.1.3) 
where 𝜎! is player 𝑖’s share of the total payoff: 
     𝜎! =    𝑠!𝑠! + 𝑠! 
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       (9.1.4) 
The parameter 𝑎  weights self-oriented preferences, while 𝑏  determines the 
contribution of inequality aversion; both parameters were bounded to be zero or 
positive.   
Charness-Rabin social preferences assume that people behave as if to 
maximise a flexible weighted average of the payoffs of all players, where the 
weightings reflect the existence of advantageous or disadvantageous inequity as well 
as the effect of intentionality. For the two-person case: 
               𝑈!" 𝑠! , 𝑠! = 𝜌𝑟 + 𝜎𝑠 + 𝜃𝑞 ∙ 𝑠! +      1− 𝜌𝑟 − 𝜎𝑠 − 𝜃𝑞 ∙ 𝑠! 
          (9.1.5) 
where 𝑟 = 1      𝑖𝑓  𝑠! >    𝑠!0  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒       𝑠 = 1      𝑖𝑓  𝑠! >    𝑠!0  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑞 = −1      𝑖𝑓  𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟  𝑗  ℎ𝑎𝑠  𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑏𝑒ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑑  0                    𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                                                        
        (9.1.6) 
In this case 𝑞 was set to zero, making 𝜃 redundant; the remaining weighting factors 𝜌 
and 𝜎 were bounded between zero and one.  
 Since the current experimental choices required participants to either accept a 
suggested allocation, or alter it, I expected to observe a status quo bias – i.e. a 
tendency to accept the suggested allocation (Kahneman et al., 1991). All four models 
above were therefore modified for the current choices by adding a status quo bias, 
simply a fixed cost, 𝑥, associated with changing the allocation, such that for each 
model: 
     𝑈 𝑠! , 𝑠!|𝑎 =      𝑈 𝑠! , 𝑠!|𝑎 − 𝑞                              𝑖𝑓    𝑎 ≠ 0𝑈 𝑠! , 𝑠!|𝑎                                           𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 
         (9.1.7) 
where 𝑎 =   0 denotes accepting the default. 
Model fitting was by maximum likelihood estimation; a standard logistic 
sigmoid (softmax function) was used to transform the social utilities of the allocations 
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resulting from different actions into corresponding probability of choosing a 
particular action. Constrained non-linear optimisation was used in Matlab 
(Mathworks, MA, USA), to find model parameters which minimised the negative log 
likelihood of participants’ choices. To avoid convergence on local minima, the 
optimiser was run within a random multi-started overlay with 1000 starting points 
drawn from a uniform distribution within the parameter bounds (RMsearch). Models 
were compared using the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) (see General 
Experimental Methods, Chapter 5).  
 
9.4.1.6 Subjective Questionnaire Measures  
 
Participants also completed a 20-item Paranoia Scale (Fenigstein & Vanable, 
1992), a 40-item Empathy Quotient questionnaire (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 
2004), a Justice Sensitivity Scale (Victim and Perpetrator sensitivity) (Schmitt, 
Gollwitzer, Maes, & Arbach, 2005) and a Vengeance Scale (Stuckless & Goranson, 
1992). We hypothesised that the tendency amongst Receivers to attribute 
responsibility for their shocks to the choices of the Dictator would correlate positively 
with their paranoia score, and that their rated inclination to punish the Dictator for 
their actions would correlate with justice sentivity and vengeance scores. We further 
hypothesised that more altruistic offers amongst Dictators would correlate positively 
with the empathy quotient.  
 
9.5 RESULTS 
 
9.5.1 DISTRIBUTION OF MEAN DICTATOR GAME OFFERS 
 
  The distribution of offers across Dictators (taking the mean resulting offer 
over all three action frames for each participant) is displayed in Figure 9.5 for pain 
(Figure 9.5a) and money (Figure 9.5b for losses, 9.5c for gains). Across participants 
the mean offer of shocks was not significantly different from 12 shocks (N = 47; 
mean = 12.16, permutation test, p>0.25, see Methods), indicating a preference for 
equal allocations of pain at the group level.  By contrast the mean offer of money 
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(averaged across gain and loss frames) was significantly below £12 (N = 25; mean = 
£11.39, p=0.011, two-tailed permutation test), indicating a degree of self-oriented 
behaviour for monetary outcomes.  To compare the degree of self-oriented behaviour 
for money and shocks I focussed on comparing offers in pain and money loss 
conditions, since these were matched for valence. As predicted, offers of shocks were 
significantly lower than offers of debt (mean shocks offered in 25 subjects performing 
money choices = 11.98, mean debt offered = £12.98; p=0.021, two-tailed permutation 
test, uncorrected; p=0.042 Bonferroni corrected for two possible comparisons). 
Surprisingly there was no significant difference between the mean offers in pain and 
money gain conditions (mean money retained by dictator = £12.24; p>0.250), nor was 
there a difference beween money gain and money loss conditions (p>0.250). Notably, 
given the restricted nature of the choices, this analysis based on mean offers might not 
be the most sensitive for detecting changes in altruism between modalities. 
 
 
  
Figure 9.5 Distribution	   of	   mean	   resulting	   dictator	   game	   offers	   in	  
Experiment	   4. Histograms summarizing the distribution of mean offers across all 
choices made by each participant. In each case the horizontal axis represents an 
increasing measure of self-oriented behaviour. a Pain dictator game, offers of shocks 
by all 47 participants, b offers of shocks made by 25 participants who also completed 
monetary choices, c money dictator game, offers of debt in the loss frame, d, money 
dictator game, money retained by the dictator in the gain frame. Offers are out of a 
total endowment of 24 shocks (a, b) or £24 (c, d).  
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Nevertheless, taken together these results indicate that participants were most 
altruistic when apportioning pain, and least altruistic when apportioning debt. I 
perform additional analysis on the raw choice frequencies below, by comparing 
responses to advantageous and disadvantageous inequality for pain and debt.  
For pain allocations, 15 out of 47 participants (32%) retained more than half 
the shocks across all choices, indicating hyperaltruistic behaviour. By contrast, in the 
money loss frame, only 3 out of 25 participants (12%) assigned more than half of the 
money to the receiver (one-sided Fisher’s exact test p=0.054).   
 
9.5.2 INEQUALITY AVERSION FOR PAIN AND MONEY 
 
 To examine the pattern of social preferences in more detail, I analyzed the 
frequency with which participants altered the default allocations as inequality 
changed. In the Take frame participants were increasingly likely to take a fixed 
number of shocks from the other participant as the default number of shocks allocated 
to the other participant increased (Figure 9.6A). Similarly in the Give frame, 
participants became less likely to give shocks to the other participant as the baseline 
number of shocks allocated to the other participant increased (Figure 9.6B). An 
equivalent effect was seen in the Give or Take frame (Figures 9.6c and d). In the 
monetary domain a similar effect was also observed (Figure 9.7). Importantly, this 
particular pattern is in keeping with an increasing marginal effect of inequality, since 
the propensity to correct inequality by the same degree, 6 shocks, increased as the 
baseline level of inequality increased (from 6-18 to 0-24 in the Take frame, and from 
18-6 to 24-0 in the Give frame).  
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Figure 9.6 Dictator behaviour for pain as a function of default allocations in Experiment 
4. For each plot a single data point represents a mean choice probability across 47 
participants; error bars are 95% confidence intervals around the mean, generated by re-
sampling the data 100,000 times with replacement. A Probability, in the Take frame, that 
dictators chose to take 6 shocks from the receiver’s allocation (decreasing the resulting offer 
by 6 shocks), as opposed to leaving the allocation unchanged, is plotted as a function of the 
initial allocation of shocks to the receiver (the default offer). Dictators were increasingly 
likely to take shocks from the receiver as the initial allocation to the receiver increased, 
consistent with an increasing marginal cost to having fewer shocks than the receiver. B 
Probability, in the Give frame, that dictators chose to give 6 of their allocated shocks to the 
receiver (increasing the resulting offer by 6 shocks) is plotted as a function of the initial 
allocation of shocks to the receiver (the default offer). Dictators were increasingly likely to 
give shocks to the receiver as the initial allocation to the receiver decreased, consistent with 
there being an increasing marginal cost to having more shocks than the receiver. Similarly, in 
the Give or Take frame, the probability that dictators chose to take 6 shocks from the 
receiver’s allocation increased as the initial allocation to the receiver increased (C), and the 
probability that dictators chose to give 6 of their shocks to the receiver decreased as the initial 
allocation to the receiver increased (D). 
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9.5.3 SELF-ORIENTED PREFERENCES FOR MONEY BUT NOT PAIN 
 
To further compare social preferences for debt and pain at the group level, I 
separated choices (in the Give and Take action frames) that entailed disadvantageous 
inequality (24-0 vs 18-6, 18-6 vs 12-12) from those that entailed advantageous 
inequality (6-18 vs 0-24, 12-12 vs 6-18).  Here, choosing the more equal option in 
‘disadvantageous’ choices more frequently than in the symmetrical ‘advantageous’ 
choices indicates a degree of self-oriented behaviour. This analysis creates a three-
way factorial design with two outcome modalities (debt vs pain), two action frames 
(Give vs Take) and two directions of inequality (advantageous vs disadvantageous). A 
main effect of modality would indicate greater or lesser inequality aversion for pain 
compared with debt irrespective of the direction of inequality. By contrast a modality 
x inequality-direction interaction would indicate more or less altruistic behaviour for 
pain.  
Three-way repeated measures ANOVA on the probability of choosing the 
more equal option (termed equality-seeking) for the 25 participants who made choices 
for both modalities revealed a significant main effect of inequality-direction 
(F(1,24)=4.616, p=0.042), driven by some degree of self-oriented behaviour 
irrespective of modality or action frame (estimated marginal mean equality-seeking = 
0.745 for advantageous choices, 0.872 for disadvantageous choices). There was 
neither a significant main effect of modality (F(1,24)=0.183, p>0.250), nor a 
significant main effect of action (F(1,24)=2.348, p=0.139). Importantly, as predicted, 
there was a significant interaction between modality and inequality-direction 
(F(1,24)=6.233, p=0.020). Follow-up non-parametric tests (by randomly reshuffling 
condition assignment) indicated that this was driven by greater self-oriented 
behaviour for debt than for pain. For example, for debt participants were on average 
26% more likely to choose the more equal option in disadvantageous choices than in 
advantageous choices (mean difference = 0.26, two-tailed p<0.001, N=25). By 
contrast, for pain there was no significant difference in equality seeking between 
disadvantageous and advantageous choices (mean difference <0.01, two-tailed 
p>0.250, N=25). Furthermore, the observed asymmetry for debt was significantly 
greater than that for shocks (two-tailed p=0.018, N=25).  
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The above analysis also revealed a significant interaction between action 
frame and inequality direction (F(1,24)=14.605, p=0.001). Follow-up permutation 
testing indicated that this was driven by more self-oriented behaviour in the Take 
frame than in the Give frame (difference in mean inequality-direction effect = 0.27, 
two-tailed p<0.001). Since default offers of debt or pain to the other participant were 
higher in the Take frame, this effect is consistent with a status quo bias in dictator 
behaviour. As described below a status quo bias was also evident in the mean offers 
across all three outcome modalities. The remaining interactions in the three-way 
ANOVA (between modality and action frame, and the three-way interaction) were not 
significant (F(1,24)=0.660, p=0.424 and F(1,24)=0.604, p=0.444 respectively).  
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Figure 9.7 Dictator behaviour for money as a function of default allocations in 
Experiment 4. Each data point represents a mean choice probability across 25 participants; 
error bars are 95% confidence intervals, generated by re-sampling with replacement. A 
Probability (in the Take frame) that dictators chose to take £6 from the receiver, as opposed to 
leaving the offer unchanged, plotted as a function of the initial net (default) offer, indicated 
by the symbol . Also plotted is the probability (in the Give frame) that dictators chose to 
give £6 of debt to the receiver, indicated by the symbol . In both cases, dictators were 
increasingly likely to reduce the offer as the initial offer increased, consistent with there being 
an increasing marginal cost to having less money than the receiver. B Probability (in the Give 
frame) that dictators chose to give £6 to the receiver, as opposed to leaving the offer 
unchanged, plotted as a function of the net default offer, indicated by the symbol .  Also 
plotted is the probability (in the Take frame) that dictators chose to take £6 of debt from the 
receiver, indicated by the symbol . In both cases, dictators were increasingly likely to 
increase the offer as the initial offer decreased, consistent with an increasing marginal cost to 
having more money than the receiver. Similarly, in the Give or Take frame, the probability 
that dictators chose to decrease the net offer by £6, either by taking money ( ) or giving debt 
( ) increased as the initial offer increased (C), and the probability that dictators chose to 
increase the net offer by £6, either by giving money ( ) or taking debt ( ) decreased as the 
initial offer increased (D). A tendency towards self-oriented choices is evident from the 
greater propensity to decrease rather than increase offers, for the same degree of inequality. 
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9.5.4 STATUS QUO BIAS 
 
Owing to the nature of the choices in this experiment, in which an initial 
allocation could either be accepted or altered, I had expected to observe a status quo 
bias, reflecting an overall reluctance to change the current state of affairs (Baron & 
Ritov, 2004; Kahneman et al., 1991; Spranca, Minsk, & Baron, 1991).  A status quo 
bias predicts higher offers in the Take relative to the Give frame, since default offers 
are higher in the Take frame. As displayed in Figure 9.8, mean offers in the Take 
frame were indeed significantly higher than those in the Give frame, for both pain 
(p<0.001, two-tailed permutation test), money gains (p<0.001) and money losses 
(p<0.001).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.8 A status quo bias in dictator behaviour. A Mean offers of shocks across all 
dictators (vertical axis; N = 47), for each action frame (horizontal axis category).  Solid black 
horizontal bars indicate the mean default offer under each frame. Upper dashed horizontal 
bars show the mean offers that would result from maximally selfish behaviour, lower dashed 
horizontal bars the mean offers that would result from maximally selfless behaviour. Mean 
offers were higher in the Take frame than in the Give frame, consistent with a status quo bias. 
B Mean net offers of money across all dictators (vertical axis; N = 25) under Give (G), Take 
(T) and Give or Take (G/T) action frames (horizontal axis category, individual bars), under 
both Gain and Loss (debt) frames (horizontal axis groupings). Here, taking money is 
equivalent to giving debt, and vice versa. A status quo effect is evident for money gains and 
losses (debt), whereby net offers were higher when the net default offer was high (Take frame 
for money gains and Give frame for money losses), compared with when the net default offer 
was low (Give frame for money gains and Take frame for money losses). Error bars indicate 
95% confidence intervals generated by resampling the data 100,000 times with replacement. 
Asterisks indicate p values associated with two-tailed permutation tests; *** p<0.001. 
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9.5.5 MODELLING DICTATOR BEHAVIOUR 
 
Predictions of the Social Discounting model in a Dictator Game are displayed 
in Figure 9.9, for the special case where 𝑢! and 𝑢! are concave and identical (the same 
form of utility function for payoffs to self and other). Where 𝜅 < 1, player 𝑖 will 
assign more weight to their own payoff than those of the other player, and therefore is 
motivated to allocate more than half of the benefit to themselves. For 𝜅 = 1, players 
can maximise their utility by achieving equal payoffs (𝑠! = 𝑠!). For the opposite case 
of 𝜅 > 1, corresponding to hyperaltruism, player 𝑖 is motivated to allocate more than 
half of the benefit to the other player.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.9 Social utility functions based on a Social Discounting model. The total utility 
predicted by a social discounting model of the form shown in Equation 1 (vertical axis, 
arbitrary units), is plotted as a function of the offer to the receiver (𝑠!) in a dictator game with 
an endowment of 24 units (𝑠! = 24 − 𝑠!). Two possible scenarios are shown, either a 
decreasing offer of painful shocks (horizontal axis, upper scale) or an increasing offer of 
money (horizontal axis, lower scale). The four lines represent different settings of the social 
discount parameter, 𝜅, as labeled. In each case, 𝑢!(𝑠) ≡ 𝑢!(𝑠), both given by the quadratic 
function 𝑢 𝑠 = 𝑠 − 𝑏𝑠! , where 𝑏 = 0.01. For 𝜅 = 1 the function has a maximum when 
allocations to both participants are equal (𝑠! = 𝑠! = 12),  corresponding to symmetric 
inequality aversion.  𝜅 < 1 generates a  preference for assigning more than half the benefit to 
oneself, while  𝜅 > 1 (hyperaltruism) generates a preference for assigning more than half the 
benefit to the receiver. For each parameter setting, moving away from one’s preferred 
allocation carries a non-linear (increasing marginal) cost.  
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Of the models tested, only the Social Discounting model can theoretically 
incorporate both hyperaltruism and increasing marginal inequality aversion, two key 
patterns observed in the data for pain. With the standard parameter bounds, Fehr-
Schmidt utility accounts for neither finding, ERC accounts for non-linear inequality 
aversion, but not hyperaltruism and Charness-Rabin preferences are capable of 
incorporating hyperaltruism, but do not incorporate non-linear inequality aversion. I 
therefore hypothesised that the Social Discounting model would provide the best fit to 
the observed data. Since the behavioural data are consistent with a status quo bias, I 
modified each model to incorporate this effect, by assigning a cost to altering the 
status quo. (See Methods for detailed model specifications). 
Consistent with predictions, the Social Discount model, with the addition of a 
status quo bias, was unequivocally the best fitting model at the group-level (highest 
maximum likelihood and lowest BIC) for both pain (Figure 9.10A; BIC difference of 
124 over the next best model, in this case Charness-Rabin social preferences with a 
status quo bias) and money (Figure 9.11A; BIC difference of 152 over the next best 
model, in this case ERC with a status quo bias). The choice probabilities predicted by 
the model, formed by taking the mean of individual choice probabilities across 
participants, are overlaid with the observed data for pain and money in Figures 9.10B 
and 9.11B respectively For pain, mean 𝜅=1.17 (95% CI by resampling = 0.95-1.44; 
N=47), indicating a non-significant trend at the group level towards assigning greater 
weight to others’ pain, i.e. hyperaltruism, in keeping with the behavioural findings 
above. For money, mean 𝜅=0.81 (95% CI by resampling = 0.64-0.96, one-sample 
p=0.0162; N=25), indicating significantly self-oriented preferences. Also in keeping 
with the preceding model-free analyses, mean 𝜅 for money was significantly lower 
than that for pain (p=0.0158, two-tailed permutation test), supporting the conclusion 
of more altruistic choices for pain than for money. 
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Figure 9.10 Model Fits to pain dictator game choices in Experiment 4. A| BIC values for 
the alternative models, either with status quo bias (light blue bars, right bar of each pair) or 
without (dark blue bars, left bar of each pair). The social discounting model provided the 
most parsimonious fit, indicated by the grey dot. B Maximum likelihood choice probabilities 
of the social discounting model, formed by taking the mean of the predicted choice 
probabilities across participants, are indicated by the symbol , and are overlaid with the 
observed choice probabilities as displayed in Figure 4, indicated by  for choices to take on 
pain and  for choices to give pain. A single data point represents a mean choice probability 
across 47 participants and error bars are 95% confidence intervals around the mean, generated 
by re-sampling the data 100,000 times with replacement. 
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Figure 9.11 Model fits to money dictator game choices in Experiment 4. A BIC values for 
the alternative models, either with status quo bias (light green bars, right bar of each pair) or 
without (dark green bars, left bar of each pair). The social discounting model provided the 
most parsimonious fit, indicated by the grey dot. B Maximum likelihood choice probabilities 
of the social discounting model, formed by taking the mean of the predicted choice 
probabilities across participants, are indicated by the symbol , and are overlaid with the 
observed choice probabilities, indicated by  for choices to take money,  for choices to give 
debt,  for choices to give money and  for choices to take on debt. A single data point 
represents a mean choice probability across 25 participants and error bars are 95% confidence 
intervals around the mean, generated by re-sampling the data 100,000 times with 
replacement. 
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9.5.6 EVALUATION OF EXPERIENCED PAIN ALLOCATIONS.  
 
By generating equivalent outcomes framed as either Non-Social (no 
information given about the other player’s allocation) or Social (players were 
informed of the other’s allocation), where the latter can be framed as resulting either 
from the choices made by the dictator (Social-Intentioned condition) or from the play 
of chance (Social-Chance condition), I examined the effects of inequality and 
perceived intentionality on the perception of pain. A prior prediction was that 
advantageous inequality would reduce and disadvantageous inequality increase pain 
perception. I also predicted that perceived intentionality, in the Social-Intentioned 
condition, would amplify this effect, resulting in an effect of intentioned 
advantageous inequality to reduce pain perception, termed a ‘kindness effect’ and an 
effect of intentioned disadvantageous inequality to increase it, termed a ‘meanness 
effect’. 
Full ratings data was available from 50 participants, 25 dictators and 25 
responders. It was expected that receiving more shocks at a given current level would 
increase the rated intensity of the pain, owing to sensitisation from one shock to the 
next. Indeed, a repeated measures ANOVA on intensity ratings across Non-Social 
with Social-Chance conditions across all participants revealed a significant main 
effect of number-of-shocks (F(2,98) = 4.238, p = 0.017; partial 𝜂!= 0.08). I predicted 
that priming inequality in the Social-Chance condition would increase the slope of 
this relationship, manifest as an interaction between condition and number of shocks. 
In fact there was found no evidence for the predicted number-of-shocks by condition 
interaction (F(2, 98) = 0.045, p = 0.956; partial 𝜂! = 0.001), and no significant main 
effect of condition (F(1,49) = 0.297, p = 0.588; partial 𝜂!  = 0.006), suggesting that 
inequality per se did not influence pain ratings (Figure 9.12). However, comparison of 
intensity ratings from responders (N =25) in Social-Chance and Social-Intentioned 
conditions did show the predicted number-of-shocks by condition interaction (F(2, 
48) = 11.657, p < 0.001, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected; partial 𝜂!  = 0.327), as well as 
a main effect of number-of-shocks (F(2,48) = 8.026, p = 0.004, Greenhouse-Geisser 
corrected; partial 𝜂!  = 0.251) and no significant main effect of condition (F(1,24) = 
1.218, p = 0.281; partial 𝜂!  = 0.048), indicating that perceiving the other participant as 
responsible for shock allocations significantly influenced pain perception. Pairwise 
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comparisons revealed this effect was driven by lower intensity ratings in the Social-
Intentioned condition for 6 shocks (mean rating difference = 0.645 points on VAS, 
95% CI of the difference [0.15 1.13]; t(24) = 2.72, p = 0.012, two-tailed paired test; 
Cohen’s d = 0.49) whilst intensity ratings for 18 shocks did not differ significantly 
between the two conditions (mean rating difference = 0.046 points on VAS, 95% CI 
of the difference [-0.22 0.32]; t(24) = 0.351, p > 0.250; Cohen’s d = 0.03), indicating 
a significant ‘kindness effect’, but no significant ‘meanness effect’ (Figure 9.12).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.12. Rated pain intensity as a function of social context in Experiment 4. Mean 
pain intensity ratings across participants on a 10-point visual analogue scale (VAS) for the 
Non-Social condition (all participants, N=50, ) the Social-Chance condition (all 
participants, N=50, ) and the Social-Intentioned condition (split into dictators, indicated by 
 and responders, indicated by , N=25 in each group). Data are modelled as a concave 
psychophysical function of number of shocks (dashed and dotted lines, see 9.3 Discussion). 
Error bars represent one standard error above and below the mean. In the Social-Intentioned 
condition, when dictators behaved altruistically, allocating only 6 out a possible 24 shocks to 
the receiver, this significantly reduced pain perception relative to the other two conditions.  
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In the first session, after shock delivery each player rated the intensity of the 
shocks on a visual analogue scale. Immediately afterwards participants’ willingness-
to-pay (WTP) to avoid three repeats of the shocks was obtained by means of a first-
price “auction”. A similar set of effects as observed for subjective ratings was 
predicted for WTP. However, whilst there was a significant main effect of number-of-
shocks on WTP  (F(2,48) = 15.89, p<0.001, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected) there was 
neither a significant main effect of condition (F(2,48) = 0.202, p=0.756) nor a 
condition by number-of-shocks interaction (F(4,96) = 0.823, p = 0.513), suggesting 
that the motivational value of shocks was not influenced by the social context.  
 
9.5.7 RATINGS OF FAIRNESS, RESPONSIBILITY AND INCLINATION TO PUNISH 
 
In a separate experimental block, participants also made ratings in percentage 
terms of how much they perceived the other participant as responsible for the 
allocation, how fair they perceived the allocation to be and the extent to which they 
felt inclined to punish the other participant. For responsibility ratings made by 
responders (N=25) there was a large significant main effect of condition (F(2,48) = 
157.6, p<0.001; partial 𝜂! = 0.868), indicating a high degree of credibility in the 
experimental manipulation. As expected participants rated receiving 18 shocks as less 
fair than receiving either 12 or 6 shocks, whilst the latter two outcomes were rated as 
equally fair when collapsing across conditions (estimated marginal mean rating for 18 
shocks = 30.8%, 95% CI [21.5-40.2], 12 shocks = 63.9% [54.2-73.6], 6 shocks = 
61.3% [52.5 – 70.2]). For punishment ratings there were main effects of number-of-
shocks (F(2,48) = 11.03, p<0.001; partial 𝜂! = 0.315) and condition (F(2,48) = 14.2, 
p<0.001; partial 𝜂!  = 0.372), indicating responders felt more inclined to punish the 
dictator when they received higher numbers of shocks, irrespective of their causation, 
and were overall more inclined to punish the dictator in the Social-Intentioned 
condition, where they believed the dictator to be responsible  for the allocations. As 
expected, there was also a significant number-of-shocks x condition interaction 
(F(4,96) = 7.65, p<0.001; partial 𝜂!= 0.242), driven by a steeper effect of number of 
shocks in the Social-Intentioned condition, such that responders were most inclined to 
punish intentioned high allocations of shocks. These results serve as a credibility 
check on the experimental manipulation. 
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Survey measures were compared against observed behaviour with painful 
outcomes (mean offers made by dictators, and ratings of pain intensity, fairness, 
responsibility and inclination to punish by the responders) by means of linear 
regression. There was no significant relationship between any of the survey 
instruments used and either the mean offers made by dictators or the ratings made by 
responders.  
 
 9.6 DISCUSSION 	  	  
Marked inequality in health continues to exist in the UK and is often perceived 
as unjust. The current experiment finds support for the hypothesis that people are 
motivated to reduce inequalities in illness, here operationalised as pain. The 
experiment also tested two hypotheses with respect to how inequality might affect 
experienced pain: firstly that a perception of having been treated unfairly has an 
intrinsic effect to exacerbate pain, termed a ‘meanness effect’, secondly that a 
perception of having been treated with beneficence ameliorates suffering, termed a 
‘kindness effect’. The results support a kindness effect, but did not reveal a meanness 
effect.  
The hypotheses above unite existing lines of enquiry from psychology and 
economics. Psychologists have long been interested in the circumstances under which 
people are willing to cause or relieve others’ pain. The experiments of Stanley 
Milgram (unacceptable by many ethical standards, including those of the time: see 
Baumrind, 1964) reported that under specific conditions, designed to encourage 
obedience to the wishes of the experimenter, people could be induced to cause high 
levels of pain to others (Milgram, 1963, 1965). However numerous studies that have 
hitherto attracted less attention illustrate that humans are generally reluctant to 
actively harm others (Crockett et al., 2010; Cushman et al., 2012), show empathic 
responses to others’ pain (Jackson et al., 2005; Singer et al., 2004), and even choose 
to suffer pain, or pay money themselves to avoid causing pain to others (Batson et al., 
1988; Batson et al., 1983; Crockett et al., 2014; Feldman-Hall et al., 2012; Hein et al., 
2011). These studies combine to suggest that (at least within the narrow social context 
of psychological experiments) people find others’ pain intrinsically aversive. 
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Separately, economists have sought to quantify altruistic human behaviour through 
formal games, finding that many people prefer to share money with others, even when 
there is no financial reward for doing so (Engel, 2011), a behaviour that has been 
characterised as a preference for equality. Here I integrate these disparate lines of 
research, by formalizing the transfer of both pain and money between individuals in 
economic terms using a modified dictator game.  
The data indicate that being allocated more pain than others motivated people 
to transfer pain to others, while being allocated less pain than others motivated people 
to take on others’ pain, consistent with a preference for equal allocations of pain. 
Furthermore, increases in pain inequality had an increasing effect on the motivation to 
redress inequality. In psychological terms this can be viewed in terms of drive 
reduction: the further one is from a desirable goal, the stronger the motivation to act 
(Campbell & Kraeling, 1953).  In economic terms this finding indicates an increasing 
marginal aversion to inequality (Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Loewenstein, Thompson, 
& Bazerman, 1989).  
I have showed through model-fitting that this behaviour can result from a 
more fundamental principle of diminishing marginal utility (or in psychological 
terms, satiety) if it is assumed that social utility is given by a weighted sum of 
individual utilities. In other words, if people have some degree of concern for others, 
then diminishing marginal utility creates a motive to donate to those who have least, 
since they will benefit most from increases in utility. For pain, the model assumes 
increasing marginal disutility, such that the motive to share pain arises directly from 
the escalating cost of pain to each individual. Put simply, those in greatest pain are 
seen as being in the greatest need of reductions in pain.  
For monetary outcomes, people more frequently acted to correct 
disadvantageous as compared with advantageous inequality, as seen in previous 
findings where disadvantageous monetary inequality has a larger motivating effect 
(Loewenstein et al., 1989). For pain, however, there was no significant degree of 
asymmetry. Consistent with this participants were significantly more altruistic when 
allocating pain than when allocating money. I also observed hyperaltruism for pain, 
whereby close to a third of participants (15 out of 47, 32%) retained more than half 
the shocks across all choices. This pattern was readily modeled by allowing the 
weighting given to others’ utility to exceed that given to one’s own utility.  
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Notably in this experiment the differences in mean offers between money and 
pain found were subtle, and only significant for the money loss frame (mean offer of 
shocks =12.16/24, mean offer of debt = £12.98/£24). This stands in contrast with the 
more substantial differences in allocations between money and pain seen in 
conventional dictator game paradigms (A. L. Davis et al., 2011), where mean offers 
of money were more selfish than seen here (mean offer of cold water immersion time  
= 28.8s/60s, mean offer of money gain = $1.80 /$6). A possible explanation is that the 
limited choices used for the current study tended to generate a more stereotyped 
pattern of responding than conventional dictator game choices, and therefore may be 
less sensitive to differences in altruism betweeen pain and money.  
Notably however, the prevalence of hyperaltruistic behaviour seen here is 
closely comparable to that previously reported for a conventional dictator game with 
pain, which found that 16 out of 54 (30%) participants allocated less than half of the 
painful cold immersion time to the other participant (A. L. Davis et al., 2011). 
Notably both proportions are markedly lower than the rate of hyperaltruism in 
Experiment 3A (described in the preceding chapter of this thesis), where participants 
made binary choices between pain for themselves or others, and where 17 out of 27 
were hyperaltruistic. Both proportions are also lower than those reported in a recent 
study which required participants to trade off pain and money, where over half of 
participants displayed hyperaltruism (Crockett et al., 2014). One explanation for this 
discrepancy would be that choices in which outcomes are described as allocations of 
pain to each person tend to prime concerns for equality. 
Finally, by implementing selected allocations for real, I was able to examine 
the effects of inequality and perceived intentionality on the perception of pain itself. 
Although I found no significant influence of inequality per se on pain perception, I 
did observe a ‘kindness effect’, whereby participants rated a low number of shocks as 
less intense when they believed that the other participant had chosen to accept a high 
number of shocks at the same time, thus enduring extra pain for their benefit. This 
finding may reflect participants’ perception of being in the presence of a supportive 
other, consistent with existing findings that the presence of a familiar conspecific 
reduces pain responses in both humans (Krahé, Springer, Weinman, & Fotopoulou, 
2013) and animals (F. R. D'Amato & Pavone, 1993; Langford et al., 2010). Lending 
support to this idea, one previous study found that pain chosen by another participant 
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was rated as less severe if the receiver believed that the other participant would 
increase their (the receiver’s) monetary payment by giving pain, rather than believing 
that the other had no apparent motive for giving pain. Reassuringly, this effect 
suggests that the mere perception of beneficence on the part of caregivers has an 
intrinsic effect to ameliorate suffering.  
Unlike previous studies (K. Gray, 2012; K. Gray & Wegner, 2008) this 
experiment found no evidence for the converse (‘meanness’) effect, namely an effect 
of selfish behaviour on the part of the dictator to increase pain perception for the 
receiver. An explanation for this null result might be that in the current study 
intentioned-inequality was in the number of shocks; effects of intentioned-inequality 
on subjective intensity ratings might therefore be expected to resemble the effect of 
increasing or decreasing the number of shocks. Subjective intensity ratings did 
increase as a function of the number of shocks (consistent with sensitisation), 
however this relationship saturated at higher numbers of shocks. Under this account a 
meanness effect would be equivalent to increasing the number of shocks from an 
already high level, with little resulting effect on pain perception. To formalise this 
hypothesis we modeled intensity ratings as a concave psychophysical function of 
number of shocks, using a Weibull function with two parameters, asymptote,  𝐴, and 
latency,  𝐿, constrained to pass through the origin: 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝐴(1− 𝑒!!!) 
Least squares fits of this function, displayed in Figure 10, illustrate that the saturation 
hypothesis appears plausible.  
A key question for future research is whether relative deprivation or suffering 
in one modality alters responses to inequality in other modalities. There is already 
evidence to support this suggestion. For example, Mancini and colleagues report that 
experiencing pain increases self-oriented behaviour in a one-shot ultimatum game 
(Mancini, Betti, Panasiti, Pavone, & Aglioti, 2011), and that, somewhat in opposition 
to the kindness effect shown here, perceived monetary unfairness reduces neural 
responses to pain (Mancini, Betti, Panasiti, Pavone, & Aglioti, 2014).  
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10. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Vitae summae brevis spem nos vetat incohare longam 
 (Life’s short span forbids our embracing far-reaching hopes). 
     - Horace , Odes (23BC) 	  	  
This dissertation has examined a hypothesis that unhealthy behaviour, such as 
tobacco smoking, alcohol abuse or poor dietary choice, can be explained by a 
tendency to discount future health or illness. The work has also addressed theoretical 
overlap between temporal and social discounting of pain, with the additional 
hypothesis that these might be correlated across individuals as part of a ‘patient-
altruistic phenotype’. Chapters 2 and 3 described systematic reviews of studies 
measuring temporal discounting for hypothetical health outcomes, and studies 
comparing measured temporal discounting with health behaviour respectively. 
Chapter 4 critically appraised a hypothesis that hyperbolic discounting is responsible 
for a tendency for people to state that they have healthy intentions whilst continuing 
to perform unhealthy actions. Chapter 5 described general experiment methods used 
in subsequent chapters, including how Bayesian methods can be used to evaluate 
alternative behavioural models. Chapters 6 and 7 examined the phenomenon of 
‘negative temporal discounting’ for pain and illness, characterizing this in terms of 
anticipatory utility. Finally, Chapters 8 and 9 explored choices regarding others’ 
health, and responses to health inequality respectively, both conceptualised in terms 
of ‘social discounting’. 
The work supports the conclusion that temporal discounting measured for 
appetitive commodities, such as food and money, is a viable behavioural correlate of 
unhealthy choice (Chapter 3). This conclusion can be drawn without specifying the 
underlying psychological processes linking measured discounting with unhealthy 
choice. The preference reversals predicted by hyperbolic discounting purport to offer 
an explanation for the fact that people report healthy intentions which they fail to 
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carry out. However, the data reviewed here reject too strict an algorithmic 
interpretation of discounting, and theoretical considerations suggest that self-control 
failures are attributable to the effects of changes in environmental or motivational 
states (for example moving from satiety to hunger bringing about a lapse in one’s diet 
plan, or entering a bar causing one to drink alcohol during a period of planned 
abstinence), rather than to hyperbolic discounting (Chapter 4).  
The studies reviewed in Chapters 2 and 3 suggest that discounting for health-
related outcomes is a separate construct from that of appetitive rewards, and may 
require further characterisation before being used as a predictor. The models of dread-
discounting for pain and illness tested in Chapters 6 and 7 suggest a promising basis 
from which to describe individual differences in time preference for aversive health-
related outcomes, which might in future studies be capable of accounting for further 
variance in behaviour, in particular that with an aversive component. However, that 
these functions explained only a small proportion of the variance in experimental 
health budgeting choices (Chapter 7) suggests that a still richer set of data than that 
provided by conventional intertemporal choice tasks might be necessary to predict 
real-world behaviour.  
Finally, Chapters 8 and 9 find that models of social discounting that are 
formally similar to their temporal counterparts are capable of explained decisions 
regarding pain in others. However the findings of Chapter 8 find no support for a 
hypothesis that social and temporal preferences for pain are related, distinct from 
existing findings with rewarding outcomes. These (and further) conclusions are 
discussed in more detail below.  
 
10.1 DELAY DISCOUNTING AS A VIABLE BEHAVIOURAL MARKER OF 
UNHEALTHY CHOICE 
 
The systematic review presented in Chapter 3 revealed evidence for both state 
and trait-based influences on discounting of future reward. For example, discounting 
is higher in states of craving for drugs of abuse (e.g. Giordano et al., 2002; S. H. 
Mitchell, 2004; Yi & Landes, 2012), indicative of state-dependence, however 
discount rates for appetitive commodities, such as food and money, are stable over 
time (Odum, 2011), are correlated across different kinds of reward (Odum, 2011) and 
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show robust relationships with many forms of unhealthy behaviour, supporting the 
notion of discounting as a trait marker of short-sighted choice. Furthermore, measured 
discounting for money is able to prospectively predict relevant real-world behaviour, 
For example in a longitudinal study of 947 adolescents, Audrain-McGovern et al. 
(2009) found that a single standard deviation increase in baseline discounting 
increased the odds of subsequent smoking uptake by 11% (OR = 1.11, 95% CI = 1.03, 
1.23). These findings suggest that monetary discounting could be measured in young 
adolescents to determine their risk of engaging in smoking in later adolescence. 
Higher discounting adolescents might then be offered targeted preventive 
interventions. Monetary discounting measured amongst current smokers also predicts 
rates of relapse following smoking cessation programmes (Brown & Adams, 2013; 
Krishnan-Sarin et al., 2007; MacKillop & Kahler, 2009; Sheffer et al., 2012; Yoon et 
al., 2007). These findings similarly suggest that discounting could be measured 
amongst smokers wishing to quit, with more intensive support or longer follow-up 
being offered to the highest discounters. A similar approach might be taken for other 
addictive behaviours, such as alcohol abuse.  
Discounting for monetary reward has the advantage of being easy to measure. 
The much-cited monetary choice questionnaire (MCQ) as introduced by Kirby et al 
(1999) consists of only 27 choice options and uses hypothetical monetary amounts. 
Also, several studies, have convincingly demonstrated that the results of discounting 
questionnaires with hypothetical outcomes are not systematically different from those 
obtained when money is paid out for real (Johnson et al., 2002; Madden et al. 2003; 
Madden et al., 2004; Lagerio & Madden, 2005). Taken together, discounting forms a 
promising behavioural marker of unhealthy choice, and warrants further investigation 
to test whether offering additional interventions to the highest discounters is a cost-
effective strategy.  
10.2 ENVIRONMENTAL INFLUENCES ON DISCOUNTING 	  
A potential limitation to the usefulness of discounting as a marker of 
unhealthy behaviour is that high discounting is correlated with socioeconomic 
variables, which are in turn correlated with health behaviour. Controlling for these 
variables then inevitably reduces the additional predictive power of discounting. For 
example Bradford (2010), report associations between discounting and health 
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behaviour in 978 adults. Associations between discounting and health behaviour are 
striking, for example, the highest discounting women are 15.3% less likely to have 
attended for mammography (p=0.003). However, when participants’ access to health 
insurance was entered as an additional predictor, the effects were substantially smaller 
(although many of the associations between discounting and health behaviour did 
remain significant). Access to health insurance was assumed to influence the 
availability of preventive health procedures such as cancer screening, and to be 
associated with higher discounting via an association between discounting and lower 
socioeconomic status. In support of the latter, participants who had less than a high 
school level of education had mean discount rates of 4.1% lower than those educated 
to college level or above (p=0.011). Also, participants who reported needing to access 
their savings within a few months of the experiment had imputed annual discount 
rates 8.1% higher (p<0.001) than those who did not expect to access their savings 
within the next decade. 
A unifying view considers measured discounting as a summary of an 
individual’s beliefs regarding the future. (I use the term ‘beliefs’ here to refer to 
probabilistic predictions, updated in the light of evidence, e.g. Mathys, Daunizeau, 
Friston, & Stephan, 2011. Referring to these predictions as ‘beliefs’ rather than 
‘preferences’ emphasises that they are both probabilistic and malleable). These 
beliefs, which putatively lie upstream of measured discounting, would be expected to 
be influenced by an individual’s life history (Del Giudice, 2014; Ellis et al., 2012), 
including, but not limited to, their socioeconomic position. For example, lower 
financial resources might act to increase discounting through the greater opportunity 
cost of delaying money (e.g. Bradford, 2010). Notably, there may also be a 
bidirectional relationship between low socioeconomic status and discounting, 
whereby impatience for rewards leads to maladaptive choices such as substance 
misuse, which in turn are associated with worsening finances and further increases in 
discounting (e.g. S. Fields et al., 2009; Leitão, Guedes, Yamamoto, & Lopes, 2013). 
In this sense, discounting can be seen as psychological variable mediating the 
relationship between low socioeconomic status and unhealthy life choices such as 
substance misuse.  
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A further potential link between an individual’s life experiences and their level 
of discounting concerns the level of uncertainty they hold regarding future rewards. 
The utility of future rewards might be more uncertain than immediate rewards, in the 
sense of having higher variance (when the variance is known the resulting uncertainty 
is referred to as risk). If future events tend to evolve with a random component, the 
uncertainty associated with future events increases with delay (Mathys, Daunizeau, 
Friston, & Stephan, 2011).  To take an example, a decision-maker responding to a 
discounting questionnaire might have some degree of uncertainty about the subjective 
utility of a $20 payout received immediately (if this appears implausible, imagine 
being paid in a foreign currency, whose worth is uncertain). However, owing to 
volatility governing future events in their lives (e.g. becoming ill, falling into debt, 
national economic collapse), uncertainty regarding the utility of the $20 ought to 
increase as it is delayed.  In combination with risk aversion this motivates delay 
discounting. In support of this idea, individual discount rates are correlated with risk 
aversion (Anderhub, Güth, Gneezy, & Sonsino, 2001; Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, & 
Sunde, 2010; Eckel et al., 2005; Jones & Rachlin, 2009; Leigh, 1986).  
The above line of reasoning suggests that people who have experienced an 
unstable environment, in which future rewards are unreliable, ought to exhibit steeper 
discounting. In this regard an important direction for future research will be to 
examine the contribution of the childrearing environment to discounting. The study of 
self-regulation, often measured by the ability to delay gratification, in developmental 
psychology has adopted this approach; for example children who experience 
emotionally close, sensitive, and responsive caregiving have been found to exhibit 
higher levels of self-regulation (Belsky, Pasco Fearon, & Bell, 2007). Furthermore 
low childhood self-regulation has been prospectively related to poorer health 
outcomes later in life (for example Francis, 2009; Moffitt et al., 2011; Seeyave et al., 
2009). Future research into delay discounting would benefit from a similar 
developmental perspective to better understand the origins of trait-level individual 
differences.  
Recent theoretical work in the field of reinforcement learning offers principled 
approaches by which agents might update their beliefs about the changeability of the 
environment (e.g. Dayan & Daw, 2008; Mathys, Daunizeau, Friston, & Stephan, 
2011), offering a model for how such learning comes to influence intertemporal 
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choice. Such models propose that when the environment is highly changeable 
(volatile) agents ought to update their beliefs about their current state more readily in 
the light of new information (see Behrens, Woolrich, Walton, & Rushworth, 2007; 
Mathys, Daunizeau, Friston, & Stephan, 2011; R. C. Wilson, Nassar, & Gold, 2010). 
In everyday terms, changing environments demand flexibility, since past experience 
rapidly becomes outdated. This can be formalised as an increased learning rate in 
more unstable settings. These models can be inverted to derive an estimate for an 
individual’s belief about the volatility of the environment based on their learning. 
Given an estimate of the individual’s level of risk aversion, such estimates of 
environmental uncertainty ought to be reflected in delay discounting choices made 
within that particular environment.  
At present I am setting up a study to investigate the above hypothesis, using a 
paradigm which requires participants to imagine that they are selling items on eBay 
(on online marketplace). Participants are first required to track the price of two 
different items, which they sell on subsequent ‘weeks’. For one of the items the price 
they obtain is stable, for another the price is changeable. More specifically the 
changeable price evolves according to a Gaussian random walk, such that the 
participant’s uncertainty about the future price ought to increase linearly the further 
ahead they are required to predict (Mathys, Daunizeau, Friston, & Stephan, 2011). 
Having experienced the degree of volatility in the price, the participant is asked to 
state a confidence interval for the price they might obtain at varying times in the 
future. Finally, they are asked to choose when they would like to sell the item: either 
immediately or at some future delay (where the future price may be uncertain). By 
titrating the magnitude of the immediate selling price, we obtain an estimate of 
participants’ discount rates for the different items. The stable-priced item forms a 
baseline estimate of discounting, while discounting for the volatile-priced item 
incorporates additional time-dependent risk. We also obtain independent estimates of 
each participants’ degree of risk aversion, and their uncertainty regarding the future 
price derived from fitting a learning model.  
We hope thereby to test the hypothesis that participants’ level of discounting 
is sensitive to their perceived instability of the price for the items, providing a model 
for how unstable environments might come to be associated with steeper discounting. 
We also plan to gather data regarding participants’ level of uncertainty pertaining to 
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future events in their own lives, for example their health, wealth and income, with the 
simple hypothesis that people who experience greater uncertainty over their future 
resources will discount the future more steeply. Notably this approach, of combining 
self-reported data with choice-based measures, bridges the social-cognitive methods 
discussed in the introduction to this work, and the choice-based methods which have 
formed the focus of this thesis.  
 
10.2 FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR STUDYING SELF-CONTROL IN HEALTH 
CHOICE 
 
Many people who report healthy intentions subsequently fail to carry out their 
intended healthy actions, a fact that has limited the power of previous cognitive 
models to predict health behaviour (Sheeran, 2002). The observation that temporal 
discount functions for reward are well-described by a hyperbolic function (Green et 
al., 1994; Kirby & Herrnstein, 1995; Mazur, 1987), and that this hyperbolic function 
predicts a tendency to renege on one’s best-laid plans (Strotz et al., 1957), has led to 
the idea that hyperbolic discounting, interpreted algorithmically, can explain the 
lapses of will which putatively underlie the above intention-action discrepancy 
(Ainslie, 1992; Ainslie, 1975, 2001).  
However, as reviewed in Chapter 4, evidence that hyperbolic discounting is 
responsible, in an algorithmic sense, for self-control failures is mixed. In Chapter 4 I 
proposed, following on from previous theoretical accounts, that self-control failures 
frequently coincide with changes in environmental or motivational states, and that 
these state changes boost the value of actions leading to immediate reward, producing 
behaviour incongruent with long-term goals. For example, an environment previously 
associated with rewarding drug-taking behaviour can lead to drug taking even after 
prolonged abstinence.  This was conceptualised in terms of the interaction between 
two systems of reinforcement learning, model-free and model-based (for a review see 
R. J. Dolan & Dayan, 2013). The former corresponds to habit learning and assigns 
(cached) values to actions in particular cues or contexts without explicitly 
representing the consequences, while the latter corresponds to goal-directed planning 
of actions within a cognitive map of the world. I proposed that the values stored by 
the model-free system might tend to be inaccessible to the model-based system. In 
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other words the effects of cues on one’s behaviour might be difficult to forecast, 
generating qualitatively similar ‘battles of will’ as described by Ainslie (Ainslie, 
1992; Ainslie, 2001).  
10.2.1 ‘MODEL-BASED’ AND ‘MODEL-FREE’ INTERACTIONS AS NOVEL BEHAVIOURAL 
PREDICTORS 	  
The account above suggests that measures of the relative contributions to 
behaviour of model-based and model-free valuations might provide novel behavioural 
markers to supplement measures of discounting. One approach to measuring the 
interaction between model-based and model-free decision-making is to directly 
observe the acquisition of habitual behaviour through repeated training on a given 
laboratory task. Here, the rate of acquisition of habitual responding may offer a novel 
measure for predicting field behaviour. For example, outcome-insensitive habits have 
been demonstrated in humans (Tricomi, Balleine, & O’Doherty, 2009), providing a 
behavioural counterpart to studies of habit formation, which measure subjective 
automaticity (Lally, Van Jaarsveld, Potts, & Wardle, 2010). The speed with with 
responding becomes insensitive to outcome-devaluation might form an individual 
difference measure capable of predicting real-world habitual behaviour.  Also, an 
important aim for future studies will be to examine habitual or cue-triggered 
preference reversals in real-time. Along these lines, subjective measures of habitual 
automaticity in relation to smoking behaviour have been shown to predict goal-
incongruent smoking-related responses (Orbell & Verplanken, 2010, 2014).  
However, observing habit learning directly is time-consuming. Recent human 
studies (Daw et al., 2011; Daw et al., 2005; Eppinger, Walter, Heekeren, & Li, 2013; 
Gläscher et al., 2010; Smittenaar et al., 2013) have used a paradigm with a 
probabilistic tree structure which separates model-free and model-based control, 
before habitisation has taken place, depending on whether respondents incorporate the 
transition structure of the task into their learning (model-based) or learn solely based 
on the reinforcement obtained in each discrete state (model-free). Humans performing 
this task generally exhibit some combination of the two modes of control, and the 
relative contribution of the two strategies may provide a novel behavioural marker. 
Further studies are required to establish the longitudinal stability of these measures, 
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and whether they have a trait component, as well as to examine their relationship with 
habitual behaviour in the field. 
 
10.2.2 RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ‘MODEL-BASED’ CONTROL AND DISCOUNTING  
 
Mentally simulating future outcomes decreases measured discount rates (J. 
Peters & Büchel, 2010) and lesioning neural structures on which this simulation 
process depends, such as the hippocampus (Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, & Maguire, 
2007; A. Johnson, van der Meer, & Redish, 2007; Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2008; 
Schacter & Schacter, 2008) increases discounting (Mariano et al., 2009). Furthermore, 
existing studies suggest that the choice of delayed rewards, model-based control and 
working memory engage overlapping neural substrates: neuroimaging studies have 
found that the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) is activated in both model-based 
learning (Gläscher et al., 2010), and in choosing delayed rewards on intertemporal 
choice paradigms (McClure et al., 2004, 2007), while disrupting this area (using 
either transcranial magnetic stimulation or transcranial direct current stimulation) both 
decreases model-based behaviour (Smittenaar et al., 2013) and increases temporal 
discounting (Hecht, Walsh, & Lavidor, 2013). Taken together these results suggest 
that a network subserving mental simulation of the future provides a basis for model-
based control and that the engagement of this system tends to generate more patient 
intertemporal choices.  
A key question for future work is how an increased emphasis on model-based 
control might mediate reduced discounting. A plausible possibility is that mentally 
simulating the future resolves uncertainty about the utility of larger-later rewards (e.g. 
Daw et al., 2005). In this regard, an interesting possibility is that environmental 
conditions might be expected to interact with the deployment of future thinking in a 
cost-benefit trade-off. For example, if conditions are sufficiently unpredictable, then 
attempting to explicitly plan out future possibilities is futile, and may even be 
disadvantageous, given that thinking ahead is computationally (i.e. energetically) 
costly (see Daw et al., 2005). A corollary of this reasoning is that prolonged exposure 
to an unstable environmental ought to discourage the use of model-based strategies. 
This possibility would conceptually bind together an unstable childhood environment, 
diminished cognitive ability and steeper discounting of reward, providing a tentative 
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theoretical basis for explaining the association between these factors in several 
psychiatric disorders. For example, people with borderline personality disorder are 
likely to have experienced childhood abuse (Lewis & Christopher, 1989; Ogata et al., 
1990; Zanarini, Williams, Lewis, & Reich, 1997), exhibit below average cognitive 
function (Swirsky‐Sacchetti et al., 1993) and discount the future more steeply than 
healthy controls (Lawrence et al., 2010).   
10.2.3 PRE-COMMITMENT, WILLPOWER AND SOPHISTICATION 
 
The account of self-control presented in Chapter 4 considers a naïve decision 
maker, who cannot forecast the effects of state-changes on their behaviour. However 
people often demonstrate that they can predict their future tendencies, termed 
sophistication. For example, people sometimes choose paths that remove their 
opportunity to make myopic choices, an activity referred to as pre-commitment 
(Ariely & Wertenbroch, 2002; Crockett et al., 2013; Kurth-Nelson & Redish, 2010, 
2012): a person attempting to abstain from smoking might for instance throw away 
their cigarette packets. Pre-commitment devices would be expected to obscure real-
world relationships between discount rates and myopic behaviour, since at least a 
subset of sophisticated steep discounters would exhibit far–sighted real–world 
choices. 
In addition to physical pre-commitment, sophisticates can also employ more 
subtle mental devices to constrain their future choices (Ainslie, 2001; Prelec & 
Bodner, 2003), by forming a self-fulfilling prediction about their future behaviour, 
termed an intention (Gollwitzer, 1993) or a resolution (Ainslie, 2001). Gollwitzer 
(1993) suggests a particular form of commitment device called as ‘implementation 
intention’, which involves specifying an “if-then” plan as to when, where and how the 
goal-directed behaviour will be enacted: 
 
The purpose of an implementation intention is to lay down a specific plan that helps 
to promote the initiation and efficient execution of goal-directed activity (Gollwitzer, 
1993).p152. 
 
Forming these ‘if-then’ plans is assumed to cede action control to situational cues, 
preventing people from being derailed from their goals by contextual factors 
	   257	  
(Gollwitzer, 1993). Viewed in terms of the model-free and model-based interactions 
discussed above, an implementation intention can be envisaged as pre-assigning goal 
value to executing a particular action in response to a cue. There is good evidence that 
coaching people to form implementation intentions fosters successful behaviour 
change, across a number of settings not restricted to health (Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 
2006; Sheeran et al., 2009).  
Interestingly, as Ainslie (Ainslie, 1975, 1992, 2001) and Prelec (Bodner & 
Prelec, 2003; Prelec & Bodner, 2003) have both discussed, the success of intentions 
also lies in the belief that they will be consistently carried out (corresponding to the 
concept of self-efficacy; Bandura, 1977). Should a person fail to execute their 
intended action this is likely to undermine their belief in their ability to do so in the 
future. In this manner, the entire value of the ultimate goal (for example losing 
weight, and living longer) can come to be staked on successfully executing the 
intended actions on only very few occasions (for example abstaining from biscuits 
today) (Prelec & Bodner, 2003). For example, eating a single biscuit has a 
vanishingly small effect on one’s future weight gain and/or longevity. If each choice 
of whether or not to consume an extra biscuit is taken in isolation, the enjoyment of 
consumption might outweigh the miniscule (and temporally distant) cost, especially if 
one believes one will abstain from biscuits next time. By contrast, if consuming 
biscuits on this occasion is taken as signal that one is likely to do so in future, then 
each individual choice gains greater leverage. In the limit, giving in to temptation this 
time might be taken to indicate that one will never succeed in resisting, and so by 
proxy acquires the value of consuming on a whole series of future occasions (e.g. 
eating a packet of biscuits every day for the next few months), making the health 
consequences more significant, and well-placed to outweigh the enjoyment of a single 
instance of consumption. Studying self-signalling and cognitive precomitment 
experimentally is challenging, but worthy of further study. Furthermore novel 
interventions might be developed that seek to promote self-signalling processes so as 
to encourage healthier choice, or adherence to existing behaviour change regimes.  
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10.3 DREAD AND AVOIDANCE BEHAVIOUR 
 
The work presented in Chapter 6 represents the first attempt to fit alternative 
dread-discounting functions to choices of delayed pain, and so to quantitatively 
describe intertemporal preference functions for pain. A goal for future work will be to 
examine whether dread is capable of predicting avoidance of preventive health 
behaviours, or indeed other unpleasant tasks. To achieve this, hypothetical questions 
designed to assess dread, such as the choices between alternative dental appointments 
offered in Experiment 1B, could be administered to a large sample of participants 
being offered a preventive procedure, such as a cancer screening appointment. 
Regression analysis could then be used to identify relationships between uptake of 
screening and parameters derived from a dread-discounting model. The pronounced 
individual differences in behaviour seen on such paradigms in this thesis suggest that 
dread-discounting offers a rich source of individual variability. However any such 
relationships with real-world behaviour remain to be tested. Further work is also 
required to establish the test-retest reliability of estimated dread, and whether dread is 
correlated for different forms of unpleasant outcome, in other words whether dread 
has features of a trait marker. 
 
10.3.1 AVOIDABLE PAIN 	  
A paradox exists with respect to the relationship between dread and 
avoidance. On the one hand dread increases the aversiveness of future pain, which 
ought to motivate avoidance; on the other hand if the pain is in fact unavoidable then 
dread motivates speeding up the onset of pain. It is therefore unclear on a priori 
grounds whether higher dread would predict greater avoidance of unpleasant 
preventive behaviours, or a tendency to get them over and done with. An important 
variable would appear to be whether a person believes (implicitly or explicitly) that 
the dreaded event can be avoided through delaying it.  
The notion that pain can be avoided through deferral would be expected to 
generate discounting of dread itself – since there is a possibility that future dread will 
not be encountered. In Experiment 1A, a small proportion of participants (2 out of 33) 
indeed exhibited negative time preference which reverted to positive time preference 
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at longer delays, consistent with a model in which dread is itself prospectively 
discounted. The key prediction here is that the negative value function for pain has a 
maximum at an intermediate time point, as opposed to increasing or decreasing 
steadily across time (Loewenstein, 1987). Such maxima predict that people will be 
most motivated to avoid the dreaded event at the point of maximal aversion, when the 
event is ‘looming’ in the not-too-distant future (See Figure 10.1).  
Discounting of dread itself could be studied by eliciting time preferences for 
pain where delaying pain carries the possibility of avoiding the pain. A particularly 
interesting approach would be to do so in real-time. This could be implemented in the 
laboratory, by giving participants the opportunity to pay to avoid a pain which is 
approaching in time, where there is also a fixed probability per unit time that the pain 
will simply go away of its own accord. However such a laboratory paradigm could be 
implemented alongside a study over more naturalistic time scales, of days to weeks. 
For example a candidate task would ask participants on successive days how much 
they would be willing to pay to avoid having to perform an unpleasant task (such as 
drinking an unpleasant drink, performing strenuous physical activity or doing a 
tedious number-counting task) at the end of the week, where they is also a fixed 
probability for each day that passes they will be ‘let off the hook’ without having to 
perform the task.  
In such scenarios, where future pain is potentially avoidable, an hypothesis is 
that greater discounting of dread (implying a greater belief in the avoidability of pain) 
would be expected to be associated with real-world avoidant behaviour. This could be 
tested by implementing the ‘avoidable pain’ paradigm suggested above in a cohort of 
participants invited for an unpleasant screening procedure, and examining whether the 
parameter indexing discounting of dread predicts failure to engage with screening. A 
further interesting possibility relates to the hedonic impact of future unpleasant 
events. Discounted dread predicts that future events ought to have maximal negative 
effects on wellbeing when they are looming in the ‘intermediate’ future. This 
prediction could be tested by an experience-sampling method, asking participants to 
rate their hedonic state as a dreaded event approaches in time.       
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Figure 10.1 Discounted dread and avoidance. Discounting of dread predicts that as pain 
draws nearer, there is a point of maximal aversion, where dread can be alleviated by either 
pushing the pain further into the future (thus reducing its probability of actually happening) or 
advancing the pain to ‘get it out of the way’. Due to negative time preference, at the point of 
maximal aversion people would be expected to pay more than the immediate cost of the pain 
itself in order to avoid it. To illustrate this here the present value (vertical axis, note negative 
scale) of a dreaded event under a Discounted Exponential Dread function is plotted as a 
function of the decision maker’s position in time (curved line), by comparison to a fixed cost 
alternative (horizontal line). Say for example that on Monday David agrees to go for a run 
with a friend on the coming Saturday, which he is dreading due to lack of fitness. David could 
call the friend to cancel, but this would be embarrassing, indicated by the fixed cost 
(horizontal line). Early in the week, when the run is still distant, the cost of cancelling appears 
to outweigh the pain of running. However as Saturday approaches, the dread of running 
looms larger than the cost of cancelling (shaded area) and David might be tempted to cancel; 
here the point of maximal dread is on Friday. By contrast, if the run were arranged on the 
same day, the total dread would be relatively lower, and the embarrassment of cancelling 
would still tend to outweigh the prospect of running.   
 
 
10.3.2 WHAT DOES DREAD REPRESENT? 
 
 The models of dread introduced in Chapter 5 of this thesis assume that the 
instantaneous anticipation of pain increases as pain is approach in time, and that when 
choosing the timing of pain, people take account of a prospective sum of this 
anticipation. Whilst this model appears to account well for the observed choice data, it 
is in some respects unrealistic.  
Firstly, for real-life events, anticipated over a time scale of days or weeks for 
example, the build-up of instantaneous anticipation is not likely to be a smooth 
	   261	  
function of time. By contrast, one might experience spikes of anticipation when 
reminded of the upcoming event. For example if, due to a fear of flying, I am 
dreading taking a plane to travel abroad for my summer holiday, my fear is likely to 
peak in response to stimuli associated with flying, such as when checking in for the 
flight online. Nevertheless, it appears sensible to conclude that these ‘reminder’ 
events become more frequent as the dreaded event approaches, such that an 
increasing-anticipation-by-time function is not implausible.  
Secondly, it appears unlikely that, when choosing the timing of pain, people 
explicitly think ahead over their future anticipation. It seems more likely that, through 
experience, people come to learn that deferring unpleasant events is associated with 
unpleasant anticipation, through which they form a useful heuristic to ‘get the dreaded 
event over and done with’. Nevertheless, people who find anticipating future events 
more aversive would be expected to incorporate this heuristic to a greater extent.  
Exactly why the anticipation of pain (rather than pain itself) should be 
something to avoid is unclear. For short-term instances of anticipated physical pain, it 
seems reasonable to assume that the expectation of pain is intrinsically unpleasant, in 
other words that organisms are innately programmed with a desire to ameliorate 
sensations associated with the prediction of pain. In most ecological settings in our 
evolutionary history this would be achieved by escaping the potentially noxious 
situation altogether, and would therefore be a protective response. However, as 
humans we are faced with peculiar scenarios in which the anticipation of inevitable 
pain can be best minimised by simply facing the pain as soon as possible, rather than 
attempting to avoid it.  
From a normative perspective, the cost of pain, and its anticipation, can be 
seen to derive from its effect to interfere with cognition and behaviour. The 
psychiatrist and behavioural economist George Ainslie proposes this idea in his work 
‘Breakdown of Will’ (Ainslie, 2001). Ainslie suggests that pain represents a highly 
salient stimulus, which consumes cognitive resources, exerting its effect through the 
opportunity cost of being unable to pursue other rewarding thoughts and activities 
(Ainslie, 2001). Further work on dread might seek to establish whether the 
anticipation of pain indeed interferes with ongoing reward-seeking behaviour, and 
whether participants who are more sensitive to such interfering effects are more likely 
to choose to ‘get pain out of the way’. This could be tested by having participants 
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perform an incidental reward-seeking task concurrent with the anticipation of pain 
and subsequently making choices betweeen the same painful outcomes at varying 
delays.  
A further possibility, raised in Chapter 8 of this thesis, is that the desire to 
‘have things sooner’ is independent of the nature of the outcome. That is, a tendency 
to expedite pain might simply be a form of generic impatience, perhaps driven by a 
cognitive cost associated with keeping track of scheduled future events. The failure to 
observe significant anticipatory skin conductance responses to delayed shock in 
Experiment 3A would be consistent with this possibility. This raises an interesting 
question for future work, and would predict, somewhat paradoxically, that 
participants who exhibit greater negative discounting for punishment ought also to 
exhibit greater positive discounting of reward. This could easily be tested and is 
something I intend to address in future work.  
  
10.4 SOCIAL DISCOUNTING OF PAIN 	  
In Chapter 8 I presented the first description of social discounting for pain, 
finding that participants were in fact more averse to harming close others than to 
harming themselves, but that this tendency steeply decays with increasing social 
distance. Contrary to predictions however, social and temporal preferences for pain 
were uncorrelated across participants, suggesting that, for pain, deciding for others 
and deciding for one’s future self engage distinct processes. This finding differs from 
previous evidence that social and temporal discounting for reward are related 
constructs (Bartels & Rips, 2010; Ersner-Hershfield, Wimmer, & Knutson, 2009; 
Jones & Rachlin, 2006; Jones & Rachlin, 2009; Pronin, Olivola & Kennedy, 2008) .   
Further work might focus on establishing the relationships between social and 
temporal preferences for reward and punishment in process, for example to examine 
whether factors such as reward magnitude or gain-loss framing influence each form of 
discounting in a distinct manner. A similar approach has been taken for temporal and 
probability discounting of rewards (Green, Myerson, & Ostaszewski, 1999; 
Ostaszewski, Green, & Myerson, 1998).  
Healthcare professionals are sometimes required to cause a degree of physical 
pain or discomfort to a patient within the context of medical procedures that are in the 
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patient’s long-term best interest. Understanding how people evaluate others’ pain, and 
whether such evaluations are in any way biased is therefore of interest. In Chapter 8 I 
also examined for the first time a hypothesis that people exhibit diminished negative 
discounting when choosing pain on behalf of another person, and found support for 
this idea. Whilst people did seek to hasten the occurrence of unavoidable pain for 
others, when choosing on behalf of close friends or relatives this tendency was 
diminished relative to when choosing for themselves. An interpretation offered is that 
people are reluctant to increase the intensity of pain for close others to compensate for 
a delay. This finding suggests that the actions of caregivers might tend to 
underestimate the extent to which patients dislike waiting prior to painful experiences, 
representing a subject for applied study.  For example, this could be studied by 
interviewing caregivers and patients about their preferences for the timing of painful 
interventions, to test for the hypothesised discrepancy.  
 
10.5 SPREADING AND INEQUALITY AVERSION FOR PAIN 
 
In the experiment described in Chapter 7, involving consumption of a budget 
of pain relief, many participants chose to distribute their budget evenly across time. I 
explored through simulation and model-fitting how this behaviour can result from 
diminishing marginal utility over relief (increasing marginal disutility of pain); this 
form of utility function means that being left with less relief in any given time period 
is disproportionally costly, creating a motive to spread relief. In Chapter 9 I applied a 
theoretically equivalent principle to choices to distribute pain between individuals, 
using a modified dictator game with painful outcomes. In simple terms this model 
formalises the idea that those with more pain to begin with are seen as being in 
greatest need of reductions in pain. An interesting direction for future work will be to 
examine relationships between the temporal and social spreading phenomena, given 
their hypothesised common origin in non-linear utility. This could be tested in the 
laboratory, by eliciting preferred allocations of pain relief (or reward) across time and 
across individuals in the same participants, as well independently eliciting an 
instantaneous utility function for increasing pain relief (or reward), for example by 
measuring risk attitude (e.g. Anderson et al., 2008).  
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10.6 LIMITATIONS 	  
This thesis has championed the idea simple decision-making tasks can be 
harnassed as predictors of real-world health behaviour. An outline of the general 
paradigm is as follows: 
1. Identify a ‘problem’ behaviour, e.g. alcohol abuse 
2. Identify a decision task thought to engage psychological processes related 
to the problem behaviour 
3. Compare parameters of task performance with measures of the problem 
behaviour, e.g. correlate discount rates with number of units of alcohol 
consumed per week  
4. Test whether task performance is capable of prospectively predicting 
health behaviour or response to behaviour change interventions, e.g. 
whether alcohol dependent individuals with higher discount rates are less 
likely to sustain abstinence 
5. Trial targeting interventions towards high-risk groups, based on task 
performance, e.g. offering a contingency management programme to 
individuals with steeper discounting wishing to cut down on drinking 
 
The literature review presented in Chapter 2 examined the extent to which the above 
steps have been achieved for an existing decision parameter, the temporal discount 
rate for rewards. The conclusions of this were that steps 1 to 3 have been satisfactorily 
addressed for discounting, with several authors also having addressed step 4. The 
results, that discounting is robustly associated with addictive behaviours, and can 
prospectively predict outcomes in these areas, lend support to the general paradigm of 
using decision tasks to generate behavioural markers of maladaptive real-world 
behaviour. Further work is clearly needed to address step 5, and thereby to test 
whether the predictive power of discounting can be translated into cost effective 
interventions.  
10.6.1 FACE VALIDITY OF DECISION TASKS  
   
 The empirical work of this thesis has been concerned with generating novel 
candidate behavioural markers, relating to temporal and social discounting of pain. A 
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key issue for such tasks is the extent to which they engage decision processes that are 
also engaged in real-world health-related decisions. A potential critique is that the 
laboratory tasks are somewhat rarefied by comparison to the real world scenarios they 
attempt to emulate. For example, by contrast to real-world pain, a participant 
receiving shock stimuli in the laboratory need not fear the possibility of actual tissue 
damage. Less still ought they to fear a threat to their life. This stands in contrast to, 
for example, the dread of receiving a diagnosis of cancer. As alluded to above, for the 
case of dread, an important direction for future work will be to examine consistency 
between responses for hypothetical scenarios and real pain, and also for consistency 
in response patterns over varying timescales. For example, does a tendency to dread 
shocks in the laboratory over 30 second delays correlate with a tendency to dread 
hypothetical dental pain over an imagined delay of 6 weeks or to dread the imagined 
possibility of receiving a diagnosis of cancer? If consistent responding can be 
demonstrated across such diverse scenarios this would go a long way to allaying 
potential concerns that rarefied pain-related decision tasks in the laboratory have poor 
face validity for everyday choices.  
The problem of poor face validity might also be circumvented to some extent 
by exploiting the remarkable human capacity for imagination. For example, more 
immersive tasks might be designed in which audiovisal stimuli, or unpleasant pictures 
are used to evoke more complex sets of emotions pertaining to real-world situations, 
such as stimuli associated with cancer screening. A tension emerges here between the 
need to generate controlled tasks designed to probe basic decision-mechanisms and 
the need for face validity in predicting real-world behaviour. I would advocate that 
both kinds of task will prove necessary in the endeavour to understand and predict 
health behaviour. To be of practical use, tasks must also be capable of being 
transported outside the laboratory and into the clinic. For this purpose a computer-
based task involving sounds, pictures and text would be greatly preferable to the use 
of electric shock stimuli, for example.  
   
10.6.2 PARTICIPANTS AND SAMPLING BIASES 
 
Several of the experiments described here recruit healthy adult participants 
who have volunteered to take part in psychology experiments. In many respects such 
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samples might differ from the general population, and indeed from the population of 
people considering changing their health behaviour. A substantial proportion of these 
participants tend to be well educated, and often have a personal interest in 
psychology. A further problem is that some of these individuals take part in a large 
number of psychology experiments, and as such might be over-trained in responding 
to similar kinds of choice-based task. A limitation of the current work is that rather 
scant demographic data about participants were collected.  
Another potential issue is selection bias; since the experiments described here 
all involved painful stimulation, this would be expected to influence the composition 
of the sample – particularly anxious participants for example might have chosen not 
to take part. This is potentially problematic for drawing conclusions regarding the 
distribution of behavioural tendencies in the general population. The necessary 
requirement for informed consent makes obtaining a truly unbiased sample difficult 
for experiments involving experienced pain.  
Attempts might be made to address these limitations by developing tasks that 
can be administered online, and therefore made accessible to a much larger sample, 
covering a wider cross section of society. Researchers at the Wellcome Trust Centre 
for Neuroimaging have recently taken a similar approach, developing a smart-phone 
based platform for decision-making studies which has now been accessed by many 
thousands of users (The Great Brain Experiment, London, UK). Encouragingly, the 
results, now published, replicate the findings of several laboratory experiments 
(Brown et al., 2014; McNab et al., 2015).  
10.6.3 ON COMPUTATIONAL MODELLING 
A potential criticism of computational approaches in psychology, such that 
taken here, is that they employ an unnecessary degree of mathematical complexity in 
order to demonstrate a conclusion that might have been more simply stated. For 
example, it might be argued that the key conclusion of the experiments investigating 
dread described here is simply that most people dislike delaying inevitable pain, and 
that the models of dread investigated are little more than an elaborate curve-fitting 
exercise. My view is that this is a very salutary criticism, and especially ought to 
serve as a warning to those engaged in computational neuroscience and psychology to 
ensure that their models can be interpreted based on identifiable features of the data. 
Nevertheless, I advocate that modelling behavioural and neural data has key 
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advantages. Firstly building a model forces the experimenter to explicit about the 
assumptions underlying their theories (Farrell & Lewandowsky, 2010). Secondly, and 
in a related sense, a well-specified model serves as a rigorous hypothesis regarding 
how a system will behave in a related experimental setting (Farrell & Lewandowsky, 
2010). For example, hyperbolic discounting, predicts that an agent ought to exhibit 
inconsistent choice over time. Such hypotheses can then be subjected to empirical 
scrutiny.  
 
10.7 FIN 
 
To sum up, this dissertation has investigated how people make choices 
regarding the timing of (relief from) pain and illness, both for themselves and for 
others. The chief contributions of the work have been to appraise discounting as a 
marker of health choice, to provide empirical validation for existing theoretical 
models of anticipatory utility for pain and to provide the first direct empirical tests of 
social discounting for pain. Future work will focus on examining whether parameters 
of these models are capable of predicting real-world health-behaviour, and on probing 
the underlying mechanisms of such effects. In this final chapter I have argued 
however that researchers of intertemporal choice should not limit themselves to 
measuring discount functions, but should consider the reasons for which people might 
choose to variously defer or expedite future events, since doing so offers a means to 
link an individual’s behaviour with their life-history.  
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APPENDIX: BINARY CHOICE OPTIONS  
Table A1. Binary choice options for Experiment 1A 	  
Delay Option 1 
(Trials) 
Delay Option  2 
(Trials) 
Expected 
Number of 
Shocks Option 1 
Expected 
Number of 
Shocks Option 2 
0 4 4 3 
0 7 4 3 
0 10 4 3 
0 13 4 3 
0 16 4 3 
0 7 5 3 
0 13 5 3 
0 19 5 3 
0 25 5 3 
0 31 5 3 
0 10 6 3 
0 19 6 3 
0 28 6 3 
0 37 6 3 
0 46 6 3 
2 6 7 6 
2 9 7 6 
2 12 7 6 
2 15 7 6 
2 18 7 6 
2 9 8 6 
2 15 8 6 
2 21 8 6 
2 27 8 6 
2 33 8 6 
2 12 9 6 
2 21 9 6 
2 30 9 6 
2 39 9 6 
2 48 9 6 
5 9 10 9 
5 12 10 9 
5 15 10 9 
5 18 10 9 
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5 21 10 9 
5 12 11 9 
5 18 11 9 
5 24 11 9 
5 30 11 9 
5 36 11 9 
5 15 12 9 
5 24 12 9 
5 33 12 9 
5 42 12 9 
5 51 12 9 
0 4 3 4 
0 7 3 4 
0 10 3 4 
0 13 3 4 
0 16 3 4 
0 7 3 5 
0 13 3 5 
0 19 3 5 
0 25 3 5 
0 31 3 5 
0 10 3 6 
0 19 3 6 
0 28 3 6 
0 37 3 6 
0 46 3 6 
2 6 6 7 
2 9 6 7 
2 12 6 7 
2 15 6 7 
2 18 6 7 
2 9 6 8 
2 15 6 8 
2 21 6 8 
2 27 6 8 
2 33 6 8 
2 12 6 9 
2 21 6 9 
2 30 6 9 
2 39 6 9 
2 48 6 9 
5 9 9 10 
5 12 9 10 
5 15 9 10 
5 18 9 10 
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5 21 9 10 
5 12 9 11 
5 18 9 11 
5 24 9 11 
5 30 9 11 
5 36 9 11 
5 15 9 12 
5 24 9 12 
5 33 9 12 
5 42 9 12 
5 51 9 12 
0 4 4 4 
0 7 5 5 
0 10 6 6 
0 13 7 7 
0 16 8 8 	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Table A2. Binary choice options for Experiment 1B 
 
 
Delay to 
Earlier 
Dental 
Appointment 
 
Delay to 
Later Dental 
Appointment 
 
Severity of 
Dental Pain 
for Earlier 
Appointment 
(%) 
 
Severity of 
Dental Pain 
for Later 
Appointment 
(%) 
 
0 0 60 41 
0 0 60 19 
0 1 60 60 
0 1 60 55 
0 1 60 51 
0 1 60 46 
0 1 60 37 
0 1 60 16 
0 5 60 60 
0 5 60 55 
0 5 60 51 
0 5 60 46 
0 5 60 37 
0 5 60 16 
0 13 60 60 
0 13 60 55 
0 13 60 51 
0 13 60 46 
0 13 60 37 
0 13 60 16 
0 32 60 60 
0 32 60 55 
0 32 60 51 
0 32 60 46 
0 32 60 37 
0 32 60 16 
0 89 60 60 
0 89 60 55 
0 89 60 51 
0 89 60 46 
0 89 60 37 
0 89 60 16 
0 237 60 60 
0 237 60 55 
0 237 60 51 
0 237 60 46 
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0 237 60 37 
0 237 60 16 
0 0 41 60 
0 0 19 60 
0 1 55 60 
0 1 51 60 
0 1 46 60 
0 1 37 60 
0 1 16 60 
0 5 55 60 
0 5 51 60 
0 5 46 60 
0 5 37 60 
0 5 16 60 
0 13 55 60 
0 13 51 60 
0 13 46 60 
0 13 37 60 
0 13 16 60 
0 32 55 60 
0 32 51 60 
0 32 46 60 
0 32 37 60 
0 32 16 60 
0 89 55 60 
0 89 51 60 
0 89 46 60 
0 89 37 60 
0 89 16 60 
0 237 55 60 
0 237 51 60 
0 237 46 60 
0 237 37 60 
0 237 16 60 
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Table A3. Binary choice options for self-now-self-later and other-now-other-later 
conditions in Experiment 3A 
 
Shock 
intensity 
(VAS/10) 
Option 1 
Shock 
intensity 
(VAS/10) 
Option 2 
Delay 
(s) 
Option 
1 
Delay 
(s) 
Option 
2 
    1 5 0 2 
3 5 0 2 
5 5 0 2 
7 5 0 2 
9 5 0 2 
5 1 0 2 
5 3 0 2 
5 5 0 2 
5 7 0 2 
5 9 0 2 
1 5 0 2 
3 5 0 2 
7 5 0 2 
9 5 0 2 
5 1 0 2 
5 3 0 2 
5 7 0 2 
5 9 0 2 
1 5 0 4 
3 5 0 4 
5 5 0 4 
7 5 0 4 
9 5 0 4 
5 1 0 4 
5 3 0 4 
5 5 0 4 
5 7 0 4 
5 9 0 4 
1 5 0 4 
3 5 0 4 
7 5 0 4 
9 5 0 4 
5 1 0 4 
5 3 0 4 
5 7 0 4 
5 9 0 4 
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1 5 0 8 
3 5 0 8 
5 5 0 8 
7 5 0 8 
9 5 0 8 
5 1 0 8 
5 3 0 8 
5 5 0 8 
5 7 0 8 
5 9 0 8 
1 5 0 8 
3 5 0 8 
7 5 0 8 
9 5 0 8 
5 1 0 8 
5 3 0 8 
5 7 0 8 
5 9 0 8 
1 5 0 16 
3 5 0 16 
5 5 0 16 
7 5 0 16 
9 5 0 16 
5 1 0 16 
5 3 0 16 
5 5 0 16 
5 7 0 16 
5 9 0 16 
1 5 0 16 
3 5 0 16 
7 5 0 16 
9 5 0 16 
5 1 0 16 
5 3 0 16 
5 7 0 16 
5 9 0 16 
1 5 0 29 
3 5 0 29 
5 5 0 29 
7 5 0 29 
9 5 0 29 
5 1 0 29 
5 3 0 29 
5 5 0 29 
5 7 0 29 
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5 9 0 29 
1 5 0 29 
3 5 0 29 
7 5 0 29 
9 5 0 29 
5 1 0 29 
5 3 0 29 
5 7 0 29 
5 9 0 29 
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Table A4 Binary choice options for self-now-other-now choices in Experiment 3A. Self-
now-other-later and other-now-self-later conditions both used the 90 choices shown in Table 
A3, with the addition of the following 18 choices in which both shock options occurred 
immediately (delay =0 seconds).  
 
Option 1 
Pain 
Intensity 
(VAS/10) 
Option 2 
Pain 
Intensity 
(VAS/10) 
1 5 
3 5 
5 5 
7 5 
9 5 
5 1 
5 3 
5 5 
5 7 
5 9 
1 5 
3 5 
7 5 
9 5 
5 1 
5 3 
5 7 
5 9 
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Table A5 Binary choice options for self-now-other-now (social discounting) choices in 
Experiment 3B 
Pain 
Intensity 
Self 
(VAS/10) 
Pain 
Intensity 
Other 
(VAS/10) 
Social 
Distance 
of Other 
(/100) 
   1 5 1 
3 5 1 
5 5 1 
7 5 1 
9 5 1 
5 1 1 
5 3 1 
5 5 1 
5 7 1 
5 9 1 
1 5 1 
3 5 1 
7 5 1 
9 5 1 
5 1 1 
5 3 1 
5 7 1 
5 9 1 
1 5 5 
3 5 5 
5 5 5 
7 5 5 
9 5 5 
5 1 5 
5 3 5 
5 5 5 
5 7 5 
5 9 5 
1 5 5 
3 5 5 
7 5 5 
9 5 5 
5 1 5 
5 3 5 
5 7 5 
5 9 5 
1 5 14 
3 5 14 
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5 5 14 
7 5 14 
9 5 14 
5 1 14 
5 3 14 
5 5 14 
5 7 14 
5 9 14 
1 5 14 
3 5 14 
7 5 14 
9 5 14 
5 1 14 
5 3 14 
5 7 14 
5 9 14 
1 5 45 
3 5 45 
5 5 45 
7 5 45 
9 5 45 
5 1 45 
5 3 45 
5 5 45 
5 7 45 
5 9 45 
1 5 45 
3 5 45 
7 5 45 
9 5 45 
5 1 45 
5 3 45 
5 7 45 
5 9 45 
1 5 97 
3 5 97 
5 5 97 
7 5 97 
9 5 97 
5 1 97 
5 3 97 
5 5 97 
5 7 97 
5 9 97 
1 5 97 
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3 5 97 
7 5 97 
9 5 97 
5 1 97 
5 3 97 
5 7 97 
5 9 97 
 
 
